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Abstract 
This thesis examined whether party identity (ID), or the ideological score assigned by 
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), was a better predictor of roll-call voting on Iraq 
War legislation during the 110th Congress in 2007. Party ID and ADA scores were separately 
correlated with voting outcomes on twenty-two Senate, and twenty-six House votes on Iraq 
War bills. Though party and ideology both correlated strongly with voting outcomes in cross-
tabulation statistics, a test of significance of the difference between two nonindependent 
correlations revealed ADA scores predominated in all House votes, and nearly half of the 
Senate votes. While the results add evidence of the increasing ideological homogeneity of 
parties, the particular attitudes toward military intervention directly challenged by Iraq War 
policy, and the mixed influence of party and ideology across Senate voting, suggest that 
prospects for bipartisanship in future intervention issues would depend on the justifications 
and circumstances of the policy. 
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Chapter 1 - The Basic Question 
 Introduction 
The Iraq War has drawn attention once again to the role of Congress in war policy. 
The balance of foreign policy responsibilities allocated by the Constitution to the President 
and Congress has been debated repeatedly since President George Washington’s declaration 
of neutrality in the war between France and Britain without consulting Congress in 1793.1 
When Congress does not succeed in ending an unpopular war or meet other policy 
aspirations, it might be tempting to conclude that the division of powers is flawed; that 
Congress should have either greater or lesser prerogative in international affairs than the 
President. However, the issue of divided government is distinct from the subject of how 
Congress actually uses the substantial authority it does have to influence the conduct of war 
and foreign relations.  
The change of party majority in both chambers resulting from the 2006 mid-term 
elections opened a fierce struggle for control of Iraq War policy. The elections occurred 
during a year when spiraling sectarian violence and increasing U.S. casualty rates made the 
war the leading public concern.2 The President’s approval ratings had declined to new lows 
following the federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005; and eroded further as the 
strategy of “standing-up” Iraqi security forces while “standing-down” U.S. forces appeared 
unlikely to proceed fast enough to overtake the escalating violence. Amid diminished public 
confidence in the President’s leadership, the way seemed clear for the new Democratic 
                                                            
1 Sundquist, James L. 1981. The Decline and Resurgence of Congress.  Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution; p. 91. 
2 Results of a November 11, 2007 Pew Research Organization report show the war remained the foremost 
public policy concern of the American public through 2007; although polling started to show increases in public 
support for the surge strategy as a decline in violence became recognizable by November - see  
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/642/public‐sees‐progress‐in‐war‐effort 
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majority seated in January, 2007 to easily wrest command of war policy from an unpopular 
president.  
As this is written in the final days of the 110th Congress, the President’s Iraq policy 
remains intact; including his strategy to increase force levels from early 2007. When the plan 
to deploy over 20,000 additional troops was announced in January 2007, it was greeted with 
deep pessimism across the political spectrum (and severely strained civil-military relations 
according to recent journalistic accounts).3 Yet, funding and increased troop strength was 
sustained at or near those requested by the White House in every vote. Oversight activity and 
legislative challenges to Administration policy increased greatly after the new Congress was 
seated, but did not result in the withdrawal of U.S. troops that so many Democratic 
candidates had promised on the stump. 
The basic question is: Why did opponents of Iraq War policy in the Democratic 
majority of the 110th Congress fail to achieve a legislated end to, or even a timetable for 
ending, U.S. involvement in the war? What factors internal to Congressional decision-
making, or perhaps inherent in legislative processes generally, account for the failure of war 
opponents in the changed majority setting to limit or end the President’s authority to maintain 
troops (or at least as many troops) in Iraq? Norman Ornstein (1975) observed that: 
“Congress is the law-making and law-non-making body; it can pass ground-
breaking legislation (as it did, for example, with the Voting Rights Act of 
1964) or fail to enact new policies with equally wide ramifications (as it did 
with the Nixon Family Assistance Plan of 1969 and 1970). And it can override 
                                                            
3 Strain in relations between the White House and Joint Chiefs of Staff is reported in Woodward, Bob. 2008. 
The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006‐2008. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
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a President’s veto in order in order to make new policy (as it did with the War 
Powers Act of 1973). It can even undertake the alteration of the Constitution 
by initiating the amendment process, as it did. . . with equal rights for women. 
As Congress changes internally, the direction it takes in making policy can 
change also.” 4 
Thesis Topic 
The topic of this thesis is to examine the role of partisanship and ideology in voting 
on Iraq War legislation during the First Session of the 110th Congress in 2007. The objective 
is to determine whether party allegiance - or the ideological profile ascribed to individual 
Members - is a better predictor of Iraq War votes in both the House and Senate. In light of 
accumulating evidence of increasing partisanship over the past quarter century, this research 
will seek to measure how dramatic a role partisanship played in votes to both support and 
oppose continuation of major U.S. involvement in Iraq.  
A corollary objective is to determine how closely ideological coding corresponded to 
party-line voting on an issue as momentous as war. Unless we assume that members within 
each party held completely identical views of the war, then some variance between party 
identity and ideological coding should be discernible. Otherwise, party and ideology would 
have exactly the same influence in voting decisions. The essential task of this research is to 
test for any independent causal effects of party label and ideology in voting on the most 
controversial issue of U.S. foreign policy since the Vietnam War. Issues that challenge 
                                                            
4 Introductory remarks by Ornstein, Norman J., (Ed.) 1975. Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform. New 
York: Praeger Publishers; p. ix. 
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deeply-held values would be expected to produce measurable ideological effects in voting 
decisions that may or may not be consistent with party interests.  
The present research addresses concerns about the implications of increasing partisan 
and ideological polarization for Congressional foreign policy-making. According to 
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), a Liberal interest group that rates members of 
Congress on the proportion of their voting record that supports Liberal policy positions, the 
ideological divide between the two parties has never been further apart in almost 60 years of 
scoring than it has over the past seven years.5 This would seem to challenge attempts to 
design a valid or reliable method of distinguishing the influence of ideology from party 
identity. But the assumption must be sustained that party allegiance and ideology have not 
(yet) become completely unified. There will certainly be a close correspondence between the 
two, but statistical comparison of the way each variable correlates with specific votes should 
still reveal “light” between their respective influences at a statistically-significant level. 
Traditionally, the historical strain between idealism and realism in American outlook 
has shaped different attitudes toward international involvement that range from isolationism 
to support for engagement (internationalism). Beliefs about the use of military force are 
another important dimension of foreign policy opinion that differs on a demographic and 
regional basis across America. The way different attitudes toward international involvement 
and military power have become associated with party identity through realignment of the 
American electorate should be a key part of any analysis of Iraq War voting patterns. 
Changes in the electorate over the past thirty years have altered the distribution of foreign 
                                                            
5 Americans For Democratic Action (ADA) was founded in 1947. Its online publication ADA Today, describes 
the present ideological divide on page 5, at: www.adaction.org/media/votingrecords/2007.pdf 
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policy ideologies within each party. As conservative Southern Democrats, more generally 
populist in suspicion of formal institutions and international cooperation, and more accepting 
of a role for military force in world affairs, moved to the Republican Party in response to 
Civil Rights reforms and Liberal opposition to the Vietnam War, the parties became more 
distinctively separated by attitudes toward military intervention, nationalism, and 
participation in multilateral institutions like the United Nations.  
The Democratic Party became more associated with anti-military sentiments from the 
mid-1960s as a result of the Vietnam War. After the defeat of fascism in World War II, 
Liberals supported continued U.S. global involvement to uphold world peace and contain the 
new threat of communism. Those views shifted profoundly amid the tragic paradoxes of 
fighting the Vietnamese insurgency - changing to pacifism and anti-interventionism (perhaps 
also linked with sympathy for demands for self-determination in anti-colonial nationalism 
that peaked during that decade) which still echo in the policy preferences of the Left today.6 
A substantial number of serving members of Congress and senior Administration 
officials came of age during the Vietnam War and hold strong beliefs on both sides of that 
earlier controversy, which they now struggle to reconcile with the new complexities of 
American society and a rapidly-changing international order. Security issues appeared to 
become much less central to relations among states following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and after the first Gulf War in 1991. Diverse interpretations of post-Soviet 
international change and the role of the United States as the sole remaining superpower had 
not coalesced into convictions anywhere nearly as well-integrated or widely-shared as the 
                                                            
6 The change in liberal attitudes toward international engagement, especially by members of the Americans 
for Democratic Action (ADA), is observed by Busby, Joshua W. and Jonathan Monten. “Without Heirs? 
Assessing the Decline of Establishment Internationalism in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Perspectives on Politics, 
Volume 6, Number 3, September, 2008; pp.451‐472 (see p. 455). 
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Cold War containment strategy before the events of September 11, 2001. The wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, and the broader War on Terror (not to mention the current international 
economic crisis), have become the new crucible of American foreign policy values.  
Legislative activity during a period of severe crisis in the war offers a chance to 
evaluate Congressional decision-making when the policy and political stakes were especially 
high. The war broached a sharp ideological divide across United States domestic politics and 
world opinion from the outset; and remains a touchstone for contested beliefs about the role 
of U.S. power and the utility of military force in world affairs. Therefore, it would be 
expected that voting on the Iraq War presents a chance to validly assess the strength of party 
loyalty against deeply-held ideological values. This project is an attempt to closely examine 
the present connection between partisanship, ideology and policy outcomes in time of war; 
and perhaps draw some inferences about Congressional foreign policy-making in the future.  
The 2006 Mid-Term Elections 
The election of Democratic majorities in 2006 was more dramatic in overcoming the 
traditional advantages of incumbency that had accrued to Republicans over twelve years of 
dominance than in the impact it would have on war policy. The Democrats gained a total of 
30 seats in the House, fifteen more than necessary to cross the majority threshold; and gained 
six Senate seats, all taken from long-serving Republican incumbents, to achieve a one seat 
majority. On the whole, the Democrats gained a respectable - but not completely dominate 
(filibuster-proof in the Senate) - majority.  
Public apprehension over rising violence in Iraq, and disapproval of President Bush’s 
management of the war were the “primary source of the pro-Democratic tide in 2006”, 
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according to Gary Jacobson’s (2007) study of the elections.7 Declining public approval of the 
war closely tracked the President’s job approval rating in the months leading up to the 
elections.8 In addition, discontent with the legislative productivity of the Republican-
controlled Congress, which Democratic campaigns succeeded in associating with incidents of 
scandal involving Republican Members and lobbyists (packaged into a “culture of 
corruption” message strategy), bolstered the fortunes of Democratic candidates. In total, the 
Democrats successfully managed to “nationalize” the election into a referendum on the 
President and Congress. 
Jacobson’s study tested the relevance of three factors that, in combination, are 
generally deemed in the political science literature to predict party fortunes in midterm 
elections: the number of seats held by the President’s party; the health of the economy; and 
public views of the President’s job performance. The first two factors might have 
compensated somewhat for the President’s poor approval ratings had it not been for the depth 
of public concern for the war. In terms of number of House and Senate seats, Republicans 
hold a “structural advantage” that (since the 1964 presidential election) “derives from the fact 
that [Republican voters] are distributed more efficiently across districts and states than 
Democratic voters.”  This means that while there may be numerically-fewer Republican 
voters across the nation as a whole, more districts lean Republican (defined as a district 
majority vote for the Party’s candidate at least two percentage points above the national 
                                                            
7 Jacobson, Gary C.   “Referendum: The 2006 Midterm Congressional Elections”,  Political Science Quarterly,  
Volume 122, Number 1, 2007; pp.1‐24. 
8 ibid., Jacobson, 2007: p. 5. Jacobson cites a Lowess‐smoothed summary of 771 polls of job approval ratings 
gleaned by Gallup, CBS News/New York Times, Los Angeles Times, NBC/Wall Street Journal, ABC/Washington 
Post, Quinnipiac, Newsweek, Time, CNN, Bloomberg, Associated Press, and Pew Center for the People and 
Press poll. Measures of Iraq War support were a Lowess‐smoothed summary of 579 polls (using 40 different 
wordings) conducted by the organizations listed above, plus Fox News, Knowledge Networks, and Zogby. 
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average in the most recent Presidential election). Conversely, Democratic voters are 
concentrated in fewer (especially urban) districts. A thirty-year trend toward increasing 
partisan consistency; and successful gerrymandering by Republican-controlled legislatures in 
key larger states, had bolstered the Republican electoral advantage. Also in the preceding 
months, the economy was performing well, having rebounded from the “dot-com” bubble 
and disruptions following the 9/11 attacks earlier in the decade.  
With a correlation of 84 percent between the President’s job approval rating and 
public support for the war, Jacobson points-out that the correlation was “more tightly linked” 
than Harry Truman’s with the Korean War (60 percent) and Lyndon Johnson’s with the 
Vietnam War (64 percent consistent). As a general rule, he contends, “negative opinions of 
presidential performance tend to motivate voters more strongly than positive opinions.9 
What significantly turned the tide for Democrats was the “pessimism about the war 
and its consequences” among a considerable portion of Republicans; but more significantly, 
by independents. Unlike the elections of 2002 and 2004, when Republicans could enjoy a 
few percentage points greater loyalty in voting, “the opposite was true in 2006.” And while 
self-classified independents had given Democrats a slight advantage in 2004, “in 2006, they 
broke decisively for the Democrats.” 
The strong suggestion of a national referendum on the war, manifest by the inroads 
on Republican electoral advantages and the weight in polling evidence of public discontent 
with the progress of the war and the President’s management, make it natural to expect that 
Congress would act decisively with a confidence that only strong public urgency can provide. 
                                                            
9 ibid., Jacobson, 2007: 17. Jacobson cites Samuel Kernell, “Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An 
Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President’s Party”, in American Political 
Science Review, 71 (March 1977): 44‐46. 
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Shaping the Debate, Part I: Administration Responses to the Elections 
The President’s determination to prevail against both the Iraqi insurgency and 
domestic opposition to the war is a crucial dimension of the partisan and ideological dynamic 
that stymied efforts on Capitol Hill to end the war. Congressional actions intermingled with 
Presidential decisions and rhetoric. It is worth reviewing Administration actions leading up 
to, and following, the 2006 elections to better understand how Congressional activity and 
statements responded to the way the President and his advisors dealt with the evolution of 
events in Iraq, and the political dilemmas at home broached by those events. Executive and 
Congressional views of the war actually converged on some issues. Electoral demands for 
policy change, and consequent reversal in the balance of power in Congress - as well as 
objective conditions in Iraq - altered the calculus of Executive Branch decision-making. Post-
election military and political adjustments in Administration strategy reflected compromise 
on certain goals, but also a tenacious commitment to other, fundamental principles that 
shaped the subsequent Congressional debate. 
On February 22, 2006, the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque (also known as the 
“Golden Mosque”) of Samarra, the third most revered Shi-ah holy site, ignited fierce clashes 
between Shiite and Sunni militias.10 Battles quickly spread throughout Baghdad, a city of 
around seven million, whose stability was considered the lynchpin of Iraqi national unity.11 
                                                            
10 The al‐Askari Mosque, and adjoining Maqam Ghaybat shrine are significant for Shiite eschatological 
precepts as the mausoleum of the 10th and 11th Imams. For Twelver Shi‐as, the 12th Imam, Muhammad al‐
Mahdi, or  Hujjat ibn al‐Hasan  has been hidden, or “occulted” by God to emerge at the end of history to bring 
peace and justice to the world. The Samarra sites are usually regarded third most holy after Karbala, and 
Najaf.  Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/samarra‐mosque.htm  
11 Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, a Powerpoint slide presentation dated January, 2007, contains a 
summary of the pre‐surge situation in slide number 6; at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/       
iraq‐strategy011007.pdf  
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Newly-constituted Iraqi security units, already precariously cleft by sectarian, ethnic and 
tribal loyalties, dissolved before the militias. The number of U.S. troops that could be 
committed to Baghdad was inadequate to hold neighborhoods that had been cleared of 
warring factions.  Battles among sectional militias, along with refugee displacements, spread 
across Iraq and merged with the ongoing insurgency against the occupation, threatening to 
fragment the country into brutally- “cleansed” Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish sub-state regions.  
Well before the sectarian crisis that ultimately led to the U.S. surge strategy of 2007, 
the ongoing insurgency that became recognizable in mid-2003 was wearing the patience of 
the American public. The cultural and tactical dilemmas of combat amid the general 
population (a prime source of asymmetric strength for insurgencies), and especially the 
increasing frequency and lethality of attacks with improvised explosive devices (IED’s), 
called into question the cost in American lives and prospects for a military solution. The 
drumbeat of criticism on various issues ranging from the absence of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) used to justify the invasion; the Abu Ghraib prison scandal; allegations 
of mismanagement on the part of the Coalition Provisional Authority; to complaints from 
soldiers about the lack of armor protection against IED’s; had already placed the 
Administration on the defensive (and probably hardened the President’s resolve). But the 
escalation of communal violence on top of the insurgency greatly added to the perception 
that the war was spinning further out of Washington’s control. Whatever progress had been 
made toward legitimizing the authority of the new constitutional government following the 
first national elections on January 30th, 2005 was in dire jeopardy. 
Pressure had been building within the Republican Party to change war policy long 
before the November, 2006 elections. The ideological split within the party that predated the 
11 
 
war widened between traditional conservative realists concerned about the deterioration of 
U.S. influence and strains on military power, and neoconservatives who (still) regarded the 
war as a test of fundamental values on the international stage.12 Some Congressional 
Republicans, watching their reelection chances diminish with every passing day of rising 
turmoil, had quietly pleaded with the White House to either change management of the war – 
starting with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfield (whose brusque responses to the media, 
Congressional committees, and NATO ministers had come to symbolize the character of 
unilateralism) - or at least adopt a more conciliatory or flexible public tone toward calls for 
policy change.13  
Iraq policy was defended in stark terms by the White House; with reasons that ranged 
from promoting individual freedom and democracy in the Middle East, to the danger of Iraq 
falling into the hands of Islamic extremists. Through the 2006 campaign season, the 
President repeatedly insisted that “victory” over the insurgency could be achieved, and 
equated calls for U.S. withdrawal with “defeat.”14 He steadfastly refused to make changes in 
senior appointments; set a timetable for a draw-down of forces; publicly discuss alternative 
strategies; or acknowledge criticism of the war’s conduct prior to the elections. Whether the 
President intended to avoid the appearance of subordinating war policy to election politics; 
                                                            
12 A recent description of variation within conservative foreign policy ideology is presented by Rathbun, Brian 
C. “Does One Right Make a Realist?: Conservatism, Neoconservatism and Isolationism in the Ideology of 
American Elites”; Political Science Quarterly, Volume 123, No. 2; Summer, 2008; pp. 271‐299. The most 
notable fracture in party unity over Iraq surfaced seven months before the war with former National Security 
Advisor Brent Scowcroft’s editorial in the Wall Street Journal  on August 15, 2002 bluntly entitled “Don’t 
Attack Saddam.” 
13 Nagourney, Adam and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Bad Iraq News Worries Some in GOP on ‘06”, The New York 
Times, August 18, 2005; at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/18/politics/18repubs.html?_r=1  
14 Examples of the President’s terminology and rationale for persevering in Iraq can be found in a speech given 
at Ft. Bragg, N.C. on June 28, 2005, posted by the White House Press Office at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050628‐7.html  
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keep the enemy guessing about U.S. intentions; or even to brace Republican loyalists; his 
resolve was costly at the polls. 
The Administration’s bearing shifted immediately after the elections. The very next 
day, November 8, 2006, Secretary Rumsfield was replaced by Robert M. Gates, who had 
served as CIA Director and deputy national security advisor under George H. W. Bush.15 At 
the news conference to announce Rumsfield’s departure and Gates nomination, the President 
opened by saying: “What’s changed today is the election is over, and the Democrats won”16 
He went on to concede that “Iraq is not working well enough, or fast enough”; and further 
observed that “[the] message is clear, the American people want their leaders in Washington 
to set aside partisan differences . . .” Some of the President’s former staff later wondered 
aloud if the base of both parties would permit cooperation on war policy.17  
To the very day of the election, the President had largely succeeded in publically 
concealing personal doubts about the course of the war. The surprise change in Pentagon 
leadership required forethought, changed beliefs, the ascendance of advisors advocating 
change; and recruitment of a replacement who could win Congressional confirmation - which 
strongly suggests that holding a resolute line through November 7th was at least partially 
calculated for election considerations.  
The more idealistic goals of Administration war policy were apparently on their way 
out at least a year before the election. As early as August, 2005, Robin Wright of the 
                                                            
15 Fletcher, Michael A. and Peter Baker. “Bush Ousts Embattled Rumsfield: Democrats Near Control of Senate: 
Ex‐CIA Chief Robert Gates Nominated to Lead Pentagon”. Washington  Post, Thursday, November 9, 2006,  
p. A01 
16 ibid., Fletcher and Baker, “Bush Ousts Embattled Rumsfield”, Washington Post, November 9, 2006. 
17 ibid, Fletcher and Baker. 2006. Former Press Secretary Ari Fleischer is quoted as saying of President Bush: “If 
that means he’ll compromise, he’ll do so. The question is, will the Republican base let him? Will the 
Democratic base let [House Speaker] Nancy Pelosi and [Senate Majority Leader] Harry Reid compromise? 
13 
 
Washington Post quoted unnamed U.S. officials “in Washington and Baghdad” as saying the 
Bush Administration “is significantly lowering expectations of what can be achieved in Iraq. 
. . [and] no longer expects to see a model new democracy, a self-supporting oil industry or a 
society in which the majority of people are free from serious security or economic 
challenges.”18 In the same story, another “senior official involved in policy since the 2003 
invasion” is quoted as saying “[w]e are in the process of absorbing the factors of the situation 
we’re in and shedding the unreality that dominated at the beginning.” By 2006, according to 
Ivo H. Daalder and I. M. Destler, President Bush realized that the war effort was faltering 
and agreed to the counsel of his new National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, to review 
policy assumptions and meet with analysts offering alternative strategies.19 
The presence of Robert Gates in the Cabinet was a more substantive indication that 
policy was about to change, as he was known to favor reducing the U.S. commitment in 
Iraq.20 At the time of his appoint as Defense Secretary, Gates was serving on a panel of 
former senior government officials advising the bipartisan Iraq Study Group (ISG), co-
chaired by former Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, and former House Foreign Affairs 
(now International Relations) Committee Chairman Lee H. Hamilton. The ISG had formed 
independently to assess the deteriorating security, political, economic, and international 
implications of the situation in Iraq. Its report, released at headline-making White House and 
Capitol Hill presentations December 6, 2006 (a month after the elections), was a 
                                                            
18 Wright, Robin and Ellen Knickmeyer, “U.S. Lowers Sights On What Can Be Achieved in Iraq”, Washington 
Post, Sunday, August 14, 2005; p. A01. 
19 Daalder, Ivo H. and I. M. Destler, “In the Shadow of the Oval Office”, Foreign Affairs, Volume 88, Number 1, 
January/February 2009; p. 126. 
20 Broder, Jonathan, “Reality Check”, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, September 10, 2007; p. 2613. 
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compendium of elite and expert opinion on the war up to that time from across the 
ideological spectrum.21  
Judging by the number of times it is stated throughout the report, a solid consensus 
had formed among the principal members of the ISG that the insurgency could not be 
defeated by military means alone; and that stability would depend on political reconciliation 
among the various factions in the central government.22 Three recommendations in particular 
(among a total of 79 offered) differentiated ISG views from Administration positions: 
reorientation of the U.S. military mission to training and advising Iraqi security forces, and 
special operations against al Qaeda affiliates; creating a modicum of security in a few 
locations (major cities, government zones, critical infrastructure, and supply routes) rather 
than defeating the insurgency in detail throughout the country; and a proposal that Iran and 
Syria be included in a regional effort to mediate Iraq’s internal divisions. Generally, the 
group placed special emphasis on speeding-up the process of training and advising Iraqi 
forces, and hastening development of other government capacities. Many of the 
recommendations were for managerial or organizational changes. The President’s acceptance 
of the report was cordial; but reserved in stating he would wait for pending reports from the 
Pentagon, State Department and National Security Council in order to select from “all 
options” available23 
                                                            
21 The Iraq Study Group report is posted at the website of the U.S. Institute for Peace (which sponsored the 
Study Group); at http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html  
22 The absence of a military solution and need for political reconciliation is asserted throughout the ISG report; 
and listed as the first premise in the opening of the section listing military‐security recommendations on  
page 49. 
23 Northam, Jackie, “Iraq Study Group: U.S. Policy 'Not Working’”, National Public Radio broadcast, December 
6, 2006; at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6591608.  
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Democratic leaders lauded the report as affirming the need for change in 
Administration policy.24 Key Republican lawmakers made receptive remarks, but tended to 
dismiss the inclusion of Syria and Iran in any regional approach. For many conservatives, the 
report’s overall vision of shifting away from direct combat to an advisory effort and 
strengthening the Iraqi government did not necessarily contradict the President’s long-term 
objectives - as long as it didn’t ratify a quick withdrawal that further destabilized the country, 
or be interpreted as defeat by the insurgency.25 Select parts of ISG report would become a 
touchstone for both parties in the Congressional debate over the following year; and the 
language of certain recommendations, especially in regard to reducing the military mission to 
training and special operations, would be written into legislative attempts to end U.S. 
involvement.26 In most proposals calling for withdrawal, or the setting of deadlines for 
withdrawal of troops, qualifying language was always included that permitted retention of 
troop levels for force protection or security of diplomatic and private contractor facilities and 
personnel. Opponents of the war did not want to be blamed for legislating inadequate safety 
for troops. 
During the rest of the month of December, 2006 the Administration intensified its 
review of alternative strategies. Apart from the pending cabinet reports, the President held 
consultations with the military services and retired officers, members of the intelligence 
                                                            
24 Both Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress are quoted at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=6587217  
25 Phillips, James, and James Jay Carafano, “The Iraq Study Group Report: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”, 
Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1278 , December 6, 2006 at: http://www.heritage.org/research/iraq/ 
wm1278.cfm  
26 An example of legislation that reflected the overall compromise position of the Iraq Study Group on 
continuing the Iraq military mission by reducing it to training and anti‐terror special operations is H.R. 4156,  a 
supplemental appropriations bill, that called for withdrawal of “most troops” except those deployed for “force 
protection, counterterrorism and. . . training of Iraqi forces .” 
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community, prominent historians and other experts outside government. A particularly high-
profile meeting occurred at the Pentagon on December 13th, where the President and Vice 
President Richard Cheney met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss military options.27 
Yet, despite White House efforts to demonstrate it was engaged in an orderly search for 
solutions to the crisis, uncertainty about the next course of action in Iraq hovered over the 
110th Congress as it was sworn into office on January 4, 2007 - and Iraq policy seemed all the 
more susceptible to Congressional intercession. 
Shaping the Debate, Part II: The Surge 
The surge strategy that President Bush decided upon and announced January 10, 2007 
seemed to endorse the views of those in both parties who had long-argued for a larger 
occupation force to ensure civil order once major combat operations had ceased (after the 
Iraqi Army withdrew from conventional warfare). Many regarded the size and composition 
of the post-war force as a key shortcoming in pre-war planning for the occupation, and the 
issue had become one more indictment of false optimism on the part of the Administration. 
This criticism fell mostly on Defense Secretary Rumsfield, who had placed sustained pre-war 
pressure on Central Command planners to minimize force size for the initial drive to 
Baghdad, but then did not adjust requirements for the occupation.28  
                                                            
27 Wright, Robin and Ann Scott Tyson. “Joint Chiefs Advise Change in War Strategy”. Washington Post, 
Thursday, December 14, 2006; p. A01; retrieved at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/ content/ 
article/2006/12/13/AR2006121301379.html A unnamed source for the story is reported to have said that the 
Joint Chiefs “did not favor adding significant numbers of troops to Iraq”; and had recommended to the 
President placing more emphasis on training Iraqi forces ‐ along the lines of the main Iraq Study Group 
recommendation. Gen. George W. Casey, Jr. then‐Coalition Commander in Iraq, was already pursuing the 
Administration’s “standing‐up (Iraqi forces) while standing‐down (U.S. troops) mission, and further 
recommended withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities into a few isolated bases. 
28 This is the account given by Gordon, Michael H. and General Bernard E. Trainor (Ret.). 2006. Cobra II: The 
Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Pantheon Books; Chapters 1 and 2. 
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In outline, the surge called for sending approximately 21,500 additional troops, 
equivalent to about five additional brigades, and initially retained 4,000 Marines previously 
scheduled to end their deployment in al-Anbar Province. These would reinforce the 12-15 
brigades that had served as the nominal U.S. ground force level since 2003.29 The immediate 
objective of the surge was to stabilize Baghdad, and pacify the so-called “Sunni Triangle” to 
the north and west of Baghdad that encompassed much of Anbar Province. The new 
Coalition commander, General David Petraeus, would implement an updated 
counterinsurgency doctrine he had coauthored, centered on securing and isolating the general 
population from insurgents and militias by taking-back Baghdad neighborhood tracts, and 
keeping troops in those neighborhoods to backstop Iraqi security and reconstruction efforts. 
This “clear-hold-build” approach reversed prior Joint Staff plans to withdraw most of the 
Coalition occupation force into large fortified bases to reduce casualties, and the profile of 
the occupation.30  
Iraq’s new government was expected to contribute forces that would lead clearing 
operations where possible, with embedded U.S. units and advisors providing backup if 
necessary. Furthermore, the government was to act as early as possible to make the 
compromises, decisions and agreements necessary to mitigate underlying political causes for 
the violence.  
                                                            
29 Based on estimate in 2006 prepared by O’Bryant, Joanne and Michael Waterhouse, “U.S. Forces in Iraq”, 
CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS22449, November 13, 2006, found at: http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/ 
other/RS22449.pdf . Later reports suggest that the pre‐surge peak was 15 brigades, In Tyson, Ann Scott, 
“Combat Brigade is Cut 6 Weeks Early Iraq”, The Washington Post, November 6, 2008; retrieved at: 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2008/11/05/ AR2008110504143.html .  
30 The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual 3‐24; Marine Corps 
Warfighting Publication 3‐33.5. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007.  Also: Wright and 
Scott‐Tyson, The Washington Post, December 14, 2006 regarding Joint Staff planning following the advice of 
Gen. George W. Casey to redeploy most U.S. forces into large bases. 
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An important issue for Democratic war opponents and Republican skeptics was the 
ability of Iraq’s government to reconcile internal divisions, consolidate authority, establish 
legitimacy and perform democratically. Following national elections in January, 2005, 
frustration had mounted in Washington over the slow pace of selecting a new prime minister 
in a parliament comprising religious, tribal and ethnic parties, and particularly in reaching 
agreements over the distribution of oil revenue and other funding issues that stoked sectarian 
rivalry. Many Democrats and Republicans wanted to increase leverage on Iraqi decision-
makers to seal agreements as a condition for any additional commitment of U.S. blood and 
treasure. 
Calls to leverage greater responsibility from Iraq’s government were partially heeded 
by President Bush. The announcement of the surge included mention of certain goals or 
“benchmarks” that the leadership would be expected to achieve under the umbrella of greater 
security created by the surge. In addition to oil revenue decisions, these included: 
reconstruction spending, provincial elections, reform of de-Baathification laws originally 
imposed by the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the institutionalization of an equitable 
process to amend Iraq’s constitution.31 Security, for the most part, would be the tacit fulcrum 
of political progress. However, the goals were not defined in terms of ways to measure 
specific progress or outcomes; nor were any timeframes or deadlines mentioned. In the 
absence of specifics or timelines, continued delays in meeting the goals generated increasing 
                                                            
31 A transcript of President Bush’s  January 10, 2007 speech was found during November, 2008 at: 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110‐7.html  
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frustration and criticism in Congress from members of both parties, placing the surge policy 
under greater political siege.32 
Later, an absence of confidence in the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, 
to lead parliamentary reconciliation efforts became yet another controversy in the struggle 
between the President and Congress. In this case, concerns about the intentions and ability of 
Mr. Maliki were actually shared by the White House and Congressional opponents, but had 
the political effect of challenging the wisdom of committing more troops. A memo written by 
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, and leaked to the media in November 2006, 
described a pattern of sectarian bias in the distribution of government services, dismissal of 
Sunni officials, and emergence of Shiite majorities in all government ministries.33 Mr. al-
Maliki was known to be dependent on the support of extremist-Shiite groups connected to the 
powerful Iranian-supported cleric Moutada al-Sadr, whose militias accounted for much of the 
instability in the southern provinces (which had suffered substantial defeat after attempting to 
make a stand against Coalition forces in Najaf the previous year).34 In public statements, 
President Bush always expressed unqualified support for al-Maliki. But questions about his 
ability to bridge the sectarian divide raised concerns about Iraq’s long-term integrity – let 
alone achieving the Bush Administration’s objective of secular and democratic institutions - 
                                                            
32 Issues surrounding the benchmarks for Iraqi political progress, including reporting of criticisms and concerns 
by officials inside the Bush Administration, can be found in Richter, Paul, “Administration Foiled by its Own 
Iraq Benchmarks – Failure to Prod Baghdad into Action has Aided Foes in Congress and in the Field, Officials 
Say”, The Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2007; p. A1; found at: http://articles.latimes.com/2007/jul/12/nation/ 
na‐benchmarks12   Also, a summary by Beehner, Lionel, “Defining ‘Benchmarks’ in Iraq”, Council on Foreign 
Relations background paper, at: www.cfr.org/publication/13329/defining_benchmarks_in_iraq.html  
33 Gordon, Michael R., “Bush Aide’s Memo Doubts Iraqi Leader”, The New York Times, November 29, 2006; 
retrieved at: www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/middleeast/29cnd‐military.html  Also see Broder, 
Jonathan, “Reality Check”, CQ Weekly, September 10, 2007; pp. 2615‐2616. 
34 ibid., Gordon, Michael R., “Bush Aide’s Memo Doubts Iraqi Leader”, The New York Times, November 29, 
2006. Mr. al‐Maliki’s connection to Moutada al‐Sadr’s  Jaish al‐Mahdi militia is also mentioned in Broder, 
Jonathan, “Reality Check”, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, September 10, 2007; p. 2615. 
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and perhaps heightened the sense that the surge was a gamble unless governing capacities 
and legitimacy improved. 
Comparison of the Surge with Iraq Study Group Recommendations 
At first glance, the President’s troop augmentation plan resembled the ISG’s 
allowance for the possibility of a “short-term redeployment or surge of American combat 
forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, if the U.S. 
commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective” (p.50). The ISG had 
phrased their recommendation to imply an exchange of forces – advisors for combat units - 
or as a covering force to stabilize Baghdad for a simultaneous transition to an advisory and 
economic development mission. As described in the fourth ISG recommendation, in 
reference to accelerating the transition to an advisory role: 
“As these actions proceed, we could begin to move combat forces out of Iraq. 
The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting 
the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat 
operations” (p.48). 
The ISG had rejected the idea of maintaining a larger number of U.S. troops for an indefinite 
time; not only because of the scarcity of available forces, but also to avoid the semblance of a 
permanent occupation that might incite further security challenges (see Recommendation 
No.11 on page 50 in the ISG report).  
However, the surge strategy differed from the ISG’s vision in one important way: 
Despite the President’s assertion that he had “made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq’s 
other leaders that America’s commitment is not open-ended”, no timetable was given for 
ending the surge or progress by Iraq’s government in meeting the benchmark expectations. 
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The surge strategy appeared to be a more open-ended “surge-and-stay” plan, rather than a 
“surge-and-redeploy” plan or beginning of a withdrawal that Democratic opponents and 
Republican skeptics of the war’s progress (and prospects for success) would have preferred.  
Secretary Gates however, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee the day 
after the surge announcement, hinted that the absence of deadlines did not mean an indefinite 
commitment when he stated: “American patience is limited, and obviously if the Iraqis fail to 
maintain their commitments we’ll have to revisit our strategy.” Later in the same hearing 
however, he more closely defended the Administration line by saying: “At the outset of the 
[surge] strategy, it’s a mistake to talk about an exit strategy.”35 
The Administration had certain conditions that would have to be realized before 
contemplation of withdrawal. The ‘strategic objectives’ that the surge was to help accomplish 
included large nation-building assignments; as summarized in a National Security Council 
PowerPoint presentation dated January, 2007:  
1.) ”Defeat al-Qaida and its supporters and ensure that no terrorist safe haven 
exists in Iraq.  
2.) Support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad and regain control 
over the capital. 
3.) Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and counter/limit destructive Iranian and 
Syrian activity in Iraq. 
4.) Help safeguard democracy in Iraq by encouraging strong democratic 
institutions impartially serving all Iraqis and preventing the return of the 
forces of tyranny. 
                                                            
35 Quoted by Raum, Tom, “Bush War Plan Draws Fire on Capitol Hill”, Washington Post, January 11, 2007. 
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5.) Foster the conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation, but with the Iraqi 
Government clearly in the lead. 
6.) Continue to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces and accelerate the transition of 
security responsibility to the Iraqi Government.  
7.) Encourage an expanding Iraqi economy, including by helping Iraq maintain 
and expand its export of oil to support Iraqi development. 
8.) Promote support for Iraq from its neighbors, the region, and the international 
community.”36 
These aspirations differed little from the original goal of changing the Baathist regime, 
except perhaps to emphasize that Iraq had become even more important as the central 
battlefield in the global war on terror. The Administration took seriously al Qaeda’s stated 
intention to found a “caliphate” in Iraq as the first step toward creating an expanding 
territorial sanctuary for radical Islam, and viewed the sectarian violence as a deliberate 
strategy for creating a failed state in which a new Islamic authority could emerge. Radicals 
from across the Muslim world and Europe also appeared to believe in al Qaeda’s goal, and 
flowed into Iraq to join the war. 
Taken together, it can be argued that differences over the extent of real policy change 
played a large part in subsequent battles in Congress for control of Iraq War policy. The 
length of time it would take to achieve the President’s strategic goals, and precise point at 
which each goal would be considered fulfilled, were open and contentious questions. The 
absence of a timescale or deadlines for Iraqi government decisions suggests that the 
                                                            
36 Ibid., Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review, slide number 8, “Strategic Goals and Objectives”; at:  
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq‐strategy011007.pdf  
23 
 
President’s goal was to reduce forces only after a more thorough consolidation of Iraqi 
stability. The former head of the State Department’s cell overseeing intelligence on Iraq, 
Wayne White, told the Washington Post in 2005 that “[in] order to get out earlier, 
expectations are going to have to be lower, even much lower. The higher your expectation, 
the longer you have to stay.”37  
The White House response to the elections was less a search for an exit strategy than 
it was for a new way to overcome the insurgency and sectarian conflict. The evolving 
balance between finding a pragmatic solution to the insurgency, and trying to salvage as 
much of the ideological agenda for liberal political and economic development as possible, is 
the central drama of Administration policy; and perhaps, the unspoken axial difference in 
voting decisions in Congress. The adaptation of select bipartisan recommendations for a 
change of policy into a more robust redoubling of efforts to transform Iraq appeared to defy 
rather than compromise, and may have raised political barriers higher. However, the 
sectarian divisions that made it difficult for Iraq’s governing parties to reach early important 
agreements crucial to establishing the legitimacy of their authority made it all too clear that a 
liberal democratic vision of Iraq’s future was not going to be self-generating after Saddam’s 
removal. Any new Administration strategy had to face an enormous range of nation-building 
– and confidence-building - challenges; beginning with the absence of basic security at the 
street level. In that sense, simply as a practical matter, any continued effort to salvage policy 
or influence Iraq’s development would inevitably have to involve increasing the number of 
troops. 
                                                            
37 ibid., Wright and Knickmeyer, “U.S. Lowers Sights On What Can Be Achieved in Iraq”, Washington Post, 
August 14, 2005. 
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Early Congressional Reactions to the Surge Strategy 
 Even before the surge strategy was announced by President Bush, Congressional 
opinion leaders on both sides of the aisle began to weigh-in on outlines of the strategy that 
had been briefed (and leaked) beforehand. The newly seated House Speaker, Rep. Nancy 
Pelosi (D-CA.), and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), expressed distrust and 
skepticism about the plan in broadcast interviews. Speaker Pelosi said: “If the President 
wants to add to this mission, he is going to have to justify it.” Intriguingly, she went on to 
say: “If the President chooses to escalate the war, in his budget request we want to see a 
distinction between what is there to support the troops who are there now.”38 On the surface, 
and in tone, these statements might have implied unqualified opposition to the surge strategy; 
but in essence, they merely called for further justification of the mission, and clarification of 
budget requirements. The statements were not an outright rejection of the proposal. 
 A day later, Senator Edward Kennedy was quoted in the New York Times as saying 
that prohibition of money for a troop buildup was “under discussion”.39 The term 
“discussion” was likely a careful way of indicating that debate was underway among Senate 
Democrats, further implying a potential openness to the idea of increasing troop levels to 
address the evolving chaos in Iraq. By mid-January, journalists had already detected a split in 
the Democratic Party; between those merely willing to remain rhetorically in opposition, 
versus those seeking to pass spending limits or other legislative measures to limit the 
President’s discretion.40 On January 17th, only a week after the surge announcement, Senator 
                                                            
38 Both of Speaker Pelosi’s quotes are taken from Gordon, Michael R. and Jeff Zeleny, “Latest Plan Sets a Series 
of Goals for Iraq Leaders”, The New York Times, January 8, 2007. 
39 Loven, Jennifer, “Senator: Bush Plans Iraq Troop Surge”, The New York Times, January 9, 2007. 
40 See Branigin, William and Howard Schneider, “Dodd Introduces Bill to Cap U.S. Troops in Iraq”, The 
Washington Post, January 17, 2007; p. A1. 
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Christopher Dodd (D-CT.) introduced the first bill to cap funding on forces already deployed 
in Iraq. “Other than expressing opposition,” Dodd said, “I felt we should do something 
more.”41 
 During the same week, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-DE.), Democratic Chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had expressed skepticism that Congress could 
substantively block the President’s strategy. When speaking of exercising congressional 
power over the war budget, he said: “You can’t go in like a Tinkertoy and play around and 
say you [the President] can’t spend the money on this piece and this piece. He’ll be able to 
keep the troops there forever, constitutionally, if he wants to. As a practical matter, there is 
no way to say, ‘Mr. President, stop.”42 Biden was clarifying a central reality of congressional 
authority, and offering a partial answer to the basic question of the ability of Congress to 
exercise control of war policy: the power of the budget is a difficult instrument to wield with 
precision in managing or micro-managing the conduct of foreign policy. But was Senator 
Biden also suggesting a degree of Democratic acquiescence to the surge plan? And was he 
also perhaps laying a basis beforehand for defending the inability of Democratic lawmakers 
to end the war, given the slim Democratic majority margins and structure of preferences in 
both chambers? 
 Positions were also being established on the Republican side of the aisle prior to 
announcement of the surge. Senator John E. Sununu (R-N.H.) recounted that at a January 8th 
White House meeting with Republicans, in response to a question as to how the additional 
forces proposed for the surge “would be more likely to succeed than previous troop 
                                                            
41 ibid., Branigin and Schneider, The Washington Post, January 17, 2007. 
42 ibid., Gordon and Zeleny, The New York Times. January 8, 2007. 
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increases”, the President and National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley replied that the 
surge would be accompanied by “specific goals, different rules of engagement, and different 
expectations for cooperation with the Iraqi government.”43 Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-
TX) came out of that same briefing to say the President had offered no details about 
expectations of the Iraqi government, or numbers of troops that both the U.S. would send and 
that the Iraq government would make available.44 Mentioning these basic details may have 
been a tacit signal that both Republicans and Democrats would be weighing the advantages 
of the surge proposal in detail. Other “leading Republicans” were reported to have said that 
“sending more troops would overly strain the armed forces without assurances of success.”45 
Even those Republicans who had been consistent advocates of increasing the force size; 
especially John McCain (R-AZ), who had been critical of force planning from the moment 
Iraqis began widespread looting shortly after the invasion, expressed concern about the Iraqi 
side of the strategy and the availability of U.S. troops; but told reporters, “I think we can 
succeed.” Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR.) reported that the President and Mr. Hadley had 
emphasized that the surge plan responded to a request from Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al 
Maliki several weeks prior. Each of the three Republicans faced difficult reelection bids in 
2008. All of these statements could be viewed as placing a cautious spin on the private 
skepticism they held about the surge plan – and which the Administration feared was shared 
by many Hill Republicans. 
 Members on both sides of the aisle wanted the benchmarks mentioned by President 
Bush in his January 10th surge announcement made into a formal reporting requirement; not 
                                                            
43 ibid., Gordon and Zeleny, January 8, 2007. 
44 ibid., Loven,  The New York Times, January 9, 2007. 
45 ibid., Loven, January 9, 2007. 
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only to hold Iraq’s government responsible, but also as a way to hold the U.S. commitment to 
concrete measures of progress. The Administration initially opposed setting formal 
requirements in order to preserve the President’s discretion.46 However, eighteen benchmarks 
became an Executive  reporting requirement under section 1314 (b)(2)(A) of Public Law 
110-28; the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007 that passed as H.R. 2206 on May 24th  and signed 
by President Bush the next day. The President’s subsequent report rated progress on ten of 
the eighteen benchmarks “satisfactory” by the date that the report was submitted on July 
12th.47  
 The day after the President’s announcement of the surge, pubic position-taking 
began in earnest, and the reaction of Republicans was closely watched. The most critical 
statement came from Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE.), who told Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice, appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “I think [the] speech given 
last night by this president represents the most dangerous foreign policy blunder in this 
country since Vietnam, if it’s carried out.”48 
Additional Basic Questions 
This thesis is about the relative contributions of partisanship and ideology in 
Congressional voting decisions on the war. If strong ideological preferences determined 
voting decisions, then how were those preferences weighed against party loyalty? 
Conversely, if party loyalty was determinant as the stronger voting pattern, then how was 
                                                            
46ibid., Richter, Paul, “Administration Foiled by its Own Benchmarks – Failure to Prod Baghdad into Action has 
aided foes in Congress and in the Field, Officials Say”, Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2007. 
47 The President’s July 12, 2007 report to Congress on progress by Iraq’s government toward meeting 18 
benchmarks specified under Public Law 110‐28 was found during December, 2008 at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070712.html  
48 Quoted in Raum, Tom, “Bush Plan Draws Fire on Capitol Hill”, The New York Times, January 11, 2007 
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ideology connected to party-loyalty? As yet a third dimension - what role did electorate 
preferences have? The answers to these questions might be deduced or inferred from the 
ways scholars theorize the role of party influence and ideology in legislative decision-
making, discussed in the next chapter. But theorizing would be richer and perhaps more valid 
in the context of the particular policy questions being decided. 
For members of both parties, essential realities of the war certainly must have 
influenced beliefs about what was practically achievable for U.S. efforts in Iraq. To what 
extent were there shared understandings of the objective circumstances and available policy 
options? Members of both political parties viewed the same media footage of mayhem in 
Iraq, heard the same presentations by empanelled experts and warfighters, but arrived at quite 
different voting decisions. 
The signal feature of the Iraq War by the end of 2006 and into early 2007 was that it 
appeared to virtually all observers as “beyond strategy”.49 Few professional analysts were 
willing or able to confidently predict positive outcomes resulting from any change in 
strategy. Both of the general policy options – stay, or withdraw – held potentially terrible 
consequences, and included considerations at odds with distinctive sets of American values. 
In times of uncertainty, reliance on ideological values increases and becomes more 
influential in structuring perceptions. The way that both American parties had become more 
closely associated with particular belief systems may explain the strength of partisan voting 
as a link to ideological convictions. 
                                                            
49 ibid., Broder, “Reality Check”, CQ Weekly, September 10, 2007. The phrase “beyond strategy” is borrowed 
from Broder’s use of the term on page 2610 of the article. 
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But what was the most fundamental “issue space” or dimension of policy difference 
between the parties? And did it arise from electoral demands, or pre-existing ideology beliefs 
about the war?  
It is instructive to summarize the ways in which the viewpoints of the President and 
his domestic political opponents differed and converged (or overlapped) on war policy. Very 
substantial differences existed; but just enough overlap in agreement on the conditions in 
Iraq, and consequences of abrupt departure existed to permit continued Republican partisan 
support of the policy, and also Democratic reluctance to support measures completely 
shutting-down military efforts. Elements of Administration war policy contested by 
Congressional opponents and moderate skeptics include: 
1.) The strategic wisdom of invading Iraq (and the doctrine of preemptive war 
and regime change generally); regardless of Iraq’s connection to terrorism; 
2.) Susceptibility of the Iraqi insurgency and sectarian conflict to a military 
solution; thus the wisdom of surging additional troops; 
3.) The long-term prospects for development of liberal democratic and 
capitalist institutions in Iraq. 
Issues where the views of the President and war opponents converged – especially after the 
2006 elections - include: 
1.) The need to change or adapt strategy as strife spiraled out of control; 
2.) The need to hold the Iraq government accountable for political progress and 
consolidation of legitimate authority; 
3.) Doubts about the intentions and ability of Prime Minister al-Maliki’s 
government to broker political progress. 
30 
 
Until the 2006 elections, the Bush Administration’s unwillingness to concede the 
development of military and political difficulties, and unilateral tone, especially on the part 
of senior war policy advocates (especially Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary 
Rumsfield) did not succeed as an adroit political strategy in minimizing opposition to war 
policy. Did the quality of the Administration’s political practice influence or even harden 
subsequent attitudes and voting outcomes in Congress? It would be surprising if this were not 
the case. Profound differences over the strategic importance of changing Iraq’s regime in the 
first place was already a significant political problem for the President and the Republican 
party as conditions worsened in Iraq.  The reluctance and delay in publically acknowledging 
problems or adjusting policy/strategy, or in explaining policy dilemmas and possible 
solutions more frankly, as well as the delay in taking a stronger and more specific (public) 
stand on expectations for Iraq’s government, eroded the President’s political capital - even 
among members of his own party. It is hard not to conclude that while Presidential 
prerogative is essential for executive effectiveness, it appears to make a poor justification for 
foreign policy on its own, and is probably better guarded in any event by the cultivation of 
broader political support.  
Michael Hunt (1987), characterizing the role of the American electorate’s interest and 
influence in U.S. foreign policy-making, and given polling evidence of substantial gaps in 
electorate knowledge and understanding of foreign policy issues, concluded that: 
“. . . an intolerance of ambiguous policy, an impatience with complicated, 
long-term solutions to difficult policy problems, and deep divisions over how 
to handle major commitments that run into serious, unexpected difficulties.”  
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Precisely because of these traits and the suspicision that many Americans are 
at heart isolationist, policymakers have been reluctant to make the public a 
genuine partner in policymaking, or to risk open and vigorous debate. . . 
Policymakers have instead preferred to exploit the tendency of the electorate 
to take at face value official estimates of the world scene and to withhold 
information likely to excite popular isolationism or diminish the likelihood of 
getting the national resources essential to realizing their vision of national 
security.” 50 
Twenty years later, this argument might fit the public debate and behavior of a triangular 
relationship between the electorate, Congress and the President in the struggle for control of 
Iraq War policy.  
By the end of 2008, at the conclusion of the 110th Congress, we can now begin to 
cautiously see that a combination of several factors in addition to the surge strategy have 
substantially improved Iraq’s security and stability. Junior officers on their own initiative 
approached tribal leaders and other population elements to win greater confidence, and built 
alliances with Sunni tribesmen against foreign al-Qaeda cells.51 Allusions have been made to 
the role of new technologies and methods of intelligence that substantially improved 
capacities for monitoring and locating insurgent networks.52 Perhaps, simply, the adaptation 
of the Iraqi population to the daily presence of American soldiers reduced cultural alienation 
to a level that gradually made it easier for U.S. forces to work with local communities. More 
pessimistic observers believe that the reduced levels of conflict are merely the end result of 
                                                            
50 Hunt, Michael H. 1987. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press; p.180. 
51 Jaffe, Greg, “How Courting Sheiks Slowed Violence in Iraq”, The Wall Street Journal, Vol. CCL, No. 32,  
August 8, 2007; p. 1. 
52 ibid., Woodward: 2008. 
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population displacements wrought by the earlier sectarian and ethnic “cleansing”. Other 
patterns of influence, and negotiations of consequence, await future revelation to explain the 
full historical unfolding; but the surge policy, and reorientation of approaches to the conduct 
of the war, appears to have succeeded in changing the security situation. Ultimately, as 
described below, Congressional efforts to impose deadlines for withdrawal, or inhibit White 
House war powers, dropped-off as evidence of increasing security became apparent to 
Congressional delegations visiting Iraq.  
None of these subsequent impacts were visible as the 110th Congress began to 
generate war policy legislation in January, 2007.  
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Chapter 2 – Parties and Ideology 
This chapter will explain how Congress generally involves itself in the making of 
foreign policy, and describe how political parties and ideologies of international order are 
theorized in Congressional research.53 The central argument is that Congressional activism in 
foreign policy parallels historical changes in the ideological consistency of the political 
parties, which according to most theories of party influence, pursue certain strategies for 
increasing their share of institutional power. The parties, defined as “organized groups who 
pursue their goals by contesting elections and perhaps controlling political offices,” compete 
for positions of institutional power from which to exert greater (if not always dominant) 
influence over policy.54 Sometimes, assumptions about international policy are shared across 
the aisle, but increasingly they define party differences.55 Party identity has become almost 
synonymous with certain foreign policy doctrines since the Vietnam War, largely due to 
changes in the American electorate. This melding has substantive implications for 
institutional power and the way international issues are debated and decided in Congress - 
and between branches of government. The objective of this chapter is to explain the links 
between activism, ideology, and partisanship that would account for voting on Iraq War 
legislation. 
                                                            
53 The term “international order” that I refer to as the ideological subject does not mean a particular 
arrangement; but rather a “pattern of activities or set of arrangements that characterize the mutual behavior 
of states . . . which provide method and regularity to international relations”; as defined in Evans, Graham and 
Jeffery Newnham. 1998. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. London and New York: Penguin 
Books, Ltd.; p. 269. 
54 This definition of parties is quoted from: McCormick, James M. 1998. American Foreign Policy & Process, 
Third Edition. Itasca, IL.: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc.; p. 472, who in turn cites: Sorauf, Frank J. 1984. Party 
Politics in America. Boston: Little, Brown and Company; pp. 6‐28. 
55 ibid., McCormick, 1998:477‐478. The ‘across’ and ‘along’ geometry of ideological differences between the 
political parties guides the discussion of changing bipartisanship since World War II in the opening pages of 
Chapter 11. 
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The question this project explores is the gap between Congressional actions to end or 
reduce U.S. involvement in Iraq during 2007, and the failure to enact measures to do so. 
Explaining this gap necessarily begins with describing how Congress decides foreign policy 
issues and why efforts to assert its prerogatives in that sphere have varied over time. The 
level of attention and activity devoted to foreign affairs by Congress is governed far less by 
any limits of formal (Constitutional) authority than by several political considerations 
proposed by James M. Lindsay (1994, 2004).56 Congressional activism will be linked in a 
second section to changes in the electorate and certain institutional reforms in Congress that 
have polarized the parties and raised the stakes for partisan competition over the past four 
decades (Davidson, 1992; Deibel, 2007; Jacobson, 2002). The subject of electoral changes 
will blend into a third section that reports on how parties and ideology have been theorized. 
Theories of party influence – including those that minimize the role of parties - are important 
for how they propose political authority flows through and shapes the institution. The 
significance of the content of the various ideological orientations within the (realigned) 
Democratic and Republican parties for foreign policy voting will also be discussed in the 
third section. A fourth and final section will hopefully summarize a nearly seamless account 
of how historical variance in Congressional foreign policy engagement is connected to 
changes in the American electorate - and the parties they belong to - that might be used to 
explain Iraq War voting during 2007. 
 
 
                                                            
56 James M. Lindsay, “Congress and the Politics of American Foreign Policy”, in Wittkopf Eugene and James M. 
McCormick, (Eds.). 2004. The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence. Lanham, 
MD. and Oxford, U.K.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; pp. 183‐195. Also, Lindsay, James M. 1994. 
Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press. 
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I - The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy-Making 
The role of Congress in U.S. foreign policy is potentially as broad as the political 
imagination of its membership, and ranges far beyond the powers specified in the 
Constitution. James M. Lindsay (2004) divides the subject into two distinct “realms” (or sets) 
of issues and arguments. The “legal” realm concerns the balance of powers that essentially 
stem from the core issue of “which branch should prevail as a matter of principle when their 
powers conflict.”57 The other realm concerns the politics of decision-making that mirror 
informal patterns of institutional authority which account for alternating periods of 
assertiveness and deference to Presidential initiative. Questions surrounding this latter 
dimension are often about why Congress may have acted in a particular way on a given 
policy issue. 
The “Legal” (Constitutional) Realm 
The issue of whether Congress has adequate authority to influence foreign policy can 
be laid to rest at the outset.  Lindsay reminds us that the Constitution actually confers a 
greater variety of specified powers to Congress than the President; the latter serving as 
‘Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy’ (Article 2, Section 2); makes treaties and 
appoints ambassadors (subject to Senate approval) ; who “shall receive Ambassadors and 
other public Ministers” (Section 2, Article 3). “Other than these clauses”, Lindsay observes, 
“the Constitution stands silent on the question of the President’s authority in foreign affairs.”  
For Congress: Article I, Section 8 stipulates the power “to provide for the common 
Defence”; to regulate Commerce with foreign nations”; to define and punish Piracies and 
Felonies committed on the high seas”; to declare war”; to raise and support Armies”, to 
                                                            
57 ibid., Lindsay, 2004: 185. 
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provide and maintain a Navy”; and “to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the 
land and naval Forces.” The Senate is required to provide advice and consent to treaties and 
ambassadorial appointments under Article 2, Section 2. Each of these mandates cover broad 
policy sectors, especially the “making of Rules for Government” clause which comprises 
procedural legislation, discussed further below.  
Beyond these specified powers, “[determining which] branch of government has the 
power to make peace, to abrogate treaties, or to extend recognition to other states are all 
questions that cannot be answered by reading the text of the Constitution” (p.13). Virtually 
all other powers and practices have been institutionalized by two centuries of practice and 
legal precedent, and are built on inferred intent and assertions rather than literal readings. 
Lindsay believes that “even if the Constitution dealt with foreign policy in greater depth, we 
still would not know exactly how foreign policy powers are divided between the president 
and Congress.”  
Democrats and Republicans employed nearly the full range of legislative and non-
legislative instruments to oppose and support the war effort during 2007. In addition to the 
few powers that specifically refer to international relations, the most important lever for 
Congressional foreign policy involvement is Article I, Section 9 that states “No money shall 
be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” The 
Founders drew many lessons from British political history. Perhaps the foremost of these, in 
the words of George Mason at the 1787 Philadelphia convention, is that the “purse & the 
sword ought never to get into the same hands – whether Legislative or Executive.”58 
                                                            
58 ibid., Fisher: 1997: 221. Fisher quotes Max Farrand’s The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,    
Volume 1, pp. 139‐40. 
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Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 69 that the American President was far less 
threatening than the King of England, because the King could both declare war and raise and 
regulate armies and fleets. Likewise, James Madison wrote: “Those who are to conduct a war 
cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be 
commenced, continued, or concluded.”59 Madison also wrote in Federalist 68 that: 
“. . . the power of the purse is “the most complete and effectual weapon with 
which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, 
for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every 
just and salutary measure.” 
The use of funding authority comprises several approaches. As James McCormick 
observes, “the elimination of funds for foreign policy actions that it oppos[es]” is the “blunt 
instrument” Congress uses to influence policy. When roll call votes on bills specifically 
written to change policy do not succeed, reductions or outright elimination of funding in 
appropriation bills for policy programs might have the effect desired by policy opponents. 
Lindsay has observed that “the most popular congressional instrument for influencing the 
substance of foreign policy is the appropriations power . . . The popularity of authorizations 
and appropriations bills is due in part to the fact that dollars often are policy.”60 
Influence can be finely calibrated by the conditions set on how appropriations are to 
be spent. This offers enormous leverage for satisfying legislative preferences that range from 
the ability to extract more information about programs by mandating reporting requirements, 
to reductions or restrictions that slow (or effectively prevent) achievement of program 
                                                            
59 ibid., 1997: 221. Fisher quotes from Hunt, Gaillard. 1910. The Writings of James Madison, Volume 5: 148. 
60 ibid., Lindsay, 1994:86. 
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objectives. The Boland Amendments to defense appropriation bills and continuing 
resolutions passed during 1982-1986 were some of the most formidable obstacles to 
Executive independence in recent history by imposing militarily-significant restrictions on 
the use of aid, and ultimately cutting-off funding for the Reagan Administration’s 
controversial support of insurgencies against pro-Soviet regimes in Central America. 
Congress has also succeeded in injecting particular values into U.S. policy, such as human 
rights reporting requirements in arms control legislation, or as conditions for trade 
agreements with other nations.  
The earmarking of funds for specific purposes is another way Congress is able to 
pursue its policy objectives. Earmarking is simply the designation of funds for particular 
programs, which for foreign policy have traditionally included development aid and arms 
transfers; allocating funding independent of either existing programs or bills sent over from 
the other chamber or the White House. 
Oversight of executive branch activity is the other major dimension of Congressional 
power in foreign policy. Oversight consists of the review and monitoring of government 
action through reports that are specifically mandated in legislation.61 Three types of reports 
are usually required: periodic or recurring; notifications; and one-time reports.62 The 
periodic/recurring reports typically require the President or government agencies to report 
certain kinds of information, such as changes in human rights conditions, or progress toward 
certain policy goals, that have transpired over the reporting interval. Notifications are the 
most frequent type of report submitted, and are especially important as a requirement – in 
                                                            
61 ibid., McCormick, 1998: 346 
62 ibid., 1998: 347 
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both juridical and political terms – to military action. Notification of military commitments 
abroad are a centerpiece of the 1973 War Powers Act that signified a new era of 
Congressional foreign policy activism in response to the Vietnam war and strong assertions 
of Executive prerogative during the Nixon Administration. Importantly, notifications can 
serve as either tacit assertions of will, or applications for Congressional approval. George W. 
Bush notified Congress of his intention to change the regime of Saddam Hussein as both an 
assertion of Executive prerogative, and to legitimize the intended action by complying with 
Congressional expectations and requirements to be informed. Finally, one-time reporting 
requirements are usually mandated to clarify policy, or to analyze or answer particular 
questions about an issue area.  
Oversight also involves direct questioning of government officials, including military 
officers, and other witnesses in hearings before a variety of committees.  Both the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, and House Foreign Affairs (formerly, International Relations) 
Committee, were the leading centers of Congressional foreign policy-making in their 
respective chamber. Over the past quarter century however, their prominence has receded as 
U.S. international involvement has diversified, and their role has changed in response to the 
changing quality and activism of leadership, diversification of U.S. international 
involvement, and resulting competition from other committees with widening jurisdiction 
over international economic and special interest involvement.  
Lindsay summarizes implications for Congressional foreign policy influence by 
proposing that Congressional involvement in foreign affairs differs in three categories of 
policy: crisis policy, strategic policy, and structural policy. International crises that are 
perceived as an immediate threat to national interests attract the greatest attention, but are the 
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least susceptible to decision-making by Congress. In crisis situations, Executive capacities to 
react in a timely way mean that “. . . practical, normative and electoral concerns generally 
leave Congress little choice but to follow the President’s lead.”63 Strategic policy on the 
other hand is where broader national interests are connected to foreign policy goals and 
approaches. Far more issues are at stake in the development of international strategy than the 
Executive can claim exclusive authority over, which offers Congress a broad and creative 
role in deciding fundamental diplomatic, economic, and military issues. Finally, Lindsay 
defines structural policy as “govern[ing] how American resources will be used to achieve 
foreign policy goals.” Structural policies include the distribution of resources and creation of 
legal guidelines to meet particular international goals, such as foreign aid spending, military 
force structure funding, and immigration and trade laws. Structural policy could perhaps be 
thought of as a subset of strategic policy, since the structure of U.S. resource allocations and 
laws arguably is a reflection of U.S. international strategy. 
Iraq War policy would fit into all three categories. Iraq had become an immediate 
crisis as the sectarian violence rapidly spread; it was a strategic issue in terms of the 
deterioration of the U.S. political and diplomatic standing in the world; and it had become a 
structural crisis in terms of its implications for military and reconstruction costs. Lindsay’s 
typology of foreign policy issue areas persuasively summarizes how Congressional power 
can be applied, but politics still determine the extent of Congressional participation. 
The Political Realm of Congressional Foreign Policy 
The politics of foreign policy-making in Congress occur as electoral calculations, 
ideology, and party competition shape efforts to gain influence or control over U.S. 
                                                            
63 ibid., Lindsay, 1994: 147. 
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international affairs. The varying extent to which Congress actively tries to influence policy 
is the focal political issue of Congressional foreign policy-making. The basic question is: 
What determines the level of effort, or activism, to influence foreign policy?  
Legislative decisions on any given issue are usually analyzed in the broadest term as a 
tension between electoral (reelection) considerations and the personal beliefs of lawmakers.64 
Though constituent and lawmaker preferences are not always mutually exclusive, and 
sometimes overlap, they form both ends of a motivational continuum in the logic of 
democratic representation. The politics of foreign policy decisions in Congress likewise stem 
from – though are not necessarily determined by – variations on this elemental tension 
between electoral constraint and lawmaker preferences.  
Traditional understandings of electoral influence in foreign policy start from the fact 
that public interest and knowledge of international affairs is limited. This has had two 
implications for officeholders: 1.) Low constituent interest and inattention offers limited 
electoral incentives for involvement in foreign policy issues; and 2.) public inattention opens 
greater leeway for voting discretion. The reverse is almost true when public concern about an 
issue is high: Congressmen have incentives to become more involved and gain useful 
recognition by holding hearings, taking newsworthy positions, and prioritizing votes on 
relevant legislation; but electoral preferences may also proscribe voting discretion when a 
member’s personal views differ from large or important segments of their constituency. 
Exceptions to this pattern can occur, during periods when international events hold little 
                                                            
64 ibid., Lindsay, 1994: 48. 
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concern for the public at large, if members of Congress find and actively promote issues of 
narrow interest to a significant district or state constituency.65  
Party interests and institutional leadership positions offer incentives that sometimes 
conflict with constituent preferences. Former House Minority Leader Robert Michel (R-IL.) 
has said: “There are some issues that I’d like to represent the people back home on, but that’s 
not the will of my conference. If I [vote constituent preferences] too many times, the 
conference will accuse me of being too parochial.”66 Leadership roles demand cultivation of 
a broader view than constituent opinion. Because lawmakers cannot be experts on 
everything, they look to leadership for voting cues.67 
Congressional assertiveness has also varied with the role accorded Presidential 
leadership in response to international conditions. Observers of American governance as 
early as Alexis de Tocqueville connected Congressional activism to the absence of external 
peril, drawing on their familiarity with the ancient pattern of concentrated politico-military 
authority in the sovereign or executive rule of Eurasian empires and states bordered by 
historical adversaries.68 The public and Congress traditionally look to the President for 
leadership during times of crisis or threat, and Congressional activism has often been 
                                                            
65 ibid., Lindsay, 1994: 41. Lindsay cites the example of Rep. Stephen Solarz (D‐N.Y.) who succeeded in accruing 
both a profile as a foreign policy opinion leader, and an enormous campaign war chest, through his focus on 
the Marcos regime in the Philippines during the 1980’s. 
66 A May 25, 1995 interview with former Rep. Michel quoted by Uslaner, Eric M. 1999. The Movers and the 
Shirkers: Representatives and Ideologues in the Senate. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press; p. 142. 
67 ibid., Uslander, 1999: 142. Uslander refers to Matthews, Donald R. and James A Stimson. 1975. Yeas and 
Nays. New York: John Wiley. 
68  ibid., Lindsay, 2004: 186. A quote  from de Tocqueville  is cited, making the comparative historical analogy 
between  Congressional  assertiveness  in  the  first  half  of  the  19th‐century  and  European  traditions;  that  I 
reproduce here from a different source: “If Executive power is less strong in America than in France, one must 
attribute the cause of it perhaps more to circumstances than laws. . . If the life of the Union were constantly 
threatened, if it’s great interests were mixed every day with those of other powerful peoples, one would see 
the executive power grow larger in opinion, through what one would expect of it and what it would execute.” , 
in Alexis  de  Tocqueville, Democracy  in America.  (Mansfield, Harvey C.  and Delba Winthrop,  (Eds.).  2000b. 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press; p. 118.) 
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observed to increase when the perceived risk to the nation is minimal. When the perception 
of threat is high, Congress is more deferential to Presidential leadership, but confidence in 
White House leadership also must be sustained. The erosion of confidence in President 
Bush’s decision-making leading up to the 2006 elections, and the election results, support 
Lindsay’s contention that “[w]hen Americans believe they face few external threats – or 
think that international engagement could itself produce a threat – they see less merit in 
deferring to the White House on foreign policy and more merit in Congressional activism.”69 
In this sense, the vigorous challenges to White House control of Iraq War policy following 
the 2006 elections may have reflected beliefs that the conflict did not sufficiently threaten 
U.S. national security. The same may have occurred during the Vietnam War when the 
contention that continued involvement was necessary to staunch the threat of Communist 
expansion through a regional “domino effect” lost credibility with the public.  
Several implications for Congressional behavior follow from the ‘threat perception’ 
model. Throughout the Cold War, Presidents could argue that blocking their initiatives risked 
being interpreted as weakness by the Soviets.70 After the Cold War, in the absence of a clear 
external threat, there were few if any political risks in challenging White House policy. And 
while the presence of an external threat often focuses public attention on foreign policy, in 
the absence of peril lawmakers become more interested in how single-issue causes will 
bolster re-election support, especially in districts with ethnic populations that champion a 
particular political issue in their country of origin. In catering to narrow interests, 
Congressional actions sometimes conflict with more stable, longer term strategic policies. 
                                                            
69 ibid., 2004: 186. 
70 ibid., Lindsay, 2004: p. 188. 
44 
 
The role attributed to electoral influence can be overstated.  Lindsay (1994: 38-44) 
points out that ascribing too much credit to electoral factors does not account for the many 
instances when Congressional foreign policy decisions differ from public sentiment or 
interest group lobbying, nor does it account for the substantial increase in activity on 
international policy since the 1960’s. Members of Congress are not simply slaves of 
constituent opinion. Public opinion, Lindsay contends, acts more as a constraint that a guide 
to voting behavior, and lawmakers do possess their own views of the national interest and 
good public policy that they seek to enact or lend their support to (1994: 42-44). Finally, the 
increasing extent of Congressional foreign policy involvement in recent decades partially 
reflects the broader variety of global issues (mostly economic and trade) that intersect with 
domestic interests, which committee and subcommittees jurisdictions have scrambled to 
subsume since the institutional reforms of Congress in the 1970’s.71 
II. – Ideological Sources of Partisan Foreign Policy 
 Power and interest are often regarded as the primary determinants of political affairs, 
especially in international relations. The role of ideas in statecraft is less easy to describe and 
measure, and harder to operationalize, in empirical research. But ideas - especially bundled 
together with beliefs and values as an ideology - do have an impact in world politics. As 
Terry Deibel (2007) observes, “[what] other cause than the impact of television could lie 
behind the U.S. decision to intervene with force in 1992 to feed starving people in Somalia, a 
country without the slightest weight in the global balance of power?”72 
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45 
 
There is no single definition or meaning of the term ‘ideology’.73 A recent dictionary 
entry describes ideology as “a body of ideas reflecting the social needs and aspirations of an 
individual, group, class, or culture.”74 This suggests that ideology fulfills two roles. The 
phrase “body of ideas” in the first part of the definition connotes some form of ordering, 
association, or interrelatedness; and indicates that ideology has a schematic function in 
structuring interpretation. The “needs and aspirations” half of the definition refers to a more 
political role, and ideology is most frequently studied for the way(s) it legitimates social or 
political power. “To study ideology”, contends John B. Thompson, “is to study the ways in 
which meaning (or signification) serves to sustain relations of domination.”75 Even by the 
most neutral or synthesized definition, ideologies of foreign policy would not only guide 
perception of international events, but also justify policy approaches. Additionally, to 
paraphrase David Easton’s definition of politics (as the “authoritative allocation of values”), 
any ideology is inherently political in representing a precept of proper order or allocation that 
is authoritative to the person(s) holding the ideology.76 Ideological assumptions can be rooted 
in profound beliefs that are difficult for adherents to compromise – and hard fought in efforts 
to prevail. 
Traditional American Attitudes 
Contemporary American foreign policy ideologies are rooted in assumptions as old as 
the Republic itself. Public attitudes toward international affairs have been shaped perhaps 
                                                            
73 Terry Eagleton (2007) has identified sixteen definitions of the term in his book, Ideology: An Introduction. 
London and New York: Verso;   1‐2. 
74 Webster’s II New College Dictionary. Houghton Mifflin Company (city and date of publication not given). 
75 Thompson, John B. 1984. Studies in the Theory of Ideology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 4. Cited 
in Eagleton (ibid.), 2007: 5. 
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most fundamentally, as Deibel observes, by “an act of willful separation from the old world”; 
and Americans “see their nation as separate, different, superior, exempt from the usual laws 
of rise and decline, and destined to lead world progress.”77 Perhaps the most important 
consequence of this “exceptionalism” has been a unique idealism about the possibilities of 
historical progress through international engagement, especially since the end of World War 
Two. But idealism also competes with the other side of exceptionalism: a wariness of 
physical and political vulnerability to the things America defines itself against. Isolationism, 
imbued with a dose of traditional European realism (realpolitik), was quintessentially 
expressed in George Washington’s farewell warning to avoid entangling alliances that would 
draw the United States into the ancient rivalries of Europe (or in other parts of the world).  
The enduring strain between idealism and realism in American attitudes and policy-
making is manifest at a more systematic level as a rivalry between isolationist and 
internationalist ideologies. These, in turn, have become sub-divided into increasingly 
distinctive and policy-relevant viewpoints and assumptions. The present iterations of 
isolationism and internationalism are the product of the three largest post-World War 
involvements: the Cold War, Vietnam, and 9/11. The way these general foreign policy 
orientations have become closely associated with party identity through realignment of the 
American electorate is a key factor in explaining Iraq War voting during 2007. 
Liberal internationalism became the predominant outlook of the U.S. foreign policy 
elite that experienced the Great Depression, World War II and the beginning of the Cold 
War. The first generation of liberal internationalists, according to Joshua W. Busby and 
Jonathon Monten (2008), drawing lessons from America’s return to isolation after World 
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War I and the rise of fascism and closure of world trade, “committed to remaining engaged in 
international affairs and exercising U.S. power where necessary to defend global order, 
coupled with a commitment to use multilateral means to defend America’s interests.”78 The 
global order they sought was pursued with “an unprecedented array of international 
commitments . . . oriented around binding, rule-based international institutions, democratic 
governments and an open and nondiscriminatory economic system.”79 The first cohort of 
liberal internationalists recognized a historically-unique opportunity to pair the new global 
capacities of U.S. military and economic power with a cooperative, multilateral approach to 
international issues, to contain Soviet expansionism, and prevent the emergence of the kinds 
of imbalances that led to both World Wars.80 This was the ideological underpinning of the 
idealized “textbook” Congress that Presidents and lawmakers often wax nostalgic (or 
politically appeal) for; a condition of broad consensus on the character of the international 
environment shared by liberals and conservatives in both parties, with high(er) levels of 
bipartisan voting that appeared to be the norm during the first two decades of the Cold War 
when political differences “stopped at the water’s edge.”  
Until the Vietnam War, the anti-communist and containment policies of the liberal 
internationalist consensus were approved by nearly three-quarters of the general public. More 
fundamentally, public support rested on high levels of basic trust in government which lasted 
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Internationalism in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Perspectives on Politics, Volume 6, Number 3, September, 2008; pp. 
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into the early 1960’s. The paradoxes of insurgency in Vietnam however, undercut the 
efficacy of U.S. power advantages. Increasing quantities of military, economic and political 
inputs could no longer be convincingly related to the limited strategic goals of either 
defending and legitimizing the South Vietnamese government, or discouraging North 
Vietnam from trying to achieve unification. North Vietnam’s communist regime could 
neither be contained nor changed without bringing the U.S. into direct confrontation with the 
Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China.  
The more measures of raw power that the United States applied, the less political 
effect – and indeed the more political damage – it seemed to purchase. Presidents Johnson 
and Nixon were caught between the specter of South Vietnamese collapse or continued 
stalemate, but in the view of war opponents they were complicit in perpetuating unnecessary 
bloodshed in the service of an increasingly questionable containment rationale. Fewer 
believed that leaving Vietnam would result in a regional “domino” effect that could 
necessarily increase the risk to U.S. security. As the duration, cost, and causalities of the war 
increased with little tangible progress, political and military leaders confronted declining 
public confidence and political support. As Deibel reports, trust in government fell from 
nearly 80% in the early 1960’s to around 25% by the late 1970’s, especially after the 
Watergate scandal of the Nixon Administration.81 Indeed, Watergate was a symptom of the 
rupture in trust between national leadership and the public over Vietnam policy that in 
President Nixon’s distorted view, justified resort to illegal methods to defend against anti-
war subversion.  
                                                            
81 ibid. Deibel, 2007: 91. The authors quote American National Election Studies, University of Michigan, at: 
www.umich.edu/nes . 
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The strategic dilemma of Vietnam and resulting domestic divisions fractured the 
internationalist consensus. According to measures by the liberal Americans for Democratic 
Action (ADA), 1967 is the threshold year when Democratic Party liberals, previously 
supportive of both cooperation and military intervention following World War II, tip more 
toward anti-military, anti-intervention, protectionist and even isolationist positions.82 After 
Vietnam, internationalists became increasingly divided between conservative “security” 
internationalists concerned with the realpolitik of military balances, and liberal “equity” 
internationalists who already considered the Cold War passé (or at most a continuation of 
traditional great power politics), and regarded foreign poverty a more significant problem 
than the Soviet competition for Third World loyalties.83 Although Congressional 
bipartisanship in foreign policy voting remained higher relative to voting on domestic issues, 
it steadily declined from 1967 through the end of the Cold War – and continued to decline. 
According to ADA and American Conservative Union (ACU) data reported by Busby and 
Monten (2008), bipartisan votes in the House comprised 21.1 percent of the votes between 
1971 and 1990; and declined to 11.4 percent (by ACU measures), and 12.7 percent (by ADA 
measures) after the Cold War.84 During the first decade of the post-Cold War era (1991-
2001), bipartisanship was slightly higher in the House at 14.4 percent (ADA) and 16.5 
percent (ACU). Startlingly, after 9/11 between 2002 and 2004, both ADA and ACU 
bipartisan measures declined to 0 percent! 
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Electoral Realignment 
Since the 1980’s, changes in the electorate and partisanship in Congress have begun 
to alter traditional assumptions about Congressional foreign policy involvement. During the 
1980’s, partisanship and the influence of party organizations began to increase within 
Congress and across the electorate.  In sum, the ideological and policy positions of voters 
became more internally consistent and predictive of election voting, and voters sorted 
themselves among parties which became correspondingly more homogeneous and 
differentiated from one another (Jacobson 2000b, 2001; Stonecash, Brewer and Mariani 
2003; Carson et al., 2003).85 Most scholars attribute the recovery of partisanship to two 
related factors - the realignment of the Southern electorate, and institutional changes enacted 
to reform Congress during the 1970’s. Gary C. Jacobson (2007) describes the main 
interchange of the electoral realignment: “The civil rights revolution, and particularly the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, brought Southern blacks into the electorate as Democrats while 
moving conservative whites to abandon their ancestral allegiance to the Democratic Party in 
favor of the ideologically and racially more compatible Republican Party.”86 
Over nearly the same period, from the late-1950’s, successive elections brought an 
increasing number of liberal Democrats into office who became frustrated with the consistent 
ideological and policy alignments of Republicans and southern Democrats that blocked 
liberal policies. Upon eventually reaching a critical voting mass, the numerous reforms they 
passed had the overall impact of distributing authority more widely, especially away from its 
prior concentration in powerful committee chairmen and more toward subcommittee chairs 
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and party leaders.87 Decentralization was accompanied by changes in rules and procedures 
that (among several other impacts) ended seniority rules, opened committee and floor 
deliberations, required voting recordkeeping, and bolstered the power of the Speaker to select 
members of the agenda-controlling Rules Committee.88 These reforms enhanced the ability 
of party leaders to shepherd the legislative preferences of the (Democratic) majority party 
that was becoming increasing more ideologically homogeneous. The net implication for party 
influence was that the stakes for partisan control became greater, which prompted more 
extensive (across the electorate) and tighter (within Congress) partisan competition. 
Ideological competition and organizational influence now became more closely connected.  
Polarization has become an internally-reinforcing dynamic in American politics. 
Electoral realignment, including considerable partisan gerrymandering of Congressional 
districts in recent years, has resulted in ideologically-consistent districts that elect 
increasingly partisan and ideologically-extreme candidates.  Strongly-held beliefs and values 
are more difficult to compromise, and as the parties become more ideologically homogenous, 
policy positions become more opposed and difficult to agree on. As Terry Deibel observes, 
partisan polarization has resulted in “a certain de-legitimization of compromise as an 
honorable way to deal with policy differences.” The consequences for Congressional foreign 
policy-making would be the increasing difficulty in forging consensus on international 
issues, which most likely results in progressively less diplomatic and strategic flexibility in 
dealing with international problems.  
                                                            
87 A more detailed examination of Congressional reforms is presented in Davidson, Roger H. (Ed.). 1992. The 
Postreform Congress. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
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more comprehensive review). 
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Presidential leadership also depends on being able to cultivate broad support for 
foreign policy. However, Richard M. Skinner (2008) has proposed that Executive Branch 
partisanship greatly contributed to the increasing polarization of American politics.89 He 
distinguishes between “modern” presidencies and “partisan” presidencies. Skinner argues 
that a succession of “modern” postwar presidencies, Eisenhower through Carter, 
demonstrated a pattern of apathy toward their national party committee organizations that 
corresponded to the general decline of party influence in the electorate during their tenures. 
Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 brought a new pattern of presidency that works with, and 
relies more closely on the party organization; and indeed, makes the party a “tool of 
governance” by substituting party and ideological loyalists for non-partisan experts who 
(previously) staffed the “modern” administrations. Reagan’s pioneering partisan strategy 
culminated in an even more partisan version under George W. Bush. Although George H. W. 
Bush and William Clinton were less partisan presidencies and sought to engender bipartisan 
governance, they were highly constrained by electoral reliance on the revitalized ideological 
bases of their respective parties and could only go so far in compromising with the opposing 
party. 
 Where modern presidents tended to care little about down-ticket fortunes and the 
future of the party, partisan presidents became more involved in campaigning for party 
candidates and fundraising, and have placed more emphasis on highlighting party policy 
differences as voting choices and attempts to create a “permanent (or “new”) majority”, 
typified by Karl Rove’s campaign strategies. The partisan presidency is a strategy for 
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achieving the incumbent’s agenda, partially inspired Skinner speculates, by Richard Nixon’s 
arrangements to centralize policy control in the White House. 
In terms of Congressional relations, modern presidents more often sought to build ad- 
hoc coalitions to achieve their agendas; whereas the partisan presidents, especially George 
W. Bush, relied more on the Republican majority to achieve his goals rather than needing to 
create bipartisan majorities. The partisan presidents prompted the opposing (Democratic) 
party to tighten partisan unity, further polarizing Congressional voting. Ronald Reagan began 
to work more closely with the Republican leadership, “and in response to Reaganism, House 
Democrats devolved more authority unto Speaker “Tip” O’Neill.”90 It is not difficult to see 
that Skinner’s concept of the partisan presidency compliments polarizing processes already 
underway during the same period across the American electorate. 
The Structure of Foreign Policy Opinion 
Eugene R. Wittkopf (1990) has developed a widely used and debated model of 
internationalism in public opinion that differentiates cooperative from militant (military 
interventionist) internationalism.91 Both categories form bisecting continuums of opposition-
versus-support that sort the electorate (and by extension, their Congressional representatives) 
among four quadrants of foreign policy predispositions: Accommodationists who support 
cooperative internationalism but oppose military intervention; Isolationists who oppose both 
cooperative involvement and military intervention; Internationalists of the Cold War variety, 
discussed above, who support (multilateral) engagement backed by military power; and 
Hardliners who oppose cooperative internationalism but support military measures. Wittkopf 
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has found that since 1974, the American public divides almost evenly among these four 
categories, meaning that three-quarters of the public is internationalist in one sense or 
another. He has also found a close correspondence between these categories and certain 
demographic traits. Other scholars have proposed further subdividing the militant-
cooperative matrix into unilateralist and multilateralist categories to judge the politically-
significant question of whether public support for war hinges on engaging independently, or 
in concert with other states.92  
These typologies describe and classify American foreign policy orientations; but how 
have they become associated with each party as electoral realignment progressed? And, how 
are they related to the process of partisan polarization? 
The regional pattern of electoral realignment has already been sketched, but the 
foreign policy ideologies that accompanied those changes in party composition need further 
elaboration, beginning at the cultural level. It is at the cultural level that domestic and foreign 
policy dispositions meet. The starting assumption is that profound differences in attitudes 
toward international involvement, cooperation, and the use of military force are associated 
with different regions of the country which eventually become reflected in Congressional 
representation. For many scholars, the origins of regional attitudes lie in the historical 
political cultures carried by the various ethno-religious immigrants who settled each region.93 
Anatol Lieven contends, for example, that conservative white Southerners who switched 
party affiliation as a result of the Civil Rights reforms carried into the Republican Party the 
influence of populist traditions rooted in the violent deep history of religious discrimination 
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against their Scots-Irish Calvinist ancestors by Anglo-Irish Episcopalians during the 17th and 
18th centuries. An enduring, reinforcing connection between religious identity and 
nationalism; profound distrust of religious and commercial institutions and elites (stemming 
from historical conflicts with the Catholic and Episcopal Churches, and the English Crown); 
a tradition of violent defense of personal honor and acceptance of the role of violence in 
world affairs – translate today into empirically measurable levels of distrust of international 
institutions, greater military participation and public support for use of force.   
Dispositions relevant to foreign policy can be matched to the axial dichotomy 
between isolationism and internationalism proposed by Wittkopf. The many dimensions of 
any relationship between historical heritage and contemporary political attitudes would fill 
volumes, and is unnecessary for the essential argument that U.S. foreign policy attitudes have 
historical substance that systematically align with Wittkopf’s dimensions.  
The political dimensions of Iraq War voting are inseparable from electoral 
realignment and the ideological polarization of the parties. In Deibel’s (2007) account of the 
linkage between “opinion, parties, and polarization”, the end of the Cold War set in motion 
changes that have evolved into the highly polarized present. The “lack of perceived threats 
after the Soviet Union’s collapse [caused] the potency of internal [U.S. domestic] influences 
on foreign policy to rise during the 1990’s, accompanied by the reassertion of congressional 
prerogatives that were set aside during the long crisis of the Cold War.”94  
The portrait of closely-coupled ideological and partisan positions and the extension of 
domestic policy divisions into foreign policy contrast with the more traditional explanations 
for Congressional foreign policy politics based on perceptions of international threat, or 
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special interest entrepreneurialism. These conventional explanations may have accurately 
captured (mid-) 20th century politics; but those practices – especially instances of 
independent leadership - are harder to discern amid the ideological voting blocs of today. 
Gone are the independent foreign policy opinion leaders like Henry “Scoop” Jackson, Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan, and Sam Nunn, who represented distinct but erudite policy schools whose 
ideas about international engagement could be mixed and matched to build majorities to vote 
for pragmatic policy positions. As Terry Deibel contends, “[t]he replacement of moderates 
with extremists means that even presidents who want to lead the country rather just their 
party in foreign affairs have a much harder time doing so with firm support from the 
legislative branch.”95 With the hardening of partisanship and absence of ideological diversity, 
perhaps partisan strategies are the only way left to govern. 
The implications of increased partisanship and lower ideological diversity would 
ostensibly predict (all other factors remaining the same) that foreign policy activism in 
Congress will likely continue to be increasingly subordinated to partisan challenges to 
Executive leadership by a majority of the opposition party. However, few if any of the 
economic or electoral factors that have strengthened partisanship over the past thirty years 
are likely to remain the same. The severity of the current economic crisis and the 
precariousness of the global economy, along with dangerous challenges to regional stability 
in South Asia, mean that an increasing premium on Executive leadership and greater 
bipartisanship could be in the offing as the nation rallies behind Presidential leadership to 
face an increasingly uncertain and unstable world. The continued vitality and future of 
neoliberal globalization looks very uncertain as this is written in early 2009. Much will 
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depend on the approaches taken, and performance of the Obama Administration, in what 
could potentially become an extended era of multiple severe crises and reactive measures. 
Congressional activism could either increase as Administration missteps reduce public 
confidence in the President’s handling of foreign affairs, or decrease if the public places a 
premium on unitary leadership by the President as crises become more severe. 
Perhaps more important for the future of Congressional foreign policy will be how 
the current economic crisis affects domestic ideological assumptions that undergird electoral 
politics. The virtual halt in investment and growing antipathy toward laissez faire 
philosophies have yet to be felt in any particular foreign policy positions or legislation; but 
the broader social attitudes toward domestic economic and political circumstance that 
connect to foreign policy attitudes could be in for changes as yet unimagined. How would 
new distributional attitudes effect the perceptions voters hold about American power; or in a 
new era of enormous federal deficit spending, how will attitudes toward U.S. military power 
and intervention (perhaps in terms of their expense) be perceived? This could truly be a 
watershed moment in U.S. foreign policy and world history. 
III - Theories of Political Parties 
The purpose of this section is to review current empirical theories of political parties 
in Congress, and identify assumptions that pertain to party influence in foreign policy 
decisions generally, and to voting on the Iraq War specifically. There are several ways to 
study Congressional lawmaking that, at root, are differentiated by the assumptions they 
emphasize about the sources of influence on individual legislators, whether organizational or 
individually preferred. The good news is that little dispute exists in the theoretical literature 
over the idea that political parties are an organizational means to advance the goals of 
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politicians, or groups.96 The bad news is that substantial disagreements remain over how – or 
if – parties actually contribute to achieving political goals. In the absence of a universal 
theory, it is empirically challenging to validly connect particular voting outcomes with the 
behavior of party organizations. Unless research is specifically designed to test the tenets of a 
particular theory, researchers must choose which elements of competing approaches and 
paradigms best fit the voting history and data. 
The question of whether political parties are significant at all in voting decisions 
remains a central debate in the study of democratic legislatures. The literature of legislative 
structure can be divided between two schools of thought on the topic of party influence. One 
school essentially disregards the notion of ‘party’ as an analytic category based on: 1) the 
substantial evidence of internal divisions within parties (including declining party influence 
among the electorate) over most of the past century; and 2) the difficulty of validly modeling 
parties as either unitary, stable, or autonomous actors in the policy-making process, arising 
from the instability (“chaos”) of coalitions predicted by quantitative models of spatial voting 
(Schofield, 1980, 2006).97  
Theories belonging to the first school emphasize either the simple distribution of 
individual preferences, or at most, informal contingently-formed voting coalitions.98 The 
second school sees evidence of party influence in historical examples of the ‘whipping’ of 
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votes at the stage when policy choices reach the floor; the authority of majority parties over 
rules, committee appointments, and legislative schedules; and the solidarity of party voting 
on procedural (as opposed to substantive) issues. Theories of this second kind highlight the 
role of parties as floor voting coalitions or as procedural (agenda-controlling) coalitions. 
    Questions about party significance have paralleled historical variance in levels of 
partisanship in Congress and the electorate. In the early-1970’s, parties were nearly written-
off as worthy of study when new methods of analyzing historical roll call data revealed a 
decades-long decline in measures of influence among the electorate, and in Congressional 
voting cohesion.99 Standard metrics of party unity, such as the size of majorities in each party 
voting against one another; and the frequency of party votes as a percentage of all roll-call 
votes, indicated the lowest levels of party cohesion since the turn of the twentieth century.100 
The weakening of parties was also detected in declining straight-party balloting; a reduced 
role for party officials in the presidential nominating process; the increasing advantages of 
incumbency (and corresponding independence of incumbents from party organizations); and 
greater cross-over voting evidenced in roll call data.101  
Analytical Paradigms  
As party power waned by the early-1970’s, the traditional view of the Congressional 
party as a singular unit of analysis, comparable to the unanimity of British or Continental 
European parties, could no longer be justified and gave-way to more divisible models of 
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legislative decision-making.102 Two principal analytical paradigms that seemed to fit new 
ideas about the complexity of lawmaking arose to guide empirical research: rational choice 
and collective action (also known as ‘collective choice’, with variants called ‘social’- or 
public choice). Theories of institutions, forming a distinctive branch of collective choice 
approaches, comprise a third important perspective of Congressional order that melds 
assumptions from both rational and social choice approaches.103  
Economic theories of how individuals make choices in markets suggested analogies 
to legislative decisions, and scholars turned to a burgeoning number of ‘rational choice’ 
axioms to explain legislative outcomes in the context of individual- and group-level interest 
calculations. Accordingly, the predilections and choices available to individual legislators 
became the analytic centerpiece. Rational choice ideas are woven into theoretical 
assumptions on both sides of the argument for and against the significance of party influence.  
Both party-centered and non-party rational choice theories can trace their lineage to 
Anthony Downs (1957) portrait of parties and the political actors they comprise, as goal-
oriented and rational “team[s] seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in 
a duly constituted democracy”104 Parties and individual legislators were assigned 
complimentary roles. Downs regarded parties as “platforms” for aggregating appealing 
policies for the electorate; while individual candidates for office (and by extension, 
incumbents) built platforms and voted in a pattern that gravitated toward the median 
ideological preferences of the electorate.  
                                                            
102 ibid. Cox and McCubbins, 2007: 5. Traditional studies of Congressional institutions by American scholars 
often compared the fragmentation of U.S. political parties with British and continental European parties; and 
idealized European bloc voting discipline without taking into account the differences in candidate recruitment, 
parliamentary procedures and societal expectations of those parties. 
103 ibid., Montero and Gunther, 2003: 10‐16. 
104 Downs, Anthony. 1957. Towards an Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.  
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At the moment of least party sway in American politics, David Mayhew’s (1974) 
Congress: The Electoral Connection was among the first and most influential of a new wave 
of rational choice proposals to challenge the significance of parties as organizing units of 
Congressional decision-making.105 Mayhew started from a hypothesis that each legislator 
acts strictly on the basis of concern for reelection. He proposed three electoral-oriented 
activities that preoccupy legislators: advertising, credit-claiming and position-taking; and 
assessed how institutional arrangements facilitated those efforts. As a historical pattern, 
legislators generally seek institutional forms that reduce or minimize electoral risk. Party 
cohesion figures as a weak force because it does not always offer voting choices that enhance 
reelection chances. Ultimately, Mayhew argued that electoral requirements inexorably shape 
the organizational structure and operations of Congress. The system of standing committees, 
and subcommittees are particularly well suited – indeed, “. . . tailored to suit members’ 
electoral needs” - particularly credit-claiming.106 Committees, according to Mayhew, provide 
a forum separate from the chamber that permits individual Members to appear directly 
engaged in bringing subpoenaed actors or agencies to account; blocking unfavorable 
legislation; adding amendments favorable to constituents, etc.107 Committee and party 
leaderships are crucial for brokering competing interests to prevent institutional breakdown, 
in return for internal, rather than electoral, rewards; but Mayhew cast this as a background 
role rather one of primary political significance. Candidates and incumbents are their own 
most (reliable) organization and fundraisers. Mayhew presented such a compelling model of 
                                                            
105 Re‐published most recently: Mayhew, David R. 2005. Congress: The Electoral Connection, 2nd Revised 
Edition. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. I have relied on R. Douglas Arnold’s overview of the 
significance of Mayhew’s work in the Forward of this new edition. 
106 ibid., Mayhew, 1974: 60‐61, 92. 
107ibid., 1974: 97. 
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individual incentives, that parties and almost any collective action appeared marginal to 
organizational and legislative performance. 
When partisanship and leader activism began to increase during the 1980’s and 
1990’s, questions about the status of parties and institutional arrangements were re-cast in 
terms of how they help solve problems of collective action (Rohde, 1991; Cox and 
McCubbins, 1993; Sinclair, 1995, 2002). Broadly defined, a collective action approach asks 
how organizational arrangements address core problems of legislative power.108 Political 
institutions can be defined as bundled sets of rules, practices and relationships that translate 
into political outcomes.109 From an institutional perspective, the analytical questions become: 
what key rules, responsibilities, procedures or routines are implemented by the membership 
to solve dilemmas in the functioning of the organization, and/or advance collective 
interests?110   
Efforts to reach binding agreements through essential legislative processes (agenda-
setting, policy formulation, mustering majority votes, etc.) carry various costs in time and 
other resources that confront the membership as a whole. On the benefits side, law-making 
not only serves societal needs, but also generates public goods for actors within the 
legislative institution. These public goods have implications for the electoral security and 
                                                            
108 Implied from the general theoretical premise of Olsen, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. 
Boston: Harvard University Press. 
109 March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. “Elaborating the ‘New Institutionalism’”, in Rhodes, R.A.W., Sarah A. 
Binder and Bert A. Rockman, (Eds.). 2006. The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press; pp. 3‐22. 
110 The essence of the collection action approach is captured in questions that open Barbara Sinclair’s (1995) 
study of how the increasing use of special rules in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1980’s‐‘90’s 
reflected growing leadership activism: “What drives institutional arrangements? What is the core problem 
that members of the legislature are attempting to solve through institutional arrangements? What is the key 
mechanism through which the problem is tackled?” ‐  in Sinclair, Barbara, “House Special Rules and the 
Institutional Design Controversy”, in Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast, Eds. 1995. Positive Theories 
of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor, MI.: University of Michigan Press; p. 239. 
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relative power of particular legislators and voting coalitions. The kinds of public goods 
created include many of those postulated in earlier theories (such as Mayhew’s) that result 
from being able to claim credit for supporting passage of electorally-popular legislation or 
earmarks, or garnering commitments of support from other members on legislation of crucial 
interest (log-rolling). Institutional forms are assumed to reflect resource allocations and cost-
benefit trade-offs among politically-potent options.111 
Three Theories 
The current landscape of party theory is exemplified by three contending theories that 
illustrate how rational choice, collective action and institutional approaches frame alternative 
concepts of legislative behavior. These theories can be viewed as attempts to explain how 
political interests are transacted at the most fundamental level, and are included here to lend 
perspective to the underlying question addressed in this research of what essential processes 
structure political transactions in foreign policy-making. The primary assumptions of each 
theory will be summarized in turn; followed by a section (briefly) summarizing what each 
might have to offer analysis of this research. 
Theory 1: The first theory is the Conditional Party Government (CPG) model 
elaborated by David W. Rohde (1991), which argues for the presence and significance of 
partisan structure in Congress.112 Rohde starts from the premise that “the various rules, 
procedures, and traditional practices that are so extensive in the House have genuine 
consequences”; and therefore reflect some form of order and purpose. Committees, caucuses, 
conferences, rules and procedures, seniority, and the activity of party leaders are postulated 
                                                            
111 Sinclair, Barbara. 1995. Legislators, Leaders and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the 
Postreform Era. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press; p. 17. 
112 Rohde, David W. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Post‐Reform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
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to “realize outcomes different than would occur in their absence.”113 The model has effect 
when it is “clearer there is a majority party viewpoint – that is, the more homogenous the 
preferences of the majority party and the more distinct they are from the policy views of the 
minority – the more there should be a party effect” (Aldrich and Rohde, 1997b PSQ: 546).114 
According to Rohde; “[t]he word “conditional” simply means that the nature of its 
predictions depends on the distribution of policy views in the full House and between 
affiliates of the two parties” (1997: 546). The impact on voting is that “the majority party 
deflects outcomes from the chamber median toward the majority party median” (Sinclair, 
2002: 37). As the floor median is pulled toward the majority party median, policy outcomes 
“will be chosen. . . somewhere between the center of the floor and the center of the majority 
party” (Aldrich and Rohde, 1997: 547). This implies that for a chamber divided by a Liberal 
majority and a Conservative minority, policy outcomes will tend to correspond to the 
preferences of the more conservative wing of the Liberal party.  
To gather evidence, for example, of the affects of conditional party government in the 
historical voting record, four standard measures of cohesion in roll call voting that portray 
differences between parties, and agreement within parties, are used to analyze changes in 
Congressional partisanship.115 For distances between parties, the most widely-used 
dimension is the frequency of party voting, which is the proportion of votes that a majority of 
one party votes against a majority of the opposition party. Rohde (1991) points-out that “. . . 
                                                            
113 Aldrich, John H. and David W. Rohde. 1997b. ‘Congressional Politics’. Political Science Quarterly. Volume 
112: Number 4, 1997‐1998; p. 545. Sinclair (1995) found strong evidence that leadership activism correlated 
with the rising use of rules restricting amendments from the mid‐1970’s to the mid‐1980’s; apparently to 
harness greater rewards and inducements for party voting discipline. 
114 ibid., Aldrich and Rohde, 1997: 546. 
115 ibid., Rohde, 1991: pp. 8‐9. This statement and the following description of partisan measurement are 
included in this citation. 
65 
 
this is not an entirely satisfactory measure because it counts a vote on which the parties 
unanimously opposed one another the same as one on which only 51 percent majorities 
disagreed.”116 The second standard measure, average party difference, sharpens the 
distinction between majorities by calculating the absolute value of the proportion of those 
voting ‘aye’ in each party.  
For John H. Aldrich and David Rohde’s (1997) purposes, the level of agreement 
within parties is captured by two indexes. The index of cohesion is the absolute difference 
between the portion of those voting ‘aye’, and those voting ‘nay’ within each party in each 
vote. These figures are averaged over several votes to provide an indication of party loyalty 
or discipline during any given interval (or Congressional session).117 Similarly, the party-
unity index calculates the average proportion of party votes that individual members vote to 
support their party’s policy position; while the average across party member scores 
comprises an average for the party as a whole. 
More is to be gained than voting outcomes skewed from the chamber median. 
Conditional party governance is also a theory of collective action that proposes how parties 
compete and what they gain from majority control. As the “condition” of the theory becomes 
more pronounced - as agreement on issues within a party approaches unanimity, and contrast 
more with the positions of the opposing party – “partisans are increasingly likely to expand 
the powers granted to party leadership and organization, and to increase the resources 
channeled to them to act on those powers” (1997: 546). The purpose of strengthening party 
organization is to help those with shared preferences achieve collective interests. As Barbara 
                                                            
116 ibid., Rohde, 1991: 8. 
117 ibid., 1991: 9. 
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Sinclair observes: “[s]o long as members are assumed to have heterogeneous legislative 
preferences, there is an advantage to organizing a subgroup large enough to enact legislation, 
and more homogenous in its legislative performance than the membership as a whole.”118 But 
achievement of majority status also has rewards for party members. The foremost reward is 
control of the legislative agenda that not only satisfies collective aspirations, but also can be 
used to fulfill the goals of individual party members. Party leaders are also expected not 
simply to control the agenda, but also “to obtain policies that are along that dimension that 
are within the range of policies preferred by members.” An individual conservative or liberal 
legislator who is not necessarily the sponsor or cosponsor of a particular bill would 
nevertheless vote for bills that resonate with their broader view of proper social and political 
order. Rank-and-file party members empower their leaders, but also hold them responsible 
for fulfilling this (collective action) exchange. 
Aldrich and Rohde tested the CPG theory by examining the behavior of the 
Republican leadership that assumed majority status after the 1994 elections, during the 104th 
Congress. They concluded that while much depended on the leadership style of the new 
Speaker, Newt Gingrich (R-6th District, GA.) - who gained early control over committee 
assignments by foregoing seniority traditions and installing loyal chairs, and sustained 
support of his “Contract With America” agenda through a diligent and open communication 
strategy with all segments of his party – he, and party leaderships generally, are still subject 
to considerable limitations. 
Majority party control does not imply as absolute a level of control over chamber 
affairs that European parliamentary majorities enjoy. The partisan balance (margin of 
                                                            
118 ibid., Sinclair, 1995: 240. 
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majority), and the nature of the issues, determine the degree of control the majority 
leadership is able to exercise. Defections are an acute hazard for a party with a thin majority 
margin, and place a premium on the homogeneity of preferences within the party. The model 
of conditional party governance is weak if the issue mix is divisive. Agenda control is vital to 
preventing divisive issues from coming up for vote. Party leaders are expected to support the 
interests of the rank-and-file in exchange for enhanced authority. On the other hand, leaders 
are also constrained not to press particular policy positions if the body of the party is divided 
over the issue; at the risk of being deposed by party factions opposed to the leader’s 
preference(s).   
James Lindsay cites an example of this dilemma when Democratic opponents of the 
MX ICBM missile program began to discuss unseating party leaders supporting the program, 
Speaker Thomas S. Foley (D, WA.) changed his position from support in 1983 to opposition 
the following year – despite the fact that Boeing, then headquartered in his home state of 
Washington, was the prime contractor for the program.119 One of the more interesting 
corollaries of the conditional party theory is that it extends beyond Congress to include the 
role of the President in regulating the level of Congressional partisanship. The ideological 
consistency of Ronald Reagan’s policy agenda made it easier for Democrats to forge a 
consensus on alternative policies; a phenomenon that may have contributed to George W. 
Bush’s partisan contentions with the 110th Congress. 
Theory 2: A second school of thought on the role of parties has been led by Keith 
Krehbiel (1993), who defines “significant party behavior . . . as behavior that is independent 
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of [individual] preferences.”120 Indeed, the foremost concept of non-partisan Congressional 
structure is Krehbiel’s (1991, 1993, 1997a, 1998) Pivotal Politics theory.121 The principal 
assumption is that simple majority rule is more important than the rules, procedures, customs, 
committees, and caucus structures. Only various majorities, centered differently across 
different median issue preference points, matter in roll call voting. The policy adopted can 
therefore be predicted as the preference of the legislator occupying the median position along 
the policy space.  
Krehbiel’s theory seeks to explain why policy gridlock in Congress is “common, but 
not constant,” and why coalitions do not often match the exact size of partisan majorities – in 
other words, why “coalitions are regularly bipartisan and greater than simple-majority size” 
(1998:21). Krehbiel asserts that “an improved theory of lawmaking should identify 
conditions under which gridlock is broken, and it should account for some variation in 
(unusually large) coalition sizes.”122 
The pivotal politics model rests on assuming that the “policy space is 
unidimensional”; that policy proposals can be arranged along a continuous one-dimensional 
liberal-to-conservative line that accommodates all policy positions. The position that each 
legislator takes on the line is called an “ideal point” - the position that “yields greater benefits 
to the [legislator] than all other policies.”(1998:22).  
As Aldrich and Rohde (1997) point out, majority rule is exercised in Krehbiel’s 
model in two ways. The first exercise of majority rule is the election and reelection of 
members. This is the only incentive in the theory that holds legislators responsible to their 
                                                            
120 Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. “Where's the Party?”, British Journal of Political Science 23: pp. 235‐266. 
121 My brief description of the pivotal politics theory draws from Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A 
Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press; pp. 20‐30. 
122 ibid., Krehbiel, 1998: 21 (italics in the original text). 
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constituencies (and accounts for the stability of their decision location on the unidimensional 
policy line).123 Secondly, the policy status quo does not change without a simple majority 
vote for alternative policy – “only [those policies] that a majority of the full House prefer to 
the status quo can pass.”124 The ideal point does not necessarily represent the exclusive 
preference of the individual legislator, but rather a mixed balance of constituency preferences 
and personal viewpoint that remains stable over time across related issues. However, 
legislators are constrained by two “supermajoritarian procedures”: the presidential veto, and 
the Senate’s filibuster debate rules (60 vote requirement for passage). Presidential vetoes 
must be overridden by a two-thirds majority in the House, while the Senate’s Rule 22 
requires a three-fifths (60-vote) majority to end a filibuster.  
Thus, the term pivotal refers not to each Member’s preferred decision point on the 
policy continuum; but rather to the importance of four constraints on voting along the 
continuum. Four “pivotal players” determine policy outcomes in Congress: 1) The decision 
of the legislator occupying the median policy preference position along the unidimensional 
issue space in each chamber; 2) the 41-Senator minimum filibuster pivot; 3) the presidential 
veto power; and 4) the congressional override power. The pivotal points work in a specific 
order: First, the median legislator decides first to either support a new policy, or the status 
quo. Next, the “filibuster pivot” in the Senate decides to either hold-up legislation or permit 
passage; third, the President decides to either sign or veto legislation; and finally, Congress 
can override a veto with a two-thirds majority if sufficient support exists.  
                                                            
123 ibid., Aldrich and Rohde, 1997: 543. 
124 Aldrich and Rohde suggest reading Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast, “Institutionalizing Majority 
Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications”, American Economic Review, Volume 72 (May, 1982), 
pp. 367‐371. 
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Theorists who emphasize non-party influences set a high bar for demonstrating party 
and other organizational affects. Critics of the pivotal politics theory have three general 
concerns. First, as Barbara Sinclair contends, the model “takes members’ preferences as a 
given; the determination of preferences is not considered… [and] assumes away much of the 
political process in Congress.”125 The pivotal model leaves out any consideration of “how 
legislative preferences are shaped”, and risks overlooking the possibility that preferences are 
“less stable and more manipulable . . . by party leaders in and out of Congress” (39). The 
assumption that party has consequence only when “individual legislators vote with fellow 
party members in spite of their disagreement about the policy in question” begs the question 
of who persuaded the legislator to vote against their preferences in the first place.126  
The second and third concerns are raised by Aldrich and Rohde, who assert that there 
may potentially be multiple majorities on any given issue.  They contend that “unless there is 
a majority to work remotely [during committee deliberations, for example] to achieve a 
desired policy outcome, there is little reason to expect that those actions that distantly 
precede final passage in time or location will be predicated on what “the” majority wants.” 
The third concern is that incentives for occupying leadership roles in each chamber are not 
explained. Party leadership positions are highly coveted, and some form of incentive must 
exist to bear the costs in time and effort of coaxing a majority to act in its collective interests. 
Theory 3: The third theory of parties, and perhaps the foremost statement of the 
institutional approach is Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins Procedural Cartel 
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model.127 In economic terms, a cartel is an association of independent organizations formed 
to limit competition by controlling the production and distribution of a product or service.128 
Cartels are an institutional arrangement that solve problems of collective action. In the 
Congressional sense, the standing committees and party leadership posts are analogous to 
independent firms that form an association to regulate procedural aspects of the decision-
making process and advance (majority) party interests.  
In contrast to traditional theories of “committee government” that relegated political 
parties to the margin, the procedural cartel model gives parties precedence in shaping the 
power of the committees (and other organizations). The majority party acts as a “structuring 
coalition, stacking the deck in its own favor – both on the floor and in committee – so as to 
create a kind of “legislative cartel” that dominates the legislative agenda”129 One of the most 
significant forms of institutional power is control of appointments to the standing 
committees. In the cartel analogy, committees do not function as completely autonomous 
power centers (as depicted in traditional “committee government” concepts); but rather as 
affiliates of the (majority) party that “structur[es] the committee system – setting up 
jurisdictions, allocating resources, assigning members, and so forth – and then letting things 
proceed on “automatic pilot.” Majority parties create institutional arrangements that enable 
their members to both veto legislative initiatives by the opposing party, and get their own 
legislative initiatives to the floor. 
                                                            
127 Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2007. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
128 Cox and McCubbins do not offer a general definition of  ‘cartel.’ I borrow the definition given at: 
http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=cartel  
129 ibid., Cox and McCubbins, 2007: 251. 
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Cox and McCubbins observe that there are a wide range of structural and procedural 
processes employed to exert party influence. Party and staffing ratios, appointments, and 
legislative scheduling lead a potentially longer list of ways institutional means have “been 
used consistently for partisan purposes.” Evidence of majority party influence on procedural, 
rather than final passage voting from the 94th through 105th Congress’ (1975-1998) has been 
reported by Jenkins, Crespin, and Carson (2003), who interviewed exiting and former House 
members with no further political constraints on candor about cartel processes.130 Generally, 
the procedural cartel theory offers a way to visualize party effects as touching concrete levers 
of powers, though as having a less direct imprint on policy or decision-making. Where other 
models of party influence have a way of suggesting that the legislative agenda and bill 
writing are directly controlled by the party organization, the cartel model leaves slightly more 
space for the influence of powerful, semi-autonomous individuals. 
In simple terms, the question of political party significance is whether parties make 
Congress different than it would be if there were no parties. Most voting research is designed 
to identify independent effects of party identity or organizational influence either through 
voting, or through some means of structuring the legislative process (through agenda control, 
committee appointments, rule-making, etc.).131  Alternatively, those who argue that parties 
are less central, as Keith Krehbiel contends, point to evidence that legislator preferences are 
so closely matched with party identity that ideology is more predictive of voting than the 
influence of either party identity or party organizational processes. Krehbiel would require 
that to distinguish party as an independent influence, legislators would have to vote for the 
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preference(s) of the median party voter, or the preferences of the party leader, rather than 
their own preferred positions. Krehbiel excludes all other criteria for discerning party 
influence that would disprove the hypothesis that ideology essentially matches party identity.  
Party Identity as an Empirical Variable: 
 Meeting Krehbiel’s criteria for autonomous party influence would certainly appear to 
be getting tougher as the American political parties become more ideologically 
homogeneous. But would it be possible to test party identification and ideological coding 
separately against the same voting outcomes, and compare their significance? This is the 
method for gauging party influence that will be employed in this research. 
If the parties are becoming more ideologically uniform, does party identity remain 
validly distinct from ideological coding? There are two reasons why party identity can still be 
conceptualized as distinct from the personal ideologies of lawmakers. First, important 
sources of variance in ideological composition still leave room for imagining the need for 
internal party policy negotiations. Although Wittkopf has presented evidence that certain 
demographic correlates of party identification correspond to the dimensions of his typology 
of foreign policy attitudes (intervention v. non-intervention; isolationism v. internationalism), 
these are not absolute.132 Each party remains internally divided between declining numbers 
of centrist internationalists (who regard both cooperation and military means legitimate), 
accommodationists of the Left, and hardline unilateralists of the Right in the Democratic and 
Republican parties respectively. While differences over the role of military force typically 
divide the parties from each other, exceptions occur in times of clear danger that episodes 
                                                            
132 ibid., Wittkopf, 1990: 49. Some demographic correlates of party affiliation are summarized in Figure 2.2 on 
page 49. 
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like the Cold War, and 9/11, represented.133 Both parties also have member voters who are 
“non-internationalist” – that swing between interventionism and isolationism: who join 
accommodationists when fearful of the consequences of military involvement, or join 
hardliners either in opposition to cooperation when they fear it runs against the national 
interest, or for intervention when they perceive national security is threatened. Given these 
qualifications, party identity can only serve as a very blunt and generic label of foreign policy 
preferences. 
Secondly, the political parties are more than an ideological label. They are also 
widely-conceptualized as an organized means of collective action that structure decision-
making in order to gain institutional power. We must consider that in many instances the 
secular aims of advancing party organizational interests may transcend the ideological merits 
of the policy issue as an influence in voting decisions. Hypothetically, the positions of 
Democratic leaders may have represented, in part, an attempt to harness electoral opposition 
to the war to advance the institutional power of the party, while Republican support for the 
President’s policy might have seemed an overriding necessity to retain the support of that 
party’s constituent base. In this interpretation, Iraq War legislation was merely another 
commodity to be transacted for party power. A central methodological challenge in voting 
studies is to validly distinguish between secular power gambits and the influence of more 
philosophical considerations. 
For the purposes of this research, a compromise between the ideological and 
organizational significance of parties is used: Party identity simply serves to designate each 
side of the debate - as a label for opposition or support of Bush Administration policy. A 
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Democratic Party code designates a potential opponent of Administration war policy, and a 
Republican Party code identifies a likely supporter. The formal Democratic Party policy 
position was opposed to continued U.S. involvement in the war, and supported withdrawal of 
U.S. combat forces rather than the new surge strategy implemented during 2007. The 
Republican Party represented support for the President’s policies. The Democratic Party thus 
became the “brand” of choice for various schools of opposition to U.S. involvement in Iraq. 
In essence, party identity simply serves as another (albeit blunt) predictor of opposition or 
support for war policy – for both ideological and organizational reasons. The question 
addressed by this research is whether it is a stronger or weaker predictor of voting.  
If party identity merely serves to label opposing sides of the debate, what would be 
the implications of finding that party identity is more closely associated with voting 
outcomes than the strength of the correlation between voting and ADA scores? In that case, 
we would have obtained at least a first approximation answer that the benefits of 
organizational loyalty potentially outweighed the merits of adhering to ideological principles. 
The result would still not clearly tell us specifically which ideological values were 
compromised, or how the benefits of party loyalty translated into concrete institutional 
advantages for the party. Whether the benefits of voting with the party can be discerned in 
agenda control, committee appointments, or party leadership promotions, the essential 
connection is the extent to which party members vote for issue positions declared for their 
party organizations. However, if the Democratic opposition had succeeded in legislating 
constraints on Administration policy, then certainly the party would have accrued higher 
public approval ratings, and likely gained additional influence relative to the White House. 
This might have taken the form of either being able to hold, or gather more, votes for anti-
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war legislation within Congress, or in forcing the Administration to revise political 
calculations about taking further initiatives in war policy. 
During early 2007 however, the White House was apparently more concerned with 
Republican Party cohesion than the Democratic majorities. The Administration had to invest 
more effort in sustaining at least 41 Senate votes than in attempting to build bipartisan 
support.134 
IV - Ideology in Congressional Research 
The role of ideology in voting behavior is difficult to measure. Although policy issues 
and legislation are debated in reference to particular ideas and beliefs, the final voting 
decisions of legislators are hard to validly attribute to ideological conviction alone because 
decisions may also have been weighed against electoral considerations. The problem is to 
isolate ideological influence from other considerations in voting, and for the most part, this 
consists of inference. 
Most concepts of ideology for empirical research have a basis in Philip Converse’s 
foundational 1964 essay, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Politics”.135 Drawing on 
survey research conducted during the 1950’s, Converse identified stratified differences in 
ideological development between political elites and the general public. He theorized 
ideology as a belief system, “. . . a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements 
are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (p. 207). 
Elites, including Members of Congress, hold more structured (consistent or “constrained”) 
belief systems than most citizens primarily because they are immersed in, and think about, 
                                                            
134 See: Nather, David, "A Last‐Ditch Plea To a Wavering Party", CQ Weekly, July 16, 2007; pp. 2094‐2096. 
135 Converse, Philip E. 1964. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics”, in Apter, D. E. (ed.). 1964.  
Ideology and Discontent. New York and London: Free Press; pp. 206-261. 
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policy issues more frequently (by virtue of their status); “…simply ‘thinking about’ a domain 
of idea-elements serves both to weld a broader range of idea-elements into a functioning 
belief system, and to eliminate strictly logical inconsistencies defined from an objective point 
of view (p. 183).”136 Converse did not require that ideologies contain logically consistent or 
even necessarily-related beliefs; simply that issues are linked together, or “bundled”, by a 
particular understanding of “what-goes-with-what” (p. 13). 
 For legislative research, belief systems are significant as a predictive trait because 
they bundle voting preferences together. Converse contends that, “[c]onstraint may be taken 
to mean the success we would have in predicting, given an initial knowledge that an 
individual holds a special attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes” (1964: 
207). This suggests that a vote cast on one or more issues should allow us to estimate how 
the same individual will vote on a wider set of issues. With this premise, it becomes possible 
to see an empirical basis for evaluating the influence of ideology by associating the 
preferences reflected in the voting record on one set of issues with voting on other types of 
legislation. 
Spatial Models of Voting 
The way that belief systems predict how votes are linked to other votes is only a short 
step away from visualizing ideology as a “dimensional” framework that structures voting 
preferences in a linear order. A chamber of legislators can be ranked by how their votes 
consistently fall as preferred, or “ideal”, points along a continuum of ideological positions 
from Left or liberal, to Right or conservative. Roll call votes split only two ways, for or 
                                                            
136 Cited from a reprinting of Converse, Philip E. 1964. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” in Jost, 
John T. and Jim Sidanius, eds. 2004. Political Psychology. New York: Psychology Press; p. 183. Found at: 
http://books.google.com/books 
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against a bill, dividing the continuum in half according to how legislators evaluate the 
ideological implications of the bill. The roll call division itself constitutes the measure of the 
role ideology played in the voting outcome. The outcome of voting will be to one side or the 
other of how the median legislator has voted. If the majority of votes fall to the left of the 
median legislator, the liberal side wins because moderates (in the center of the continuum) 
and enough conservatives do not regard the issue sufficiently inconsistent with conservative 
principles. The converse is true of liberals if voting splits to the right and conservatives win. 
Voting coalitions shift as the critical median vote shifts. This very simplified depiction is the 
basis of spatial models of roll call voting that have become the most widely used method for 
evaluating the role of ideology in legislative decisions. 
Some of the most sophisticated spatial models of Congressional voting have been 
developed by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1991, 1997, and 2007), who assume 
that “[t]he basic implication of the constraint hypothesis is that all issues tend to be mapped 
onto a fixed ordering or placement of legislators” (2007:13).137 This means that each issue 
has a particular ideological significance that corresponds – or “maps” – to a point, or interval, 
among a fixed order of legislators along the Left-Right ideological continuum. The 
ideological order of legislators forms a “predictive” dimension that policy issues map into.138 
The ordering of legislators holds across diverse issues, but their “ideal” voting points shift 
within an estimated interval unique to each issue (calculated with complex stochastic 
equations).  Accordingly, each policy issue will have a unique midpoint between those 
legislators who vote for, and those who vote against, legislation (in substantive or procedural 
                                                            
137 Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. (2007). Ideology and Congress. New Brunswick, N.J. and London: 
Transaction Publishers. 
138 ibid., Poole and Rosenthal, 2007: 13. 
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form) pertaining to the issue. Highly polarizing issues would tend to cluster legislators on 
either side of the issue closer together as the preference intervals of like-minded legislators 
narrowed. Less divisive issues would distribute voting preferences more widely along the 
ideological continuum. 
Poole and Rosenthal caution that spatial models can evaluate policy outcomes, but 
not necessarily predict outcomes ahead of voting. Spatial modeling is retrospective, but 
applicable to roll call voting data for any Congress - indeed, over the entire history of the 
Republic. In a 1997 (and 2007) study, Poole and Rosenthal were able to fit all congressional 
roll call votes taken between 1789 and 1985 into a two-dimensional spatial model to estimate 
85 percent of the voting decisions of each member. Poole (2005) has been able to estimate 
that a single dimension (economic/wealth distribution) accounts for close to 90 percent of all 
roll call votes by the 104th-105th Congress. The pertinence of these astonishing results for 
evaluating the role of ideology in legislative research is that a vote on a single issue is a 
pretty reliable clue about how that individual will vote on other legislation, largely 
confirming the predictive quality of ideology hypothesized by Converse.  
It also becomes possible to see how beliefs pertaining to domestic policy can extend 
to foreign policy issues, and how increasing ideological division over domestic policy cause 
foreign policy positions to drift apart as well. 
Coding Ideology 
Another method of inferring ideological influence is a simple scoring logic employed 
by ideological interest groups to gauge the relative support of members of Congress for their 
positions on a broad array of legislation. The Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) 
calculates a “Liberal Quotient” (LQ) rating for every member of Congress. The LQ score is 
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the percentage of twenty votes each Member casts in favor of the Liberal position that the 
ADA identifies for each of the twenty pieces of legislation on diverse policy issues. All votes 
are worth five points, for a total of 100 points. A Representative or Senator voting in favor of 
the ADA position in 15 of the 20 votes would receive an LQ score of 75 percent; which 
implies a 75 percent probability that he or she will vote the liberal position on any given 
piece of legislation.139 ADA ideological scores remain one of the best (shorthand) indicators 
of voting proclivities precisely because they offer a composite measure of complex belief 
systems across votes on multiple, disparate issues.  
Because the types of issues scored in creating the LQ ratings is diverse, it may be 
surmised that the interest group scoring method tests Converse’s “bundling” concept to the 
maximum. However, the ideological “constraining” function is really exercised by ADA’s 
Legislative Committee, which decides what the Liberal position for each bill is. On one hand, 
this selection process may contribute to the validity of the LQ measure by providing a 
consistent reference for equitably calibrating the voting tendencies of the population of all 
members, some of whom probably hold ideological proclivities that exceed even the Liberal 
range of the Legislative Committee itself.  
On the other hand, some scholars fear that Legislative Committee choices introduce a 
degree of selection bias. How representative is the Legislative Committee of median 
American Liberalism? William R. Shaffer (1989) performed a principle components analysis 
of the reliability and validity of ADA scoring for both the House and Senate between 1969 
and 1986, and found that although “some specific roll-call votes are weak indicators of the 
                                                            
139 A more complete description of how ADA calculates the ‘Liberal‐Quotient’ (LQ) scores using the 
Congressional voting record is described at the organization’s website: www.adaction.org/media/ 
votingrecords/2007.pdf 
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‘Liberalism’ factor”, the factor remained a reliable and valid indicator of ideological 
character.140 On the whole, ADA LQ scores, and similar scores for conservative adherence 
generated by the American Conservative Union (ACU), are widely used in empirical 
research and have become an accepted standard as a “proxy” measure of ideological 
attributes.  
In the end, how do we know whether most members of Congress have strong 
ideological convictions specifically about the war? Knowledge of international affairs, and 
the nature of warfare itself (especially conflicts as complex as counterinsurgency), are 
limited among constituents, and by extension most of their representatives. Can ideological 
coding serve as a valid attribution of beliefs about the war? The answer is that we should 
think of them as suggestive of a relationship between attitudes on a wide range of issues - 
including war, and particularly the Iraq War. However, just because a representative or 
senator with an above-average (toward the Liberal end of the continuum) LQ score votes 
against Iraq War policy doesn’t necessarily mean that he or she has not balanced non-
ideological considerations against their vote. The present research does not correlate 
particular foreign policy ideologies with Iraq War voting. But if roughly three-quarters of the 
House and Senate are internationalists to one degree or another according to Wittkopf’s 
typology of foreign policy opinion, then attitudes toward military intervention are the 
primary, or most fundamental, ideological issue distinguishing supporters from opponents of 
the Iraq War. 
 
                                                            
140 Shaffer, William R., “Rating the Performance of the ADA in the U.S. Congress”, The Western Political 
Quarterly, Volume 42, Number 1, March, 1989; pp. 33‐51. 
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Ideology as an Empirical Variable: 
Ideology has been conceptualized as a predictive quality, operationalized in empirical 
research as a measure of reliability in supporting Liberal or Conservative positions across 
multiple votes – the way ADA scores are derived as a percentage of votes for a particular 
(Liberal) position across diverse issues. If foreign policy attitudes are regarded as an 
extension of attitudes toward other types of issues and policy, then voting across diverse 
issues is likely to predict attitudes toward international policy. The ADA scores do not 
necessarily place or “map” the holder into a specific category of American strategic culture 
or foreign policy attitudes, but ratings along a Liberal-to-Conservative spectrum have been 
correlated with attitudes toward international engagement and the role of military force in 
world affairs. While it might be possible in future research to code individual lawmakers 
with a more precise measure of their foreign policy attitudes, perhaps based on votes cast 
specifically on foreign policy issues and/or position statements, for the purposes of this 
research ADA scores are used simply as a measure of the relative inclination to support or 
oppose war policy. 
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Chapter 3 – Research Design 
During 2007, a newly-elected Democratic Party majority swept into office by a 
powerful tide of opposition to the Iraq War was unable to alter White House war policy. It is 
widely recognized that the sixty-vote majority requirement in the Senate was crucial to 
sustaining President Bush’s Iraq policy - only 41 votes were necessary to prevent passage of 
anti-war policy. Senate Republicans, at times by the narrowest margin, repeatedly blocked 
bills containing any language that would have thwarted the surge, withdrawn forces by a 
particular deadline, set troop rotation intervals, limit or suspend funding; or restrict 
employment of forces within Iraq’s borders. And cloture votes were used by Senate 
Republicans on all issues so often that by the end of the first session in December, 2007, the 
62 cloture votes had been called and cast exceeded the record set for both years of the entire 
107th Congress during 2001-2002.141 
This project will not provide a unique explanation for why the Bush Administration’s 
war policy remained intact. The modest goal of this research is simply to contribute some 
evidence that might suggest how partisan loyalty and ideology are presently balanced in 
voting decisions on an issue as central to U.S. foreign policy as war. Majority status was not 
sufficient to wrest control of war policy from the President, but that does not mean that party 
influence was not strong. Nor does it mean that partisanship was the exclusive voting 
consideration for each legislator. The central problem is to validly distinguish the role played 
by each factor. The general method will be to separately correlate party identity and ideology 
with roll call voting, and then compare the strength of those correlations. The strength and 
                                                            
141 Epstein, Edward and Bart Jansen, “Role Reversal Yields Stalemate”, CQ Weekly, January 7, 2008; p. 18. 
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statistical significance of those correlations will serve as the measure of the relative influence 
each factor exerted in voting decisions. 
To this point, the focus has been on describing electoral and partisan changes external 
to Congress, and the theoretical issues they raise, that set the stage for voting on war 
legislation during 2007. The dimensions of electoral opposition to the war have been 
examined in Gary Jacobson’s analysis of the 2006 elections; Presidential actions that appear 
to have further galvanized opposition prior to the elections and President Bush’s change in 
strategy to remain engaged contrary to election results; and changes in the ideological 
character of the electorate and the rise of partisanship in American politics in recent decades 
were assessed. Theories of Congressional politics, organization, parties, and ideology have 
also been reviewed to frame some of the issues pertaining to the present research. The last 
step before turning to review Iraq War voting results within Congress is to describe how 
those outcomes will be analyzed. 
Method of Analysis 
In overview, the research process consisted of correlating ordinal party identification 
codes, and interval LQ ideological ratings provided by the Americans for Democratic Action 
(ADA), with votes for and against Iraq War policy in separate cross-tabulations. The separate 
party and ideology correlations were then compared to assess which variable had the closest, 
or most significant, association with voting outcomes. The votes included twenty-two Senate, 
and twenty-six House, votes on Iraq War bills selected from the numbered votes listed and 
described in weekly issues of Congressional Quarterly published during 2007. The 
legislation voted on was organized by issue category to compare differences in partisan and 
ideological voting patterns across the subject matter of Iraq War issues. 
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To answer the basic question of whether party identity or ideological coding is a 
better predictor of voting on Iraq War legislation, a statistical procedure was needed to 
compare the relative influence of both variables in each roll-call vote. Isolating the causal 
effects of the independent party and ideology variables is becoming a greater challenge as 
parties have become more ideologically homogeneous. Party identity has become so 
intertwined with certain ideological dispositions, that only careful comparisons of paired 
observations on these two variables will distinguish their effects.  
The Chi-Square (χ²) statistic is the perfect tool for this requirement because it 
measures the extent to which observations would be different from the case of no relationship 
between independent and dependent variables.142 The statistic also provides a level of 
confidence or probability that the relationship is significant. Chi-Square analysis is applied to 
determine whether independent variables have any methodical impact; in this case, whether 
discrete party identity (ID) and ideological ADA variables ordered voting by chance, or had 
some level of systematic impact. 
 While the Chi-Square test is valuable for indicating whether the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables is significant, it does not report the scale or size of the 
relationship. Furthermore, the Chi-square statistic is influenced by sample size, which does 
not always reveal treatment effects – larger sample sizes simply result in larger statistics.143  
 
 
                                                            
142 This preliminary definition, and following discussion of the Chi‐Square statistic, is borrowed from Lisa A. 
Baglione. 2007. Writing a Research Paper in Political Science. Belmont, CA.: Thomson‐Wadsworth; pp. 132‐
136. 
143 Abrami, Philip C., Paul Cholmsky and Robert Gordon. 2001. Statistical Analysis for the Social Sciences: An 
Interactive Approach. Boston, London: Allyn and Bacon; p. 522. 
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A standard measure of effect size is the phi-coefficient (Φ), where: 
Φ = √ χ² ⁄ N 
(N = overall sample size, in this case the number of votes cast for each piece legislation.) 
Jacob Cohen (1988) has assigned phi-coefficient effect sizes the following range:144 
0.10 = small effect 
0.30 = medium effect 
0.50 = large effect. 
A phi-coefficient will be calculated for each of the party and ideology chi-square values 
produced for each voting outcome. Comparison of party and ideological Φ values should 
offer additional insight into the strength of each variable’s respective contribution to the 
voting results. 
Variables, Sources, and Coding 
Three different variables were used for this study. Two independent variables - party 
identity, and the ADA ratings as a proxy score for ideology - were each separately evaluated 
against a third (dependent) variable that consisted of the voting record on Iraq War 
legislation. All statistical procedures were performed with SPSS™ (V.14) statistical analysis 
software.145 
Party: The party identity of each member of Congress was drawn from the roll call 
order of the 110th Congress published with the list of legislation voted on each week by 
Congressional Quarterly. Party identification was coded with the commonly used scores of 
                                                            
144 Cohen, Jacob. 1988. Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 2nd Edition. Hillsdale, N.J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Quoted in Abrami, Cholmsky and Gordon, 2001: 522. 
145 SPSS is a registered trademark of SPSS Inc.  © 2009 . All rights reserved. SPSS Inc. Headquarters, 233 S. 
Wacker Drive, 11th floor, Chicago, Illinois 60606. 
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‘100’ for Democrats, and ‘200’ for Republicans. Independent and other party affiliations 
were excluded from the data set, with the exception of Senator Joseph Lieberman (I- CT.), 
who was re-coded as a Democrat because he continues to caucus with Senate Democrats 
since changing his party affiliation in 2006. In all but foreign affairs, Senator Lieberman’s 
voting record closely resembles median Democratic preferences in supporting social and 
economically liberal domestic legislation. 
ADA Scores: The ideological orientation of each Member, on a Liberal-Conservative 
continuum, was represented by proxy measure in the form of the widely-used Liberal 
Quotient (LQ) calculated by the ADA. As discussed in the previous chapter, LQ ratings are 
determined by the percentage of votes cast in support of twenty pieces of legislation 
representing liberal policies on a variety of issues selected by ADA’s Legislative Committee. 
Liberal Quotient (LQ) scores for this research were drawn from ADA data sets for the 110th 
Congress at ADA’s website: www.adaction.org.146 
Because the ADA scores are continuous variables, it was necessary to recoded them 
for bivariate analysis according to the mean ADA score in each chamber: ‘0’ for those 
percentages less than the chamber mean, and ‘1’ for percentages greater than the chamber 
mean. Some members of the House entered office between elections to fill vacancies caused 
by illness or death, and had not yet received an ADA rating. The seven House members 
missing ADA scores, and their votes, were selected-out of the sample. 
Voting Record Data: The voting record that provided the dependent variables for this 
analysis consisted of selected roll call votes on Iraq War legislation taken from data arrays 
                                                            
146 The full website address is: www.adaction.org/media/votingrecords/2007.pdf. Commentary and overview 
are provided at the site in the ADA Action online publication section. 
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compiled by Jeff Lewis and Keith Poole at their website: www.voteview.com/DWNL.htm.147 
The separate data arrays for the House and Senate are a record of all votes taken during the 
current Congress, and are very large digital files. Information on each lawmaker, including 
party identification, state, and district numbers, are coded with ICPSR conventions. The 
twenty-two Senate and twenty-six House votes used for the present research were selected 
out of the total voting record, and placed into two new arrays in separate Excel™ 
spreadsheets that served as SPSS™ input.148 All voting abstentions were selected-out of each 
cross-tabulation. 
One concern bearing on the research design was that the level of influence exerted by 
the independent variables might vary according to the issues being voted on in each piece of 
legislation. Some policy issues might be more significant for ideological beliefs than others; 
with less sensitive issues decided in the context of certain institutional advantages accrued 
from demonstrating party loyalty. To control for issue content, the voting record was sorted 
into five categories of war policy issues, identical for each chamber, described in more detail 
below. 
Tests Performed 
Chi-Square tests were performed on cross-tabulations assembled by SPSS™ to 
separately correlate party identification (ID) and ideology (ADA score) with each and every 
vote. Cross-tabulations express the joint distribution between two or more variables. The 
cross-tabs for each vote consisted of 2x2 matrices with yea and nay votes along one axis - 
                                                            
147 The data arrays actually exist further  into the voteview website at: 
http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/rollcall/static/S110.ord (110th Senate roll call voting data) and 
http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/rollcall/static/H110.ord (110th House roll call votes). 
148 Excel is a registered trademark of ©Microsoft Corporation. The Excel version used for this project is part of 
Microsoft Office 2007. 
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and either the party ID codes (‘100’ for Democrats, ‘200’ for Republicans), or the recoded 
ADA variables (recoded ‘1’ or ‘0’ depending on the original scores relationship to the 
chamber mean) - along the other axis. 
Along with basic Chi-Square testing, SPSS™ conveniently facilitated the 
performance of other tests of the strength-of-association of variables within each of the cross-
tabulations. These statistics included a Chi-Square Test of Pearson that is a ‘goodness-of-fit’ 
test to identify whether data fits a particular type of probability distribution; a continuity 
correction function; likelihood ratio; and linear-by-linear association. For all tests, the 
number of degrees of freedom (df), a key factor in the significance level of variable 
associations, was ‘1’. Directional, nominal-by-nominal measures included Lambda, 
Goodman and Kruskal tau, Uncertainty Coefficient, and an ordinal-by-ordinal Somers’ d test. 
Finally, Nominal-by-nominal symmetric measures included Phi, Cramer’s V, Contingency 
Coefficient, an ordinal by ordinal Gamma and Spearman Correlation, and an interval-by-
interval case Pearson’s R. All of these tests provided cross-confirming avenues of 
verification. 
 The statistical significance of the relationship between variables was equated with 
voting influence. The average of the chi-square-derived significance levels of both the party 
ID and ADA scores were simply compared to determine which variable had the strongest 
influence. The significance levels of party ID and ADA score relationships were also 
averaged within each category of legislation to assess whether there was any variance in the 
influence of party and ideology between the categories – to detect whether a different mix of 
decision considerations between the types of issues voted on may have been present. 
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An excepted standard for statistical significance in the social sciences is that 
hypotheses must hold at the 0.5 percent level or lower (no less than ninety percent of the 
phenomenon must be explained for the hypothesis to hold true).149 Statistical significance 
depends on the sample size and the number of categories (in matrix form) evaluated. The 
results of the statistical analyses are summarized in tables included in the chapters that follow 
which separately describe voting in each chamber. Three categories of information are 
included in the summaries. The first two are the chi-square statistics and their significance in 
each vote for both party ID and ideological ADA. Additional columns contain the percentage 
of the total number of lawmakers voting in each roll call by both party ID and ADA score. 
These columns form an additional cross-tabulation to help visualize the distribution of voting 
across the two independent variables.  
Testing the Difference between Two Non-independent Variables 
Because party affiliation and ADA scores have become so closely correlated, it may 
be necessary to regard these independent coefficients as non-independent. Ideological 
scoring essentially predicts party affiliation, and vice versa. A further test of significance can 
be applied to examine how substantially the treatment variables, party ID and ADA scores, 
are themselves inter-correlated versus the dependent vote variables. 150 Developed by 
Williams (1959), and confirmed by Steiger (1980), this test of non-independent variables is: 
t =    
                                                            
149 ibid., Baglione, 2007: 136. 
150 Howell, David C. 2007. Statistical Methods for Psychology, Seventh Edition. Belmont, CA.: Cengage 
Wadsworth; pp. 277‐278. 
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where 
  
 This ratio is distributed as t on N-3 degrees of freedom (df). The terms  and  
are the correlation coefficients whose difference is to be tested, and  is the correlation 
between the two predictors.  is the determinant of the 3 x 3 matrix of intercorrelations, but 
can be calculated without knowing the determinants. As Williams observes, the test “is valid 
for comparing the efficiency, as predictors of the given sets of values  and  [the 
independent variables party and ADA scores]  However, he cautions, “treated as an 
unconditional test, it underestimates significance since it does not take into account the 
possible variation in  and  [the independent variables] from sample to sample.” 
Party Defectors 
 The identification of lawmakers defecting from party-line voting could be considered 
yet another gauge of the relative strength of party influence versus personal preference. Very 
few members of either party in both the House or Senate crossed the aisle more than once – 
but those that did tended to do so frequently. Charts were constructed to rank members in 
both parties and in both chambers on the number of times they voted across party lines on all 
Iraq War legislation. This analysis consisted of simply tabulating the names of those voting 
across party lines for each vote, and then counting the total number of times they voted with 
the other party across all Iraq War votes. These frequencies are summarized in the Appendix. 
If opposition to the war (or at least opposition to the way President Bush was 
conducting the war) extended across party lines, then Democrats should have been able to 
form a coalition with Republicans from districts or states whose constituents favored change 
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in war policy to create sufficient numbers of votes to enact policy change. Ideology may be 
increasingly coextensive with party identity, and vice versa, but how much of a difference is 
there in the strength of ideological traits (coded by ADA LQ scores) to make a difference in 
adherence to party voting discipline? In other words, does the extent of cross-over voting 
indicate a threshold ADA value at which lawmakers, presumably starting with those in the 
middle (centrist) ranks, break with their party over particular issues? 
Legislation 
 The weekly voting record published in Congressional Quarterly’s CQ Weekly was 
used to select the numbered votes subsequently drawn from Lewis and Poole’s voteview.com 
website. All issues of CQ Weekly published during 2007 were screened for votes pertaining 
specifically to the Iraq War. As many war-related votes as could be found were selected in 
order to provide the largest possible sample. No selection criteria on the basis of the type of 
(war-related) legislation, procedure, or content were applied.  
Issue Categorization 
One possible result of the research would be evidence that party and ideology weigh 
differently for different categories of legislation. How does partisanship and ideology vary in 
influence across different kinds of legislation? What kinds of legislation invoke stronger 
party unity versus ideological voting?  
To better control for the influence of legislative content, Iraq War legislation was 
sorted into five general issue categories, applied to votes in both chambers. The order of the 
five issue areas largely represents the chronological procession of legislative strategies 
during 2007. These are briefly introduced below, and described in more detail along with the 
results of the voting analysis presented for each chamber in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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Issue A: Troop Levels (Surge Policy) 
House Legislation 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political Implication 
96  H.Con.Res.  63  ‐  Iraq War/Previous Question:  Motion  to  order 
the  previous  question  (ending  debate  and  amendment)  on 
adoption of rule (H.Res. 157) to provide for House consideration 
of  a  non‐binding  concurrent  resolution  that  would  express 
support  for  troops  already  serving  in  Iraq,  while  disapproving 
deployment of additional troops (Sponsor: Slaughter, D‐N.Y.) 
13‐Feb  Agreed, 
227‐197 
Nay supported President 
97  H.Con.Res. 63 ‐ Iraq War/Rule: Adoption of the Rule (H.Res. 157) 
to provide  for House  consideration of a non‐binding concurrent 
resolution that would express support for U.S. military personnel 
serving in Iraq, while disapproving of President Bush's decision to 
deploy additional combat troops. 
13‐Feb  Adopted 
232‐192 
Nay supported President 
99  H.Con.Res. 63 ‐ Iraq War/Adoption:  Adoption of the concurrent 
resolution that would express support for U.S. military personnel 
serving in Iraq, while disapproving of President Bush's decision to 
deploy more than 20,000 additional troops to that country. 
16‐Feb  Adopted 
246‐182 
Nay supported President 
 
Senate Legislation 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political Implication 
44  S.470 ‐ U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq/Cloture: (Same as S.Con.Res. 2 
above) Motion to invoke cloture limiting debate on motion to 
proceed to a concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the 
Senate it is not in the U.S. interest to deepen U.S. involvement in 
Iraq by increasing troop levels; plus, stating that Congress should 
not withhold funds for U.S. forces already serving in Iraq 
5‐Feb  Rejected    
49‐47 
(cloture 
always 
requires 60 
votes.) 
Nay supported President 
51  S.574 ‐ Iraq War/Cloture: Motion to invoke cloture on motion to 
proceed to bill expressing sense of the Senate supporting U.S. 
troops already in Iraq while disapproving additional deployments. 
Also, to require the President to report to Congress every 30 days 
on military progress 
17‐Feb  Rejected   56‐
34 
Nay supported President 
 
The first category of bills concerned the troop surge strategy proposed by the 
Administration at the outset of the year. Politically, the surge was portrayed by opponents as 
a potentially fruitless escalation – “throwing good resources after bad” – designed to resonate 
with those generally skeptical of the role or utility of military force in international affairs. In 
the Senate, efforts to halt the surge consisted of two cloture votes on non-legislative items. 
The first cloture vote on February 5, 2007 for S.470 was to close debate over a concurrent 
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resolution to express the sense of the Senate that deepening U.S. involvement was not in the 
national interest. The concurrent resolution also contained a clause stating Congress should 
not withhold funds from U.S. forces already deployed in Iraq. The first cloture vote was 
taken nearly three weeks after President Bush announced the surge, and well into the 
deployment planning cycle of the first wave of surge units to deploy. The cloture motion, 
requiring 60 votes for passage, was rejected by only a two-vote margin, 49-47. The second 
cloture vote, for S.574, also was intended to close debate over a bill expressing support for 
troops already in Iraq, but also disapproving additional deployments. The same bill however, 
also had a procedural requirement that the President report to Congress every thirty days on 
military progress. 
The second and most numerous category of legislation voted on in both chambers 
dealt with the subject of troop withdrawal. Withdrawal proposals were probably more 
numerous – and attractive to lawmakers - because they could be viewed as the most direct 
policy response to electoral opposition to the war. These votes largely consisted of 
amendments to funding bills that would have mandated completion of withdrawal 
(“redeployment”) by various proposed dates during the following spring of 2008. The most 
notable of the troop withdrawal bills was an amendment to the Fiscal 2008 Defense 
Authorization bill, H.R.1585, sponsored by House Armed Services Committee Chairman 
Carl Levin (D-MI.) and Senator Jack Reed (D-R.I.) that would have required the President to 
complete the withdrawal of most U.S. combat forces by April 30, 2008. On July 18th, after a 
dramatic all-night session, forty-seven Republicans blocked the two-thirds (60-vote) majority 
required to end debate on the amendment so that the authorization bill could be voted on as a 
whole (thus enacting the withdrawal amendment). After failure to block the filibuster, the 
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Democratic leadership pulled the authorization bill to delay consideration until September 
after the Petraeus-Crocker report. It was defeated again on September 20th (vote number 
345), this time – and perhaps because of - an amendment by Senator Feingold (D-WI.) that 
required the redeployment of “most” U.S. troops from Iraq within 90 days of enactment and 
would have completely prohibited funding of U.S. deployments in Iraq after June 30, 2008. 
The most abrupt proposals for ending the war, often inserted as amendments to more routine 
defense funding bills (and even a domestic water resource bill, H.R. 1495, which Senator 
Feingold attempted to amend with a March 31, 2008 withdrawal deadline), usually did not 
pass.151 
Issue B: Setting a Withdrawal Date 
House Legislation 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political Implication 
264  H.R. 1591 ‐ Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/ Conference Report:  
Adoption of the conference report on the bill that would 
provide $124.2B in fiscal 2007 emergency supplemental 
funding, as well as set a goal of redeploying most U.S. 
combat troops in Iraq by the end of March, 2008, if the 
president can certify that the Iraq government is meeting 
benchmarks, and by the end of 2007 if he cannot.  
25‐Apr  Adopted 
226‐195 
  
265  H.R. 1591 ‐ Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/ Conference Report:  
Adoption of the conference report on the bill that would 
provide $124.2B in fiscal 2007 emergency supplemental 
funding, as well as set a goal of redeploying most U.S. 
combat troops in Iraq by the end of March, 2008, if the 
president can certify that the Iraq government is meeting 
benchmarks, and by the end of 2007 if he cannot. The 
measure would provide $95.5B for military operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, $6.8B for hurricane recovery and 
relief, $3.5B in crop and livestock disaster assistance, and 
$2.25B for homeland security anti‐terrorism programs. it 
would also raise the minimum wage to $7.25 per hour over 
two years and provide $4.8B in small‐business tax 
incentives. 
25‐Apr  Adopted 
218‐208 
(Sent to 
Senate) 
Nay supported President 
Issue B: Setting a Withdrawal Date, Continued: 
House Legislation, Con’t. 
                                                            
151 The cloture vote on the troop withdrawal amendment attached to H.R. 1495 is covered in Jonathan 
Broder’s “Reality Check”, CQ Weekly, September 10, 2007; p. 2616. 
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Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political Implication 
276  H.R. 1591 ‐ Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Conference Report:  
Passage, over President Bush's May 1, 2007 veto, of the bill 
that would provide $124.2B in fiscal 2007 emergency 
supplemental funding, as well as set a goal of redeploying 
most U.S. combat troops in Iraq by the end of March, 2008, if 
the president can certify that the Iraq government is meeting 
benchmarks, and by the end of 2007 if he cannot. The 
measure would provide $95.5B for military operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, $6.8B for hurricane recovery and relief, 
$3.5B in crop and livestock disaster assistance, and $2.25B for 
homeland security anti‐terrorism programs. it would also 
raise the minimum wage to $7.25 per hour over two years 
and provide $4.8B in small‐business tax incentives. 
2‐May  Rejected 
222‐203 
(Two‐thirds 
majority, 
284 votes, 
required to 
over‐ride 
veto) 
Nay supported President 
329  H.R. 2237 ‐ Iraq Troop Withdrawal/Recommit:  Saxton, R‐N.J. 
motion to recommit the bill to the Armed Services Committee 
with instructions that it be immediately reported back with 
language stating that a determination to withdraw or 
redeploy troops should be based on a number of factors 
including protection of the U.S. armed forces, Army Corps of 
Engineers, and the U.S. Embassy 
10‐May  Motion 
Rejected 
210‐218 
  
330  H.R. 2237 ‐ Iraq Troop Withdrawal/Passage:  Passage of the 
bill that would require the withdrawal of U.S. troops and 
Defense Department contractors from Iraq within 90 days of 
enactment. The withdrawal would have to be completed 
within 180 days. The bill would prohibit the Defense 
Department from increasing the number of U.S. troops 
serving in Iraq beyond the number serving there as of Jan. 1, 
2007 without a specific congressional authorization. 
10‐May  Rejected 
171‐255 
Nay supported President 
620  H.R. 2956 ‐ Iraq Redeployment/Previous Question:  
Slaughter, D‐N.Y. motion to order the previous question (thus 
ending debate and possible amendment) on adoption of the 
rule (H.Res. 533) to provide for House floor consideration of 
the bill that would require the Secretary of Defense, within 
120 days of enactment, to begin redeploying U.S. armed 
forces out of Iraq. 
7‐12‐07 
(?) 
Motion 
agreed to 
225‐197 
  
621  H.R. 2956 ‐ Iraq Redeployment/Rule:  Adoption of the rule 
(H. Res. 533) to provide for House floor consideration of the 
bill that would require the Secretary of Defense, within 120 
days of enactment, to begin redeploying U.S. armed forces 
out of Iraq. 
12‐Jul  Adopted 
221‐196 
  
624  H.R. 2956 ‐ Iraq Redeployment/Passage:  Passage of the bill 
that would require the Defense secretary to begin 
redeploying U.S. troops out of Iraq within 120 days of the bill's 
enactment. The redeployment, except for a "limited 
presence", would have to be completed by April 1, 2008. The 
bill would require the President, not later than January 1, 
2008, to transmit to Congress a comprehensive U.S. strategy 
for Iraq that includes a justification of the minimum force 
levels required to protect U.S. national security interests in 
Iraq after April 1, 2008; a description of specific missions of 
U.S. forces to be undertaken; the cost of maintaining such a 
force; and the expected duration of the missions. 
12‐Jul  Passed 
223‐201 
Nay supported President 
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House Legislation, Con’t. 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political Implication 
1103  H.R. 4156 ‐ Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Previous 
Question:  McGovern, D‐MA motion to order the previous 
question (thus ending debate) on adoption of the rule (H.Res. 
818) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill that 
would provide $50B to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and require troops to begin withdrawing from Iraq within 30 
days of enactment, with a goal of withdrawing most troops by 
Dec. 15, 2008.   
14‐Nov  Agreed to 
209‐185 
  
1104  H.R. 4156 ‐ Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Rule:  
Adoption of the rule (H.Res. 818) to provide for House floor 
consideration of the bill that would provide $50B to fund the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and require troops to begin 
withdrawing from Iraq within 30 days of enactment, with a 
goal of withdrawing most troops by Dec. 15, 2008. 
14‐Nov  Adopted 
219‐190 
  
1107  H.R. 4156 ‐ Iraq War Supplemental 
Appropriations/Recommit:  Young, R‐FL motion to recommit 
the bill to the Appropriations Committee with instructions that 
it be reported back immediately after striking the provisions on 
troop withdrawal, troop readiness and application of the Army 
field manual. The motion would also strike language that 
would express the sense of Congress that all funds are for 
redeployment and that the amounts are sufficient to meet the 
needs of the armed forces. 
14‐Nov  Motion 
rejected 
192‐231 
Yea supported President 
1108  H.R. 4156 ‐ Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Passage:  
Passage of the bill that would appropriate $50B in emergency 
supplemental funds for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, an 
amount estimated to last until February, 2008. The bill would 
require troops to begin withdrawing from Iraq within 30 days 
of enactment, with a goal of withdrawing most troops by Dec. 
15, 2008. It would restrict U.S. armed forces to missions of 
force protection, counterterrorism and training of Iraqi 
security forces. It would also prohibit the deployment of troops 
who are not fully trained and equipped, and would require all 
U.S. personnel, including the CIA, to follow the Army field 
manual's rules against torture. 
14‐Nov  Passed 
218‐203 
Nay supported President 
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Senate Legislation 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political Implication 
74  S. J. Res. 9 ‐ Iraq Mission/Cloture: Motion to evoke cloture 
on motion to proceed to joint resolution to establish a more 
limited mission for U.S. forces in Iraq, and to set a binding 
goal of withdrawing most troops by March 31, 2008. 
14‐Mar  Agreed to, 
89‐9 
  
75  Iraq Mission/Passage: Passage of the joint resolution to 
establish a more limited mission for U.S. forces, and set a 
binding withdrawal date of March 31, 2008 
15‐Mar  Rejected 
48‐50 
Nay supported President 
147  H.R. 1591 ‐ Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Conference Report:  
Adoption of the conference report on the bill that would 
provide $124.2B in fiscal 2007 emergency supplemental 
funding, as well as set a goal of redeploying most U.S. 
combat troops in Iraq by the end of March, 2008, if the 
president can certify that the Iraq government is meeting 
benchmarks, and by the end of 2007 if he cannot. The 
measure would provide $95.5B for military operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, $6.8B for hurricane recovery and relief, 
$3.5B in crop and livestock disaster assistance, and $2.25B 
for homeland security anti‐terrorism programs. it would also 
raise the minimum wage to $7.25 per hour over two years 
and provide $4.8B in small‐business tax incentives. 
26‐Apr  Adopted 
51‐46 
Nay supported President 
167  H.R. 1495 ‐ Water Resources Development Act 
Reauthorization / Cloture:  Motion to invoke cloture (thus 
ending debate) on the Feingold, D‐WI amendment to the 
Levin, D‐MI amendment. The Feingold amendment would 
require the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, except for 
limited missions, by March 31, 2008. The Levin amendment 
would commence redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq by 
Oct. 1, 2007, and require full withdrawal within 180 days 
thereafter; but would allow the president to waive the 
second requirement. 
16‐May  Motion 
Failed     
29‐67 
  
252  H.R. 1585 ‐ Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization/Cloture:  
Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the Levin, 
D‐MI amendment to the Levin substitute. The Levin 
amendment would require a drawdown and redeployment 
of U.S. forces in Iraq, with certain exceptions, by the end of 
April, 2008. Redeployment would begin within 120 days of 
enactment. Troop activity in Iraq would be limited to 
protecting U.S. personnel, training Iraqi security forces, and 
conducting counterterrorism  operations against al Qaeda 
and other international terrorist organizations.  
19‐Jul  Motion 
Rejected 
52‐47 
Nay supported President 
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Senate Legislation, Con’t. 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political Implication 
345  H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense Authorization/U.S. Troop 
Redeployment from Iraq:  Feingold, D‐WI amendment to the 
Levin, D‐MI substitute. The Feingold amendment would require 
the redeployment of most U.S. troops from Iraq to begin within 
90 days of enactment. It would also bar the use of funds for 
deployment in Iraq of members of the U.S. armed forces after 
June 30, 2008, with limited exceptions, including troops 
providing security for U.S. government personnel and 
infrastructure, training Iraqi security forces, and conducted 
limited targeted operations against members of al Qaeda and 
other affiliated international terrorist organizations. 
20‐Sep  Rejected 
28‐70 
Nay supported President 
411  H.R. 4156 ‐ Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Cloture:  
Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the Reid, D‐
NV motion to proceed to the bill that would appropriate $50B 
in emergency supplemental funds for the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan for fiscal 2008. The bill would require troops to 
begin withdrawing from Iraq within 30 days of enactment, with 
a goal of withdrawing most troops by Dec. 15, 2008. 
16‐Nov  Motion 
Rejected 
53‐45 
Nay supported President 
 
The third category of legislation consisted of efforts to regulate the deployment 
interval of troops as a means of limiting the availability of units for rotation to Iraq and 
inhibiting the surge strategy. This applied particularly to ground forces as the Pentagon 
struggled to schedule sufficient numbers of personnel and ready units to fill surge 
requirements. The availability of ground forces to execute the surge strategy over an 
indefinite period became the foremost problem confronting Pentagon planners. Sustaining 
over 150,000 troops in Iraq was going to require the rotation of nearly all Army and National 
Guard, and Marine Corps, combat formations. By 2007, many of these units were already 
making their second, and in some cases third, deployments for duty in Iraq, and the strain on 
families, and the absence of National Guardsmen from their civilian employments, was 
receiving increasing media coverage and widespread public sympathy. 
 Opponents of the war seized the troop rotation problem as a way to limit Executive 
options. Several of the bills contained language that would have set a minimum rotation 
interval between deployments, effectively limiting the number of troops in Iraq, and Central 
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Command’s operational planning in-country. The issue carried great political weight due to 
public concern for the welfare of the troops and their families, and was a way to bring not 
only additional public pressure against the war (and make inroads with a growing number of 
pro-military, non-internationalist conservatives), but also further challenge the 
Administration’s relationship with the military, which had already become strained during 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s tenure.  
Deployment interval legislation consisted mostly of amendments to the 2008 Defense 
Authorization Bill, H.R. 1585. Four amendments and one cloture vote in the Senate, 
pertaining to H.R. 1585, the 2008 Defense Authorization bill, were voted on in the Senate; 
and four motions to H.R. 3159 in the House, comprise this category of legislation. All of 
these proposals passed the House by nearly twenty-vote margins – close to the exact 
difference in membership between the Majority and Minority parties, meaning that these 
votes were the product of intense partisan struggle. 
Issue C: Deployment Interval 
House Legislation 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political Implication 
793  H.R. 3159 ‐ Troop Deployment Policy/Previous Question:  Slaughter, D‐
N.Y. motion to order the previous question (thus ending debate and 
possible amendment) on adoption of the rule (H. Res. 601) to provide for 
House floor consideration of the bill that would mandate minimum 
periods of rest and recuperation for units and members of the regular 
and reserve components of the U.S. military serving in Iraq. 
2‐Aug  Motion 
agreed to 
225‐201 
  
794  H.R. 4156 ‐ Troop Deployment Policy/Rule:  Adoption of the rule (H. Res. 
601) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill that would 
mandate minimum periods of rest and recuperation for units and 
members of the regular and reserve components of the U.S. military 
serving in Iraq. 
2‐Aug  Adopted 
224‐200 
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House Legislation, Con’t. 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political Implication 
795  H.R. 4156 ‐ Troop Deployment Policy/Recommit:  Hunter, R‐CA. 
motion to recommit the bill to the Armed Services Committee with 
instructions that it be immediately reported back with language that 
would require that the proposed minimum rest  times could only be 
implemented if the Defense secretary certifies that they would not 
result in extending the tours of those already in Iraq or increase their 
"operational risk." 
2‐Aug  Motion 
Rejected 
207‐217 
  
796  H.R. 4156 ‐ Troop Deployment Policy/Passage:  Passage of the bill 
that would mandate minimum periods of rest and recuperation for 
units and members of the regular and reserve components of the U.S. 
military serving in Iraq. It would exempt special operations forces units 
and allow the President and military service chiefs to waive these 
requirements in response to unforeseen circumstances. 
2‐Aug  Passed 
229‐194 
Nay supported 
President 
 
Senate Legislation 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political 
Implication 
241  H.R. 1585 ‐ Fiscal 2008 Authorization/Cloture:  To invoke cloture on 
Webb Amendment to mandate minimum deployment intervals: Active 
‐ as long as deployed previously; Reserve/Guard ‐ minimum of 3 years. 
11‐Jul  Motion 
Rejected 
56‐41 
  
243  H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense Authorization/Troop Deployments:  Hagel 
Amendment to Levin Substitute ‐ would limit length of troop 
deployments to Iraq beginning 120 days after enactment; and limit 
Army Regular and Guard to 12 consecutive months; Active and 
Reserve Marines to 7 consecutive months (waived in times of 
emergency). 
11‐Jul  Rejected 
52‐45 
  
244  H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense Authorization/Troop Deployments:  
Graham Amendment to Levin Substitute ‐ to express the sense of 
Congress  that the goal for leave time between deployments should be 
no less than 12 months for Active forces, and no less than 5 years for 
Reservists. 
   Rejected 
41‐55 
  
341  H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense Authorization/Troop Deployments:  Webb, 
D‐VA. Amendment to the Levin, D‐MI substitute. The Webb 
amendment would require active duty forces to be guaranteed as 
much time at home as they served while deployed. National Guard 
and reservists would be guaranteed three years at home between 
deployments.  
19‐Sep  Rejected 
56‐44 
Nay supported 
President 
342  H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense Authorization/Troop Deployments:  
McCain, R‐AZ amendment to the Levin, D‐MI substitute. The McCain 
Amendment would express the sense of the Congress that the 
Department of Defense should develop a troop‐deployment policy 
that would provide troops time between deployments that is equal to 
or longer than the length of their previous deployment and would 
guarantee that members of the reserve would not be deployed within 
three years of their last deployment. The Secretary of Defense could 
waive the policy for national security reasons. 
19‐Sep  Rejected 
55‐45 
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 The fourth category of legislation was funding support for the war. The most 
important aspect of the funding issue was the apparent victory by the Administration in 
raising political barriers to the use of Congressional “purse-strings” to constrain both the 
surge strategy, and overall continued U.S. combat involvement in Iraq. To begin with, unlike 
the Vietnam-era conscription-based force that was regarded at the time (and still often cast) 
in rebellious and unpatriotically-reluctant terms; the current all-volunteer generation of U.S. 
servicemen and women are held in much higher public esteem. During Vietnam, opponents 
regarded both military and political institutions culpable perpetrators. In contrast, the Iraq 
War is almost exclusively synonymous with the White House. Legislators in both parties 
were inhibited from casting any votes potentially susceptible to portrayal by electoral 
opponents as handicapping the troops or emboldening the Iraqi insurgency. The issue of 
inadequate armor protection against the emergent threat of Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IED’s) is a case in point: at first leveraged by war opponents as evidence of neglect and poor 
planning on the part of the Administration - but then used by the Administration to pressure 
Congress for full funding of war operations to guarantee troop safety. The Democratic 
agenda was therefore rhetorically re-cast in terms of ensuring the ultimate safety and welfare 
of troops by withdrawal from Iraq.  
Secondly, “benchmarks” for Iraqi political and security progress, offered by the 
President as goals that higher troop levels would facilitate, also cut both ways in funding 
debates. Although initially resisted by the Administration, benchmarks were eventually used 
to justify the utility of the surge and bolster the appearance of a systematic exit strategy. For 
war opponents, unmet benchmarks could be used to rationalize withholding funding for 
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continued U.S. military operations and aid to Iraq; as well as the setting of deadlines for 
withdrawal to pressure the Iraqi government to make progress. 
Only two votes challenging Administration policy in regard to funding were made in 
the House, while a total of five votes in this issue category were conducted in the Senate. In 
the House, the primary challenge to war policy concerned requirements attached to the Fiscal 
2007 Supplemental Appropriations bill, H.R. 2206 that the President report on progress by 
Iraq’s government toward political reconciliation. In the Senate, along with a vote on H.R. 
2206, a more diverse set of legislation ranged from adoption of two non-legislative 
resolutions expressing support for funding troops deployed in Iraq (as well as provision of 
adequate Veterans’ Administration medical support upon their return home, in S.Res. 107), 
to two amendments by Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R.,-KY.) to substitute $70 billion 
in supplemental funding to fight both the Iraq and Afghan wars for $31 billion to continue 
operations exclusively in Afghanistan (which was already part of the Fiscal 2008 Omnibus 
Appropriations bill). McConnell’s intention was apparently to get through an additional $39 
billion for the Iraq War. (Votes on the war funding issue are summarized in the chart 
beginning on the next page.) 
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Issue D: Funding/Support 
House Legislation 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Number and Description 
Date 
of 
Vote 
Voting 
Outcome 
Implication for Exec. Policy 
332  H.R. 2206 ‐ Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Recommit:  Lewis, R‐CA. 
motion to recommit bill to the Armed Services Committee with 
instructions to report it back immediately after deleting the 
section requiring a second vote to release part of the funds 
after the President reports to Congress on the Iraqi 
government's progress in meeting benchmarks. 
10‐
May 
Motion 
Rejected 
195‐229 
  
333  H.R. 2206 ‐ Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Passage:  Passage of the 
bill that would provide $42.8B in fiscal 2007 emergency 
spending for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
require another Congressional vote in late July to release the 
remaining $52.8B. The President would have to report by July 
13 on the Iraqi government's progress toward meeting certain 
benchmarks. Congress would have to adopt a joint resolution 
releasing the fenced‐off funds. The bill would also provide $6.8B 
for hurricane recovery and relief, $3.3B for military health care 
costs, and $2.25B for homeland security programs. It would 
raise the minimum wage to $7.25/hour over two years, and 
provide $4.8B in small‐business tax incentives. 
10‐
May 
Passed 
221‐205 
Nay supported President 
 
Senate Legislation 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political Implication 
76  S.Res. 107 ‐ U.S. Troop Support and Veterans/Adoption: 
Expressing the sense of the Senate supporting funding for 
troops in the field, and [provision] of adequate medical care to 
soldiers upon their return home. 
15‐
Mar 
Adopted 
96‐2 
  
77  S.Con.Res. 20 ‐ Iraq War Funding/Adoption: Adoption of the 
concurrent resolution that would express opposition to any 
Congressional action that would endanger U.S. forces in the 
field, including reducing or cutting‐off funding for their assigned 
missions. 
15‐
Mar 
Adopted 
82‐16 
  
181  Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Motion to Concur:  To appropriate 
$94.7B for Iraq and Afghanistan operations; and also to require 
the President to report on 18 benchmarks and permit the 
President to withhold reconstruction funds for benchmarks not 
met (sponsored by Sen. Reid, D., Nev.). 
24‐
May 
Agreed 
80‐14 
  
410  S. 2340 ‐ Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations/Cloture:  
Motion to invoke cloture (thus limiting debate) on the 
McConnell, R‐KY motion to proceed to the bill that would 
appropriate $70B in emergency supplemental funds for the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal 2008. 
16‐
Nov 
Motion 
Rejected 
45‐53 
  
439  H.R. 2764 ‐ Fiscal 2008 Omnibus Appropriations/Motion to 
Concur:  McConnell, R‐KY motion to concur in the House 
amendment to the Senate amendment to the bill with an 
amendment that would replace the $31B in funding for the war 
in Afghanistan with $70B that the Defense Department could 
use to conduct the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan without 
restrictions. 
18‐
Dec 
Motion 
agreed to 
70‐25 
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The fifth and final category of legislation was simply for all other questions 
pertaining to the Iraq War that could not be classified either as a distinctive issue category, or 
as a legislative strategy for supporting or ending the war. In the House, these all consisted of 
votes on amendments to the Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization bill, H.R. 1585. The House 
amendments did not deal directly with any of the immediate issues of combat in Iraq, but 
included concern for the use of funding allocated for the Iraq War for any contingency 
involving Iran; and the establishment of permanent basing in Iraq, and use of Iraqi economic 
resources. The procedural motion to go into closed session to discuss information from the 
President, vote number 331, was rejected presumably because the Democratic leadership did 
not want to give the Administration any further opportunity to plead its case for continuation 
of the war.  
Category E: Other 
House Legislation 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Number and Description 
Date of 
Vote 
Voting 
Outcome 
Implication for Exec. Policy 
331  Procedural Motion/Closed Session:  Issa, R‐CA. privileged motion  
to go into closed session to discuss information from the 
President. 
10‐May  Motion 
Rejected 
198‐216 
  
364  H.R. 1585 ‐ Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization/Iran Contingency:  
Andrews, D‐N.J. amendment that would prohibit funds authorized 
in the bill for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan from 
being used to plan a contingency operation in Iran. 
16‐May  Rejected in 
Committee 
of the 
Whole 202‐
216 
Nay supported President 
365  H.R. 1585 ‐ Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization/Military Action 
Against Iran:  DeFazio, D‐OR. Amendment that would clarify that 
no previously enacted law authorizes military action against Iran. It 
would prohibit the use of funds authorized in the bill or any other 
act to take military action against Iran without specific 
congressional authorization unless there is a national emergency 
created by an attack by Iran on the United States, its territories or 
possessions or its armed forces. 
16‐May  Rejected in 
Committee 
of the 
Whole 136‐
288 
Nay supported President 
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Category E: Other, Continued: 
House Legislation, Con’t. 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date 
of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political Implication 
369  H.R. 1585 ‐ Fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization/Temporary Military 
Bases in Iraq:  King, R‐IA. Amendment that would clarify that the 
bill's prohibition on the establishment of permanent military bases 
in Iraq should not be construed to prohibit the [U.S.] from 
establishing a temporary military base or installation by entering 
into a basing rights agreement with Iraq. 
17‐
May 
Rejected in 
Committee 
of the 
Whole 201‐
219 
  
717  H.R. 2929 ‐ Ban on Permanent Military Bases in Iraq/Passage:  
Ackerman, D‐N.Y. motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill that 
would prohibit the use of any funds made available by an act of 
Congress to establish any military installation or base for the 
permanent stationing of U.S. armed forces in Iraq, or exercise U.S. 
economic control of the oil resources of Iraq. 
25‐Jul  Motion 
agreed to 
399‐24  
(two‐thirds 
majority, 
282 votes, 
required for 
passage) 
  
 
 
Senate Legislation 
Vote 
No. 
Bill Title/Type and Description 
Date 
of 
Vote 
(2007)  
Voting 
Outcome 
Political Implication 
248  H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense Authorization/Iraq Strategy:  Cornyn 
Amendment to Levin Substitute ‐ expressing the sense of the Senate 
that the Senate should commit to a strategy not to "leave a failed 
state" in Iraq. 
17‐Jul  Adopted 94‐
3 
  
343  H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense Authorization/Support for U.S. Armed 
Forces:  Boxer, D‐CA amendment to the Levin, D‐MI substitute. The 
Boxer amendment would express the sense of the Senate to affirm 
strong support for those in the U.S. armed forces, and strongly 
condemn attacks on the honor, integrity and patriotism of any 
individual who is serving or has served honorably. 
20‐Sep  Rejected 50‐
47 
  
344  H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense Authorization/Support for Gen. Petraeus:  
Cornyn, R‐TX amendment to the Levin, D‐MI substitute. The Cornyn 
amendment expressed the sense of the Senate to affirm support for 
Gen. David H. Petraeus; strongly condemn personal attacks on the 
honor and integrity of Petraeus and members of the U.S. armed 
forces; and repudiate an advertisement by MoveOn.org about 
Petraeus. 
20‐Sep  Adopted 72‐
25 
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Chapter 4 - Iraq War Voting Results in the House 
Summary of Overall Voting Results 
The most striking result of the cross-tabulation analysis of House and Senate voting is 
that the chi-square correlations for both party identity (ID) codes and ADA scores with 
voting outcomes are very high, and indicative of strong influence on the part of both 
variables in voting. This means that we can reject the null hypothesis that each variable did 
not have a significant relationship to voting outcomes. The large sample size for each roll call 
vote in the House accounts for the very high chi-square numbers for that chamber. Phi-
coefficient values for party and ideology were well into the range considered by Cohen 
(1988) to be of “large effect” in the correlations. The difference between party ID and ADA 
chi-square scores is also quite small, confirming that ideological beliefs about the war and 
party identity are closely linked. Strictly in terms of the chi-square and phi-coefficients, at a 
statistically-significant level party affiliation and ideology had essentially equivalent 
predictive power in voting on Iraq War issues during 2007. 
At the same time, the slight differences between chi-square values for party ID and 
ADA correlations may have an important implication. We might assume that the consistently 
lower party ID chi-values are the result of cross-over voting that carried the contribution of 
the ADA scores of the defecting members (on one side of the chamber mean) over to the side 
of the vote contra-predictive of the ideological scoring of those defecting members. This 
would have the effect of (slightly) reducing the size of the correlation of party with the voting 
outcome. If one or more members of each party crossed the aisle, the overall chi-square value 
for party declined.  
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Because this effect happened more frequently for the party correlations, it suggests 
that ideology may be a slightly better predictor of voting on the war. Not only were the chi-
square values for ADA scores somewhat higher in every vote, but if lower party correlations 
reflect cross-over voting, it may indicate that ideology, or some other consideration (such as 
constituent preferences), influenced decisions to defect from the party-line. In other words, 
decisions to vote the party line were more dependent on ideology than ideology on party 
loyalty. This applies to members of both parties.  
Another analytical assumption is that the chi-square values and their associated phi-
coefficients reflect the relative political significance of the votes. Higher chi-square values 
for both party and ADA scores represent more intense partisan and ideological contention 
over the vote: the higher the correlation values, the more divisive the vote. Lower values 
indicate that party loyalty and/or ideology were less crucial in the voting decision, and would 
not correlate as strongly with the voting outcomes.  
Chi-square results for party ID and ADA scores were averaged for each issue area 
and summarized in Figure 4.1. The differences between those averages are quite small, and 
statistically insignificant in terms of indicating whether party or ideology played a leading 
role. However, they do vary between issue areas, indicating that votes on the troop surge and 
deployment interval proposals prompted the highest ADA and party chi-square values (were 
most divisive). Votes on issues less directly associated with war policy provoked the lowest 
chi-square and phi-coefficient values, indicative of less contention. 
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Figure 4.1: Average Chi-Square χ2, Phi-Coefficients Φ, and Significance (t) of Difference between 
Correlation Coefficients for Party and Ideology in the House 
  Average N 
Average 
Party  
χ2 
Φ for 
Average 
Party  χ2 
Average 
ADA χ2 
Φ for 
Average 
ADA χ2 
Difference 
of χ2 
Averages 
Average 
t 
Issue A:  Troop Levels (Surge 
Policy): 426 390.189 0.957 400.506 0.970 10.317 -20.963 
            
Issue B:  Setting a Withdrawal 
Date: 419.75 368.255 0.937 386.724 0.960 18.469 -21.033 
            
Issue C:  Deployment Interval: 425.5 391.264 0.959 401.081 0.971 9.839 -21.143 
            
Issue D:  Funding/Support: 425 389.975 0.918 397.114 0.967 7.140 -21.025 
            
Category E:  Other 418.4 235.924 0.751 260.897 0.790 24.974 -18.864 
Degrees of Freedom = 1, and ρ ≤ .01 for all Chi-Square values.     
 
The most illuminating results of the project were obtained from the tests of 
significance performed on the difference between the correlation coefficients for party ID 
and ADA scores for each vote.152 For every vote in the House, the value of each of the ADA 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients (  was consistently higher than the 
corresponding correlation for party affiliation ( ). The tests of significance for the 
difference between the correlations (Equation 1) were consistently negative, meaning that the 
ADA correlations were significantly stronger for explaining voting outcomes. When the 
values of the ADA correlation with vote outcome, the party correlation with vote outcome, 
and the correlation of party with ADA resulted in a negative value under the square root sign 
                                                            
152 I am indebted to University Professor Mack C. Shelley, II, Director, Public Policy and Administration 
Program, Department of Political Science, Iowa State University, for suggesting, performing, and explaining the 
use of the test of significance between two nonindependent correlations. Professor Shelley performed the 
calculations by inputting the test equation (Equation 1) into SPSS in separate elements, and ran the data for 
the party ID and ADA score correlations through each element of the equation to build‐up a complete solution 
for each roll‐call vote. Professor Shelley performed the significance test on both the House and Senate voting 
data. The explanation of the test equation and calculation are his. 
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(which is an imaginary number, and hence not a calculable result), the sign of the 
determinant of the intercorrelation matrix, |R| was changed to produce a nonnegative value 
under the radical sign in Equation 1. The significant t-values range between -20.12 to -23.53 
across all votes, where a value of t more negative than -2 or larger than positive 2 generally 
indicates a statistically significant result (p < 0.05).  The more negative the value of the t-
result, the more significant the effect of ADA score (ideology) in the vote. No positive t-
values occur for votes in the House on the Iraq War, meaning that ideology exceeded the 
contribution of party identity in every vote by a large margin. 
t =      Equation 1 
where 
  
 is the correlation between party and vote outcome; 
is the correlation between ADA score and vote outcome; 
 is the correlation between party and ADA score. 
N is the number of roll-call votes recorded on each vote. 
 
We can interpret the relatively higher chi-square values over the issues of troop levels 
(Issue A) and deployment interval (Issue C) as a reflection of how highly contentious those 
issues had become in the public arena. Funding/Support (Issue D), the third-highest chi-
square correlation and a relatively mid-level source of conflict, may reflect the more complex 
political problem of voting against any legislation that threatened to interrupt funding of 
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forces already in Iraq. Votes against war funding always faced the political risk of appearing 
unsupportive of the troops, who have retained vast support across the electorate for their 
service and sacrifices. Although a large portion of opponents of the war were still willing to 
use funding measures as a tactic to end the war, the supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 
2206) to continue operations to the full extent requested by the Pentagon passed by a narrow, 
but comfortable, margin with ten Democratic defections – including that of outspoken war 
opponent and Presidential candidate Dennis Kucinich (D. - 10th OH.). 
The lowest chi-square averages (though still overwhelmingly “effective”) occurred 
for the fifth group, Category E (Other), which hints that for legislative questions not bearing 
directly on U.S. combat involvement in Iraq, the closeness of the correlation between party 
and ideology diverged. Category E legislation included post-war questions about the 
establishment of permanent bases in Iraq, use of Iraq’s economic resources, and the use of 
funding for military action against Iran. These issues were less directly concerned with the 
immediate debate over the scope of U.S. involvement, measured in political discourse by the 
number of troops involved in combat (although accusations about Iran’s involvement would 
have appeared to threaten an entirely new war). Numbers of troops had become the political 
metric of U.S. war policy. 
On the whole, many more Democrats voted across the aisle at least once compared to 
Republicans, while many fewer Republicans than Democrats defected at least two or more 
times. The Republican minority had greater party solidarity than their counterparts. The 
average ADA score of those Republicans voting across party lines two or more times was 
38.46; while the average score for Democrats defecting two or more times was 82.66. For all 
Republicans who defected at least once in any of the Iraq War votes, the average ADA score 
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was a much more Conservative 19.26; while the average for all Democrats defecting at least 
once was a lower (more Conservative) score of 77.0.  
Figure 4.2: Cross-Over Voting Averages in the House 
 
2007 Party Average ADA 
Score153 
Average ADA Score of 
Those Defecting Two or 
More Times 
Average ADA Score of All 
Cross-Over Votes 
Democrats 92% 82.66% 77.0% 
Republicans 16% 38.46% 19.26% 
    
The average Republican who defected from party line voting two or more times was 
over twice as liberal as the 2007 party average ADA score of 16 percent. However, across all 
Iraq War votes, many fewer Republicans (a total of 47 voting across aisle at least once) 
defected than the 75 Democrats who crossed party lines at least once. The average Democrat 
voting across the aisle was only ten percentage points more conservative than the party 
average of 92 percent. This suggests that liberal members were more susceptible than 
conservatives to being drawn away from their party’s preferences – Democrats crossed the 
aisle more frequently to oppose measures to end the war than conservative Republicans could 
be drawn to support measures ending the war. Republicans appear to have maintained greater 
party and ideological discipline than Democrats. 
Analysis of Voting Within Issue Categories 
The following sections will examine voting results within each issue category. The 
idea here is that the party and ideological chi-square correlations correspond to the political 
significance of each piece of legislation. Hypothetically, higher values reflect greater partisan 
                                                            
153 Average party ADA scores for 2007 were drawn from the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) website 
at: www.adaction.org/media/voting_records/2007.pdf 
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and ideological contention on the issue, while lower values move (ever so slightly) in the 
direction of bipartisanship. 
Issue A: Troop Levels (Surge Policy) 
Vote 
No.  Bill Number and Title 
N 
Voting
Voting 
Outcome 
Party χ²  Party Φ  ADA  χ²  ADA Φ  t 
96 
H.Con.Res. 63 ‐ Iraq War/Previous 
Question: 
425 
Agreed, 
227‐197 
413.035  0.986  415.489  0.989  ‐20.87 
97  H.Con.Res. 63 ‐ Iraq War/Rule:  425 
Adopted 
232‐192 
401.197  0.972  411.275  0.984  ‐20.88 
99  H.Con.Res. 63 ‐ Iraq War/Adoption:  428 
Adopted 
246‐182 
356.335  0.912  374.754  0.936  ‐21.14 
 
The question of troop levels in Iraq concerned the surge policy announced by 
President Bush in January, 2007. The only votes available for sampling in this category 
consisted of decisions on a non-binding concurrent resolution, H. Con. Res. 63, a non- 
legislative expression of opposition to increasing the number of U.S. forces in Iraq. As 
indicated in the chart for this category, all passed. Democratic Majority Leader Nancy Pelosi 
(D. - 8th CA.) voted with Republicans on February 13th in opposing the first two votes on the 
measure, but in the final vote joined fellow Democrats for the resolution’s final passage. 
Final passage was supported by seventeen Republicans – the second highest number of 
Republicans voting with Democrats among any of the Iraq War votes. The large number of 
Republican defectors in that particular vote skewed the chi-square averages for both party 
and ADA below the average for the issue category as a whole. The early days of the surge 
policy were fraught with uncertainty, which probably explains the level of Republican 
wavering. Republican party defectors would have been able to claim some loyalty to the 
party position on the first two votes, but satisfy constituent opposition to increasing 
involvement in Iraq in the final vote. 
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Issue B: Setting a Withdrawal Date 
Vote 
No.  Bill Number and Title 
N 
Voting 
Voting 
Outcome  Party χ²  Party Φ  ADA  χ²  ADA Φ  t 
264 
H.R. 1591 ‐ Fiscal 2007 
Supplemental/Conference Report: 
422 
Adopted 
226‐195 
402.200  0.976  413.155  0.989  ‐20.84 
265 
H.R. 1591 ‐ Fiscal 2007  Supplemental/ 
Conference Report: 
426 
Adopted 
218‐208 
(Sent to 
Senate) 
369.002  0.931  391.611  0.959  ‐21.11 
276 
H.R. 1591 ‐ Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/ 
Conference Report:  Passage  (over 
President Bush's May 1, 2007 veto ‐ Two‐
thirds majority, 284 votes, required to 
over‐ride veto) 
425 
Rejected 
222‐203 
389.874  0.958  408.523  0.98  ‐21.01 
329 
H.R. 2237 ‐ Iraq Troop 
Withdrawal/Recommit: 
428 
Motion 
Rejected 
210‐218 
371.012  0.931  384.981  0.948  ‐21.18 
330 
H.R. 2237 ‐ Iraq Troop 
Withdrawal/Passage: 
426 
Rejected 
171‐255 
235.754  0.744  301.274  0.841  ‐22.23 
620 
H.R. 2956 ‐ Iraq Redeployment/Previous 
Question: 
423 
Motion 
agreed to 
225‐197 
403.221  0.976  411.641  0.986  ‐21.00 
621  H.R. 2956 ‐ Iraq Redeployment/Rule:  418 
Adopted 
221‐196 
394.557  0.972  398.439  0.976  ‐20.89 
624  H.R. 2956 ‐ Iraq Redeployment/Passage:  424 
Passed 
223‐201 
369.929  0.934  394.167  0.964  ‐21.31 
1103 
H.R. 4156 ‐ Iraq War Supplemental 
Appropriations/Previous Question: 
394 
Agreed to 
209‐185 
383.130  0.986  383.150  0.986  ‐20.12 
1104 
H.R. 4156 ‐ Iraq War Supplemental 
Appropriations/Rule: 
409 
Adopted 
219‐190 
386.531  0.972  396.286  0.984  ‐20.53 
1107 
H.R. 4156 ‐ Iraq War Supplemental 
Appropriations/Recommit: 
422 
Motion 
rejected 
192‐231 
364.683  0.929  381.383  0.951  ‐21.04 
1108 
H.R. 4156 ‐ Iraq War Supplemental 
Appropriations/Passage: 
420 
Passed 
218‐203 
349.172  0.912  376.079  0.946  ‐21.05 
  
As the size of the preceding chart indicates - simply on the basis of the number of 
votes taken on the issue - the setting of a withdrawal date was the most contested legislative 
battleground in both House and Senate voting on the war. The 2006 elections pivoted on 
public anticipation of Congress deciding a clear exit strategy and/or specific end-date to the 
war. Setting a withdrawal date would have most directly fulfilled electoral sentiments.  
115 
 
Within the structure of voting on withdrawal proposals however, just enough 
Democrats crossed the aisle to vote against setting a specific timetable. The earlier, or more 
rapid, the withdrawal proposal, the larger the number of Democratic Party defectors, 
although most withdrawal-related measures passed the House (they did not necessarily pass 
the Senate in the same form). Ideology dominated party affiliation as evidence by the large 
negative values of the tests of significance (t) in all withdrawal votes. 
The passage vote on H.R. 2237 (vote 330), the Iraq Troop Withdrawal Bill, resulted 
in the highest t-value (-22.23) among all votes on the Iraq War in the House. This vote is also 
notable as garnering the defection of 58 Democrats - the largest Democratic defection in any 
vote on Iraq War legislation in the House. This bill bundled together a requirement to begin 
withdrawal 90 days after enactment, to be completed only 90 days later (180 days after 
enactment), with an anti-surge provision stipulating force levels could not rise beyond the 
level deployed on January 1, 2007, prior to the surge. Democratic opponents of the bill 
voting with Republicans were either persuaded by the Pentagon that such a move was 
impractical, especially as the surge buildup was already well underway by the time of the 
vote on May 10th, or the President’s argument against leaving Iraq a failed state was gaining 
traction. The bill did not come to the floor of the Senate because the Democratic leadership 
considered it unlikely to pass. In any case, the rejection of early withdrawal proposals due to 
Democratic defections was a clear indication that a rapid end to U.S. involvement would not 
pass before the Petraeus-Crocker report on results of the surge strategy, scheduled for 
September 15th. 
The most dramatic confrontation with the White House occurred on May 2nd for the 
attempt to override the President’s veto of H.R. 1591, the Fiscal 2007 Supplemental. Apart 
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from providing an addition $124.2 billion for the war, the bill initially passed April 25th with 
language requiring the redeployment of most combat troops out of Iraq by March 2008, if 
Iraq’s government was meeting benchmarks, and by the end of 2007 if benchmarks were not 
being met. The override attempt was a numerically-close vote of 222-203, but nowhere near 
the two-thirds majority of 284 votes needed. Seven Democrats joined Republicans, while two 
of the most consistent Republican Party defectors, Wayne Gilchrest (R.-1st MD.) and Walter 
Jones (R.-3rd N.C.), voted with Democratic war opponents. Defecting Democrats may have 
been influenced by electoral considerations. The seven Democrats voting against the override 
attempt were John Barrow (D.-12th GA.), Dan Boren (D.-2nd OK.), Lincoln Davis (D.-4th 
TN.), Jim Marshall (D.-8th GA.), Jim Matheson (D.-2nd UT.), Michael McNulty (D.-21st 
N.Y.), and Gene Taylor (D.-4th MS.). With the exception of Michael McNulty’s district in 
N.Y., all of his other co-defecting Democratic colleagues were from relatively Conservative 
districts in Conservative-leaning (“Red”) Southern states. 
Issue C: Deployment Interval: 
Vote 
No.  Bill Number and Title 
N 
Voting 
Voting 
Outcome  Party χ²  Party Φ  ADA  χ²  ADA Φ 
t 
793 
H.R. 3159 ‐ Troop Deployment 
Policy/Previous Question: 
427 
Motion 
agreed to 
225‐201 
411.234  0.981  415.247  0.986  ‐21.09 
794 
H.R. 3159 ‐ Troop Deployment 
Policy/Rule: 
425 
Adopted 
224‐200 
405.244  0.976  409.696  0.982  ‐21.05 
795 
H.R. 3159 ‐ Troop Deployment 
Policy/Recommit: 
425 
Motion 
Rejected 
207‐217 
367.681  0.930  384.363  0.951  ‐21.34 
796 
H.R. 3159 ‐ Troop Deployment 
Policy/Passage: 
425 
Passed  
229‐194 
380.896  0.947  395.016  0.964  ‐21.09 
 
 The second most contentious debate was over troop rotation intervals, and all votes in 
this category were taken on legislation specifically addressing the issue: the Troop 
Deployment Policy bill, H.R. 3159. Here, the significance (t) of ADA scoring was 
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consistently high – exceeding negative 21 in all votes (the high chi-square and phi values 
reinforce the significance levels).  
The closer accountability of Representatives to constituents in their districts serving 
in the military, and their families, may have offered at least a partial electoral incentive to 
decrease the frequency of deployments. And from the standpoint of electoral risks 
traditionally associated with challenging Presidential leadership in wartime, the passage of 
any legislated rotation intervals would have been viewed as a more acceptable way to impede 
war policy by elevating concern for the welfare of troops above justifications for continuing 
the war. Along with efforts to set a withdrawal date, or withhold funding, the deployment 
interval issue presented a potent “third way” to challenge the ability of the President to 
pursue the surge strategy, thus provoking tighter (more divisive) party and ideology 
correlations.  
Issue D: Funding/Support: 
Vote 
No.  Bill Number and Title 
N 
Voting 
Voting 
Outcome  Party χ²  Party Φ  ADA  χ²  ADA Φ 
t 
332 
H.R. 2206 ‐ Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/ 
Recommit: 
424 
Motion 
Rejected 
195‐229 
400.186  0.972  406.890  0.98  ‐20.96 
333 
H.R. 2206 ‐ Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/ 
Passage: 
426 
Passed 
221‐205 
379.763  0.944  387.338  0.953  ‐21.09 
 
As mentioned above, all funding requests for war operations were passed in House 
voting. But how difficult were funding bills to oppose? How steep was the perceived political 
cost of voting to use Congressional control of the “purse strings” as a way to end the war, 
given the esteem in which the U.S. military is held in contemporary American society? The 
answer seems to be “not very steep”. Party chi-square and phi-coefficients are as tightly-
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related to voting outcomes as the more contested issues. This means that ideological 
opponents of the war were willing to vote against funding to stop the war regardless of the 
President’s argument that starving operations of funds would reflect disregard for troops in 
combat. 
The first vote on H.R. 2206 directly concerned benchmark reporting. The vote was on 
a motion to recommit the bill to the Armed Services Committee for deletion of language 
requiring a second vote to release funds after the President reported to Congress on Iraqi 
Government progress toward meeting the benchmarks. The recommit proposal was defeated 
in a tightly-partisan vote of 195-229 on May 10th. May was still early in the surge strategy, 
and progress toward stability remained ambiguous. During the first half of 2007, it was still 
not clear (and perhaps remains ambiguous to date) that the benchmarks could be met, or 
would provide the Administration sufficient leverage to force substantive gains in Iraq’s 
political progress. The fear among the President’s supporters was that the benchmarks could 
not be effectively implemented by Iraq’s leadership, and would inevitably be used to increase 
pressure for withdrawal. Once it became clear that benchmark reporting requirements had 
sufficient bipartisan support, the supplemental appropriation passed 221-205. Two-hundred 
and five members apparently voted against final passage hoping to halt the war through 
funding measures. 
Category E – all other legislation not falling within the subject matter of the other 
four issue areas – contained some of the lowest Chi-Square and phi-coefficient effect levels, 
as well as the highest significance levels (t) for the difference between variable correlations. 
The lower chi-square and phi-coefficients can be interpreted as representing the greatest 
departures from the influence of party and ideology. As previously mentioned, it may also 
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suggest that issues broader than U.S. combat involvement in Iraq per se, were (and generally 
may be) not as ideologically-provocative and thus amenable to broader bipartisan agreement. 
Category E: Other: 
Vote 
No.  Bill Number and Title 
N 
Voting 
Voting 
Outcome  Party χ²  Party Φ  ADA  χ²  ADA Φ 
t 
331  Procedural Motion/Closed Session:  415 
Motion 
Rejected 
198‐216 
399.257  0.981  396.337  0.977  ‐20.73 
364 
H.R. 1585 ‐ Fiscal 2008 Defense 
Authorization/ Iran Contingency:  Vote 
in the Committee of the Whole 
416 
Rejected 
202‐216 
288.633  0.833  318.990  0.876  ‐20.70 
365 
H.R. 1585 ‐ Fiscal 2008 Defense 
Authorization/Military Action Against 
Iran:  Voting in the Committee of the 
Whole 
421 
Rejected 
136‐288 
132.060  0.560  177.390  0.649  ‐23.53 
369 
H.R. 1585 ‐ Fiscal 2008 Defense 
Authorization/Temporary Military 
Bases in Iraq: Voting in the Committee 
of the Whole 
417 
Rejected 
201‐219 
330.200  0.890  343.979  0.908  ‐21.04 
717 
H.R. 2929 ‐ Ban on Permanent Military 
Bases in Iraq/Passage:  (two‐thirds 
majority, 282 votes, required for 
passage) 
423 
Motion 
agreed to 
399‐24 
29.468  0.294  67.791  0.4  ‐8.32 
 
 Category E contained two votes that sought to influence Administration decisions 
about Iran (in relation to Iraq War funding) which may be suggestive of House attitudes 
toward more traditional state-to-state military tensions in international politics beyond the 
politicized glare of the Iraq War. The first vote, on an amendment to H.R. 1585, the Fiscal 
2008 Defense Authorization bill, sponsored by Robert Andrews (D. – 1st N.J.), would have 
prohibited funds authorized for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan from being used 
to plan contingency operations [against] Iran. The amendment was rejected by a vote of 202-
216, preserving Presidential prerogatives, with thirty Democrats crossing the aisle to support 
the President’s position. At that time, U.S. military officials were publicizing the discovery 
of Iranian-manufactured munitions used by Iraqi insurgents, and with growing concern in the 
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world diplomatic community about the implications of Iran’s nuclear program for the region, 
especially Israel, a larger number of Democrats may have been persuaded to keep 
Administration options open. 
The second Iran-related vote was for another amendment to H.R. 1585 that would 
have prohibited any “military action” against Iran with funds authorized in any other bill 
without Congressional authorization. This amendment garnered less bipartisan support in 
being rejected - but none-the-less narrowly preserved Executive options. House lawmakers 
were more supportive of “planning” than “action”, seeking to limit U.S. regional 
involvement while also leaving the Executive options to deal with any Iranian military 
initiative. The difference in wording between “planning” and “action” had a substantial 
ideological significance in boosting the t value for the vote to a (quite strong) negative 23.53. 
Iraq War voting results in the House have been analyzed in terms of how variation in 
the chi-square values and tests of significance between the party ID and ADA correlations 
related to the political content of legislation. As the political parties and House districts have 
become more ideologically homogenous, and those elected increasingly reflective of district 
party and ideological preferences, lawmakers are freer to vote their ideological preferences in 
electoral safety. Widespread public opposition to the war by 2007 meant that all Democrats, 
representing the party “brand” opposed to the war, were free to challenge all aspects of White 
House war policy (the exception being the few Democrats from traditionally conservative 
Southern districts or districts with a military base or industry).  The dominance of ideology 
(ADA scores) indicated by the negative t-statistics of all House votes on the Iraq War may 
also be interpreted as further evidence of the growing extent of the polarization of the 
electorate. 
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Cross-over voting on issues was also attributed here to variation in the value and 
magnitude of the chi-square and t statistics. However, changes in those statistics likely 
depend on the number of party members crossing the aisle, and the particular composition of 
values of the ADA scores they carried. 
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CHAPTER 5 - Iraq War Voting in the Senate 
Summary of Overall Voting Results 
Like the cross-tabulation analysis of House voting, the chi-square correlations for 
both party ID and ADA scores in the Senate are very high, and very significant - meaning 
that we can reject the null hypothesis that either variable did not have a significant 
relationship to voting outcomes. The smaller sample sizes of each vote (no greater than 100 
votes in the chamber) account for the chi-square values being approximately one-quarter 
those in the House (roughly proportional to the difference in the size of the membership in 
each chamber). Phi-coefficient values for party and ideology were also well into the range 
considered by Cohen (1988) to be of “large effect” in the correlations. The differences 
between party ID and ADA chi-square scores are also quite small, confirming that 
ideological beliefs about the war and party identity are closely linked. As an overall 
interpretation of the chi-square statistics, party affiliation and ideology had essentially 
equivalent predictive power in voting on Iraq War issues in the Senate.  
However, there is a slightly-wider difference between chi-square values for party and 
ideology in the Senate. Although the difference remains statistically insignificant, it is larger 
than the House results. If that wider difference in chi-square values is interpreted as 
representing a greater level of independence for the party ID and ideology variables in Senate 
decision-making, then it may reflect the unique institutional traits of that chamber. In 
comparison with the House, this includes the greater decision-making autonomy of Senators 
afforded by six-year terms, more ideologically-diverse statewide constituencies, more 
numerous Constitutional responsibilities in foreign policy (and a correspondingly greater 
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attentiveness, exposure, and expertise in international affairs), and somewhat greater 
electoral (and ideological) independence from party organizations. 
 Another analytical premise used in the previous chapter to evaluate the House results 
may also apply to the Senate: the differences in chi-square values between the party ID and 
ADA correlations may correspond to cross-over voting. The consistently lower party ID 
scores might reflect the proportionally greater effect of each cross-over vote in the Senate 
given the smaller sample (chamber) size, while the ADA scores carried by party defectors 
added correspondingly greater strength to the correlations for ideology. Again, this suggests 
that on the whole, ideology may be a marginally better predictor of voting on the war (though 
not necessarily due to proportionately larger ADA chi-square scores). 
A comparison of chi-square averages between the issue categories summarized in 
Figure 5.1 reveals that roll-call votes on non-legislative resolutions opposing the surge 
strategy (in Issue A: Troop Levels), and for deployment interval amendments (Issue C) were 
the most partisan and ideological of the Iraq War votes in the Senate. The guiding hypothesis 
for House voting on the withdrawal issue (Issue B) was that it signified the most direct policy 
for ending the war, and was therefore highly contested. However, the same issue category 
provoked somewhat lower absolute levels of partisan and ideological tension in the Senate 
compared to voting in the House.  
Once again, the most revealing research results are the diverse range of t-values 
generated by the difference tests between the correlation coefficients for party ID and ADA 
scores - especially the mix of valences among those figures.154 Unlike the House, t in the 
                                                            
154 As with the results of the difference tests between correlation coefficients for party ID and ADA scores with 
voting results in the House, presented in the previous chapter, Professor Mack C. Shelley, II also performed 
the calculations to derive t‐values for the Senate voting data, presented in this chapter. 
124 
 
Senate varies considerably, and includes positive values that indicate partisanship played a 
relatively stronger, though often indeterminate, role in Senate decision-making. Roll-call 
votes in the catch-all Category E actually averaged greater statistically-significant influence 
for party affiliation. 
 Figure 5.1: Average Chi-Square χ2, Phi-Coefficients Φ, and Significance (t) of Difference between Correlation 
Coefficients for Party and Ideology in the Senate 
  Average N 
Average 
Party  χ2 
Φ for 
Average 
Party  χ2 
Average 
ADA χ2 
Φ for 
Average 
ADA χ2 
Difference 
of χ2 
Averages 
t 
Issue A:  Troop Levels (Surge 
Policy): 92 70.966 0.880 86.434 0.970 15.468 -11.17 
        
Issue B:  Setting a Withdrawal 
Date: 96.714 58.861 0.780 70.255 0.852 11.394 -9.391 
        
Issue C:  Deployment Interval: 97 72.873 0.867 83.805 0.929 10.932 +2.044 
        
Issue D:  Funding/Support: 95.6 28.783 0.549 37.599 0.627 8.816 -1.458 
Category E:  Other 96 41.436 0.657 46.833 0.698 5.397 +4.48 
Degrees of Freedom (df) = 1, and ρ ≤ .01 for all Chi-Square values.      
 
Positive t-values would be due to the Pearson product-moment correlation for party 
affiliation ( ) being greater than the corresponding correlation for ADA scores and voting 
outcomes ( ) – not only resulting in a positive value for the determinant of the 
intercorrelation matrix |R| under the radical sign in Equation 1 (Chapter 4, page 110), but also 
a positive value for the multiplicative factor (  ). Many t-values (including some of 
the positive figures) fall within a range that provides no statistically-significant indication of 
the primacy of either party ID or ADA scores in voting decisions (within the interval greater 
than -2 and less than positive 2, for which p > 0.05). For many votes in the Senate, neither 
party identity nor ADA scoring were dominate in voting decisions, in comparison with the 
primacy of ideology in every vote in the House. The Pearson product-moment values for 
125 
 
party ID and ADA scores in those votes were very close, resulting in smaller t-values that fell 
within the interval of having no statistical significance. 
There is a chronological pattern in the distribution of t-values for voting in the Senate. 
Votes earlier in 2007 on the surge, setting a withdrawal date, and funding are dominated by 
the significance of ideology (ADA scores) – though not to levels consistently attained in the 
House. As Figure 5.1 (and the statistics for individual votes in each of the separate issue 
categories presented below), the strongest ideological influence occurs for votes prior to the 
Petraeus-Crocker report in mid-September. This is also reflected in the differences between 
chi-square values for the average party and ADA scores, where the greatest difference occurs 
for the (early 2007) issue of the surge. Despite the fact that some of the highest chi-square 
values for ideology occurred for troop deployment votes, the difference in Pearson product-
moment values between the party and ADA correlation coefficients in that issue category 
were small, and resulted in t values indeterminate of the significance of either party ID or 
ideology (having values within the interval of no statistical significance, p > 0.05).  
The cautiously positive report on the progress of the surge that General Petraeus and 
Ambassador Crocker presented September 15-16 appears to have undercut support for troop 
withdrawals or deployment/rotation and funding constraints on the surge strategy. The 
chronological gradient of t-values and chi-square/phi-coefficient statistics may reflect the 
changing intensity of uncertainty about the war, which declined from its height in the 
emotionally-charged weeks following the President’s announcement of the surge strategy, to 
a state of cautious optimism after the September 15th report. Accumulating evidence of 
ebbing violence and changing loyalties among Sunni insurgents against al-Qaeda began to 
offer early hope that the surge would succeed. A substantial reservoir of opposition to the 
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war remained in the electorate (unalterably-so the further to the Left), and it is likely that the 
Democratic leadership turned to a more partisan strategy and discourse to sustain opposition 
to White House policy in order to keep anti-war voters in the party fold for the upcoming 
2008 elections. 
Figure 5.2 presents the comparison of ADA averages for those voting across the aisle. 
The average Republican who defected from party-line voting two or more times was about 
seventy-five percent more liberal than the 2007 party average ADA score of 20 percent.155 
Somewhat in contrast with the House results (and in proportion to chamber membership 
size), a larger portion of the Republican Caucus voted across party lines on all Iraq War votes 
- though a greater total number of Democrats defected. Importantly, the average Democrat 
voting across the aisle more than once carried almost exactly the same ADA score as the 
chamber Democratic average. What this tells us is that pressure to uphold Administration 
policy penetrated further through the ideological distribution of Democrats – Democrats were 
more factionalized, at least in a statistical sense. Pressure to defect from the President never 
reached the mid-range of the Republican distribution. We can infer that Republicans were 
more unified than Democrats on the war issue - party and ideology were more overlapping. 
Figure 5.2: Cross-Over Voting Averages in the Senate 
 2007 Party Average ADA 
Score 
Average ADA Score of 
Those Defecting Two or 
More Times 
Average ADA Score of 
All Cross-Over Votes 
Democrats 87% 87.22% 86.388% 
Republicans 20% 34.62% 25.75% 
 
                                                            
155 Average party ADA scores for 2007 were drawn from the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) website 
at: www.adaction.org/media/voting_records/2007.pdf  
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The lowest Party and ADA correlations occurred for funding and support votes, for 
much the same reason given for continued support of war funding in the House: reluctance to 
have votes against funding be viewed as endangering troops in the field. This idea is re-
examined for that category more closely below.  
Analysis of Voting Within Issue Categories 
Like the previous review of House data, voting results in the Senate will also be 
examined on a category-by-category basis. Similarly, the values of the party and ideological 
chi-square correlations are assumed to correspond to the political significance of each piece 
of legislation, with higher values reflecting greater partisan and ideological contention on the 
issue, and lower values signifying somewhat greater bipartisanship. 
Issue A: Troop Levels (Surge Policy) 
Vote 
No. Bill Number and Title N 
Voting 
Outcome Party χ² Party Φ ADA  χ² ADA Φ t 
44 
S.470 ‐ U.S. Troop Levels in 
Iraq/Cloture: (Cloture always requires 
60 votes.) 
95 
Rejected 
49‐47  80.667  0.921  87.830  0.962  -11.58 
51  S.574 ‐ Iraq War/Cloture:  89 
Rejected 
56‐34  61.265  0.830  85.037  0.977  -10.76 
 
  As with voting in the House, the two pieces of legislation responding to the troop 
surge strategy in the Senate were non-legislative measures to express the chamber’s position 
on the surge policy. Senate Republicans voted against both measures (a “nay” vote supported 
the President’s position). The first vote, a cloture motion on S.470, drew Republican 
opposition to language in the bill opposing “deepen[ed] U.S. involvement” with the troop 
increase. It was one of the closest votes on Iraq War legislation in the Senate sample at 49-47 
(though eleven votes short of the required 60 votes needed for passage of cloture in the 
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Senate). Two of the most centrist (or liberal) Republicans in the Senate - Maine’s Susan M. 
Collins (ADA score 55), and Minnesota’s Norm Coleman (ADA score 50) - voted with 
Democrats. Senators’ Joseph Lieberman and Majority Leader Harry Reid joined 
Republicans. The two-for-two exchange virtually nullified any change in the strength of 
Party chi-square and phi-coefficient values, while the centrist Republican cross-over votes 
added strength to the ADA correlation below the chamber mean. Ideology played the most 
significant role, indicated by the negative t-statistic (-11.58). 
 The second vote, on a cloture motion for S.574, likely drew Republican opposition to 
benchmark reporting requirements that would have required the President to report on 
military progress every 30 days. As previously observed, all efforts to legislatively mandate 
Administration accountability were resisted by the President’s supporters as an encroachment 
on Executive prerogative. Senator Reid’s vote with Republicans was likely a procedural 
tactic to ensure that the legislation could be revisited at a later time. In this vote, seven 
Republican senators - including John Warner (R.,-VA.), possessing a mid-range 
Conservative ADA score of 35, and considerable stature among both moderates and 
conservatives in his party - voted with the Democrats.156 Warner had actually co-authored the 
law requiring Administration reports in July and September that passed with a supplemental 
war spending bill earlier in the spring. 
Greater variance in voting on the issue of setting a withdrawal date (category B) 
occurred in the Senate, compared to the House. As indicated by the t-values, ideology 
remained a potent influence in voting on withdrawal proposals, but it also varied widely, 
ranging from a statistically-insignificant positive 1.13, to a weighty -29.41 – the strongest 
                                                            
156 Nather, David, “A Last‐Ditch Plea to a Wavering Party”, CQ Weekly, July 16, 2007, p.2094‐2096. 
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manifestation of ideological influence among all Senate Iraq War votes. That particular vote 
occurred May 16th for a motion to invoke cloture on debate over an amendment by Senator 
Feingold to the Water Resources Development Act Reauthorization, H.R. 1495, and likely 
reflected the anger of members on both sides of the aisle by holding a non-war-related piece 
of legislation hostage to the withdrawal issue (the motion failed 29-67). 
Issue B: Setting a Withdrawal Date 
Vote 
No. Bill Number and Title N 
Voting 
Outcome 
Party χ² Party Φ ADA  χ² ADA Φ 
t 
74  S. J. Res. 9 ‐ Iraq Mission/Cloture  97 
Agreed to, 
89‐9 
9.910  0.320  33.508  0.588  -3.53 
75  Iraq Mission/Passage:  97 
Rejected 
48‐50 
82.812  0.924  90.303  0.965  -11.67 
147 
H.R. 1591 ‐ Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/ 
Conference Report 
96 
Adopted 
51‐46 
85.391  0.943  89.313  0.965  -11.44 
167 
H.R. 1495 ‐ Water Resources 
Development Act Reauthorization / 
Cloture 
95 
Motion 
failed    
29‐67 
41.690  0.662  53.900  0.753  -29.41 
252 
H.R. 1585 ‐ Fiscal 2008 Defense 
Authorization/Cloture 
98 
Motion 
Rejected 
52‐47 
76.575  0.884  87.805  0.947  -11.22 
345 
H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense 
Authorization/U.S. Troop 
Redeployment from Iraq 
97 
Rejected 
28‐70 
40.119  0.643  46.673  0.694  1.13 
411 
H.R. 4156 ‐ Iraq War Supplemental 
Appropriations/Cloture 
97 
Motion 
Rejected 
53‐45 
75.532  0.882  90.282  0.965  0.40 
 
In the largest cross-aisle migration of the issue category, twenty-one Democrats 
joined Republicans to reject another amendment by Sen. Feingold (D., WI.) to the 2008 
Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 1585) that would have mandated one of the most expedited 
withdrawal requirements put forward to that date. It is likely Democratic crossovers did not 
want to derail a spending package crucial to a wider variety of defense programs. Democrats 
voting with the President tended to come from either relatively Conservative (Red) states, 
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such as Arkansas (both Democratic Senators), Indiana (Sen. Evan Bayh) and Montana (both 
Democratic Senators); or from states with substantial defense industries or military bases 
such as Florida (Sen. Bill Nelson), Missouri (Sen. Claire McCaskill), North Dakota (Sen. 
Kent Conrad), and Virginia (Sen. James Webb, a leading Democratic critic of the war and 
highly credible with the rank and file by virtue of decorated military service, and tenure as 
Navy Secretary in the Reagan Administration, voted with the President). Here again, 
electoral calculations appear to have been robustly competitive with party allegiance and 
ideology in voting decisions, given how Iraq War-related language was shared with other 
legislative content in each vote. 
 The issue of setting a specific withdrawal date revolved around the expected report on 
the surge by General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, scheduled for mid-
September (presented on September 15th). Prior to September, a core dispute between 
Republicans and Democrats emerged over whether to pass withdrawal legislation before or 
after the report. An attempt at compromise was offered by Sen. John Warner and Richard 
Lugar that would have required the Administration to present a withdrawal plan by mid-
October if the Petraeus-Crocker report did not show that the surge was effective. Senator 
Warner, an opinion leader on defense matters on both sides of the aisle, holding an ADA 
score of 35% in 2007, voted across the aisle twice, raising substantial concerns in the 
Administration over how many Republicans would follow. Lugar, perhaps the most 
respected voice on foreign policy in the Senate, and with an ADA score of 45% in 2007, 
probably captured the sentiments of other centrist Republicans when he stated in a floor 
speech on June 25th: “In my judgment, the costs and risks of continuing down the current 
path outweigh the potential benefits that might be achieved. Persisting indefinitely with the 
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surge strategy will delay policy adjustments that have a better chance of protecting our vital 
interests over the long term.”157 Democrats did not want to wait until the Petraeus-Crocker 
report. But former Democratic Rep. Lee Hamilton, co-chair of the Iraq Study Group, urged 
fellow Democrats to support the Warner-Lugar compromise if a withdrawal deadline could 
not be passed before mid-September. In opposing the Warner-Lugar proposal, Majority Whip 
Dick Durban (D., IL.) explained that: “I like Lee Hamilton, and certainly value his counsel, 
but I want American troops to start coming home. Anything short of a timetable is 
interesting, but not effective”158 The Democratic leadership clearly recognized that their 
caucus could be easily divided over waiting for the September report, and must have feared 
Lee Hamilton’s remark would have substantial credence in suggesting that any withdrawal 
plan was unlikely to get past the Republican minority before September. 
Senator Lugar never voted with Democrats, but his statement was indicative of a 
wider uncertainty among Republicans about prospects for the surge. Unfortunately, the 
present research cannot account for how many Republicans were willing to wait for the 
September report on the progress of the surge – but were prepared to vote for withdrawal if 
the surge had not started to show some progress toward reducing violence.  
By most accounts, the pivotal “showdown” vote on the withdrawal issue occurred 
during an overnight session July17-18 when Republicans held the line to prevent passage of a 
cloture motion (vote number 252) to close debate on an amendment to H.R. 1585 by Senator 
Carl Levin (D., MI.), chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, requiring a draw-down 
                                                            
157 “Key GOP Senator Says Iraq Strategy Not Working: In Blow to Bush, Lugar Calls for New Approach that 
Downsizes Military’s Role”, Associated Press, Tuesday, June 26, 2007; posted at 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19426648 (Author not given in byline).   
158 Donnelly, John M. and Adam Graham‐Silverman, “Reid Shelves Troop Proposal”, CQ Weekly, July 23, 2007, 
p. 2187. 
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and redeployment of forces by April, 2008. The next vote for withdrawal did not occur until 
September 20th - the week after the Petraeus-Crocker report. This time, an amendment by 
Senator Feingold that expanded the timeframe and terms of withdrawal was rejected 28-70. 
The dramatic difference in numbers, on a proposal allowing more time in favor of 
Administration policy for redeployment, and relaxing other funding conditions (in 
comparison to the previous Levin amendment), was opposed by 21 Democrats – including 
Levin – and is reflected in the low Party and ADA chi-square correlations. This constitutes 
some of the clearest evidence that the Petraeus-Crocker report succeeded in allaying fears 
about the surge. 
Despite Senator Russell Feingold’s (D.–WI.) determined efforts to obtain the earliest 
start on the withdrawal process – the issue may simply not have been as crucial to Senate 
electoral fortunes as the issue was for Representatives. Most Republican Senators who did 
cross the aisle to support setting specific redeployment proposals faced 2008 reelection races. 
Republicans Coleman (R., MN.), Collins (R., ME.), Hagel (R., NE.), Smith (R., OR.), Snowe 
(R., ME.), Sununu (R., N.H.), and Voinovich (R., OH.) all voted consistently with Democrats 
on withdrawal legislation. With the exception of Olympia Snowe, who was not facing an 
upcoming race, the remaining Republican defectors faced reelection in the coming cycle in 
more Liberal-leaning (“Blue”) states. Senator Joseph Lieberman was the only Democrat to 
defect in four out of five of the votes on the issue. The large number of Republican crossover 
votes diluted the strength of Party and ADA values.  
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Issue C: Deployment Interval: 
Vote 
No. Bill Number and Title N 
Voting 
Outcome 
Party χ² Party Φ ADA  χ² ADA Φ 
t 
241 
H.R. 1585 ‐ Fiscal 2008 
Authorization/Cloture: 
96 
Motion 
Rejected 
56‐41 
68.572  0.845  85.560  0.944  0.87 
243 
H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense 
Authorization/Troop Deployments: 
96 
Rejected 
52‐45 
81.768  0.923  87.283  0.954  0.06 
244 
H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense 
Authorization/Troop Deployments: 
95 
Rejected 
41‐55 
67.651  0.844  77.949  0.906  2.77 
341 
H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense 
Authorization/Troop Deployments: 
99 
Rejected 
56‐44 
74.654  0.868  88.670  0.946  1.50 
342 
H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense 
Authorization/Troop Deployments: 
99 
Rejected 
55‐45 
71.719  0.851  79.564  0.896  5.02 
 
  Legislation regarding the deployment interval of troops in Iraq was the second-most 
contested issue in the Senate. All votes were taken on amendments to the important 2008 
Defense Authorization bill, H.R. 1585. Ostensibly, the debate was about relieving the stress 
of repetitive rotations to Iraq on U.S. troops. Politically however, the issue had the potential 
to limit the President’s options in implementing the surge strategy if legislatively mandated 
rotation intervals reduced the availability of ground force units. It therefore became a critical 
battleground in the struggle to restrain Administration policy. 
 Senator James Webb (D., VA.) was the leading Democratic proponent of setting 
rotation intervals. The first vote on the issue, to invoke cloture on Webb’s amendment, which 
included a mandate that active duty forces be guaranteed as much time home as served while 
deployed, took place on July 11th and was narrowly defeated by the bare minimum of 41 
Republican votes needed to defeat legislation requiring a 60-vote majority (in fact, the 56-41 
outcome would not have resulted in passage even if three more Republicans had defected). 
With the exception of John Warner and Olympia Snowe, four of the most liberal and 
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electorally-vulnerable Republicans once again crossed the aisle: Collins (R., ME.), Hagel (R., 
NE.), Smith (R., OR.), and Sununu (R. N.H.).  
Senator Chuck Hagel (R., NE.), the most vocal Republican opponent of the surge 
strategy, offered an amendment that sought to limit deployment schedules from a different 
angle – by setting limits on the time troops could be deployed: 12 months maximum for 
Army/National Guard forces, and 7 months for Marine units. This amendment was also 
narrowly rejected on a less bipartisan basis, 52-45, with only four Republicans crossing the 
aisle. Where ideology had been particular strong in House voting on the deployment/rotation 
bill (H.R. 3159), neither variable dominated consideration of the various amendments that 
Senators Hagel, Levin, McCain, and Webb attempted to attach to the Fiscal 2008 Defense 
Authorization bill, H.R. 1585.  
Issue D: Funding/Support: 
Vote 
No. Bill Number and Title N 
Voting 
Outcome 
Party χ² Party Φ ADA  χ² ADA Φ 
t 
76 
S.Res. 107 ‐ U.S. Troop Support and 
Veterans/Adoption 
97 
Adopted 
96‐2 
2.127  0.148  16.716  0.415  -2.39 
77 
S.Con.Res. 20 ‐ Iraq War 
Funding/Adoption 
97 
Adopted 
82‐16 
17.631  0.426  19.790  0.452  -7.16 
181 
Fiscal 2007 Supplemental/Motion to 
Concur 
93 
Agreed 80‐
14 
9.453  0.319  16.403  0.420  -0.67 
410 
S. 2340 ‐ Iraq War Supplemental 
Appropriations/Cloture 
97 
Motion 
Rejected 
45‐53 
82.744  0.924  87.262  0.948  1.86 
439 
H.R. 2764 ‐ Fiscal 2008 Omnibus 
Appropriations/Motion to Concur 
94 
Motion 
agreed to 
70‐25 
31.959  0.583  47.824  0.713  1.07 
 
On two of those votes, large numbers of Democrats crossed the aisle to join 
Republicans. The first vote, to adopt a non-legislative Senate Resolution (S. Res.) 107, was 
certainly an un-divisive vote for members in both parties – expressing support for troops in 
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the field, and the provision of “adequate medical care to soldiers upon their return home.” 
Medical care for convalescing soldiers and wounded veterans generated a public uproar after 
facilities and care quality at Walter Reed Army Medical Center was found substandard and 
potentially harmful. Access to care for wounded veterans across the Veterans’ 
Administration system (especially the growing number with severe head injuries requiring 
highly-specialized care that had become an unintended consequence of surviving IED blasts 
and gunfire due to improved body armor) was also found inadequate, and was significant for 
the increased political pressure it placed on the Bush Administration war policy as a whole. 
The near unanimous support for such a measure would not ordinarily be valuable to leave in 
the data set because it would not betray any partisan or ideological tension. However, the 
vote was a rare moment of agreement, and was left in the data simply to illustrate how 
dramatically party and ADA scores change at a very high level of bipartisanship. 
The second voting decision (chronologically) was to vote ‘yea’ in support of S. Res. 
20, which pledged opposition to “any Congressional action that would endanger of support 
for troops already in the field, including reducing or cutting-off funding for their assigned 
missions.” This concurrent resolution was overwhelmingly adopted 82-16, quite early in the 
surge on March 15th. With more and more units arriving in Iraq, adoption of a statement 
pledging continuation of funding for operations in-country certainly should have indicated to 
war opponents in Congress (and the public-at-large) that the war was probably not going to 
be restricted by Congressional purse-strings - at least not in the Senate. Logically, Congress 
would have needed to find a way to prevent the deployment of any additional forces to 
prevent additional funding support if they adhered to the resolution. 
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In fact, a pattern of reluctance on both sides of the aisle to close-off funding is 
reflected in the lower party and ADA chi-square and phi values occurring in subsequent vote 
on the issue. The second lowest chi-square and phi correlations resulted from another 
overwhelming majority vote of 80-14 on a motion to concur for the 2007 Supplemental 
funding bill, H.R. 2206, agreed to May 24th. However, the bill did require the President to 
report on eighteen benchmarks of Iraqi progress, and authorized him to withhold 
reconstruction funds for benchmarks not met. By late May, it was probably apparent to 
Republicans that benchmark reporting would be a minor price to pay for sustaining political 
support of the war. (One of the mysteries to this researcher is why the President didn’t take 
the political initiative early-on to use benchmark reporting to bolster at least the appearance 
of working toward an exit strategy.) 
Finally, the vote exhibiting the most partisan and ideological tension in the funding 
category was to invoke cloture (suspend debate) on a motion by Minority Leader Mitch 
McConnell (R., KY.) to proceed to the bill (S.2340) that was to appropriate emergency 
supplemental funding ($70 billion) for both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars for fiscal 2008. In 
this case, both partisanship and ideological commitment were very high – all Democrats, 
(except Joseph Lieberman), and all Republicans except the three most consistent war 
opponents (Hagel, Smith, and Voinovich) – drove chi-square and phi values almost to the 
maximum they could reach. The vote occurred late in the year, on November 16th, and 
despite substantive signs of progress in the war, Republicans and Democrats remained 
divided on the future of the U.S. commitment. Opponents of the war still sought to end U.S. 
involvement as rapidly as possible. House Democrats had passed an emergency supplemental 
bill (H.R. 4156, House vote number 1108) only two days prior on November 14th  that would 
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have allocated $50 billion as a bridge fund into the following Congressional session - but tied 
those funds to a withdrawal-oriented shift in war policy with a total withdrawal deadline of 
December 15, 2008. Although it failed to pass in the Senate 53-45 (vote number 411), a 
Republican counterproposal to provide $70 billion with no conditions (S.2340, sponsored by 
Sen. Saxby Chambliss, R., GA.) also failed by a mirrored-vote of 45-53 (vote no. 410).159 
The core dispute over continued U.S. involvement in the war remained as strong as ever. 
Issue E: Other: 
Vote 
No. Bill Number and Title N 
Voting 
Outcome 
Party χ² Party Φ ADA  χ² ADA Φ 
t 
248 
H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense 
Authorization/Iraq Strategy:   
96 
Adopted 
94‐3 
3.293  0.185  11.428  0.345  11.44 
343  H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense 
Authorization/ Support for U.S. Armed 
Forces:   
96 
Rejected 
50‐47 
85.406  0.943  88.242  0.959  1.11 
344  H.R. 1585 ‐ 2008 Defense 
Authorization/Support for Gen. 
Petraeus:   
96 
Adopted 
72‐25 
35.608  0.609  40.829  0.652  0.89 
 
 Issue Category E in the Senate, like its counterpart in the House, contains issues 
substantively different from questions bearing directly on combat in Iraq, although none of 
the votes concern broader foreign policy questions. All votes in this group pertain to the 2008 
Defense Authorization (H.R. 1585). The two votes with the lowest chi- and phi values were 
relatively uncontroversial. The first of these was a vote in support of a (non-legislative) 
Levin amendment expressing the sense of the Senate not to leave Iraq “a failed state”; the 
second to support an amendment by Senator John Cornyn (R., TX.) expressing the sense of 
the Senate to “reaffirm support for Gen. David H. Petraeus . . . strongly condemn personal 
attacks on the honor and integrity of Petraeus and members of the Armed Forces; and 
                                                            
159Rogin, Josh, “War Supplementals Frozen in Senate: Parties Lock Up Over Policy Language; Action May Wait 
Until 2008”, CQ Weekly, November 19, 2007; pp. 3482‐3483. 
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repudiate an advertisement by MoveOn.org about Gen. Petraeus.” Inexplicably, the second 
vote supporting Gen. Petraeus drew 25 Democratic opposition votes - nothing has been 
published in the public record to date that indicates why it would have been advantageous for 
the sake of party solidarity, ideological commitment, or electoral advantage, to have voted 
against the bill.  
The most partisan vote among all Senate Iraq War decisions occurred in Category E 
for yet another amendment to the 2008 Defense Authorization (vote number 248), with a 
value of +11.44, sponsored by conservative Senator John Cornyn (R.-TX.), expressing the 
sense of the Senate that the Senate should commit to a strategy not to “leave a failed state” in 
Iraq. The question becomes, why would partisanship have taken precedence over ideology on 
such a matter? What aspect of the bill’s content would have provoked greater party conflict? 
It can only be speculated that the term “failed state” in a Republican-sponsored bill (in 
contrast with Sen. Levin’s amendment with the same term) probably was a red flag for war 
opponents who saw an essentially partisan strategy to shift blame for mission failure to those 
supporting any effort to end U.S. involvement in Iraq, or oppose the surge strategy. 
 The most contentious vote in terms of having the highest chi- and phi values for party 
and ideology, was a bill sponsored by Senator Barbara Boxer (D., CA.), expressing in more 
general terms the sense of the Senate “to affirm strong support for those in the U.S. armed 
forces, and strongly condemn attacks on the honor, integrity and patriotism of any individual 
who is serving or has served honorably.” This amendment was rejected by a very tight 50-47 
vote, which pushed party ID and ADA chi-square correlations to near maximum values of 
85.406 and 88.242 respectively. It is unclear whether the more specific reference to General 
Petraeus in the Cornyn amendment provoked the more generalized references to “service 
139 
 
personnel” in the Boxer amendment, or whether Republicans objected in principle to the very 
idea of needing a second amendment omitting any reference to General Petraeus personally. 
The political rationale for the Cornyn amendment condemning the personal attack on General 
Petraeus may be little clearer, given the adverse publicity the MoveOn.org ad attracted, but 
the politics of the later Boxer amendment is murky. Senator Boxer was among those voting 
against the Cornyn amendment, and her amendment may have addressed concerns (that 
remain unclear) of opponents who voted with her on the earlier bill. 
Frequent Senate Party Defectors:  
 Party discipline was higher among Democrats than Republicans across all of the Iraq 
War votes. Senator Joseph Lieberman (I.-CT.) was coded as a Democrat in the data array 
because he caucuses with Democrats; but voted with Republicans in 11 out of 22 Iraq War 
votes. A strong supporter of Israel, and reliably conservative on cultural and national defense 
issues, Sen. Lieberman’s interest in continuing and increasing the U.S. commitment in Iraq 
was (and remains) likely connected to his concern for regional security if Iraqi instability 
were allowed to fester.160 Sen. Lieberman was twice joined by Majority Leader Reid, a vocal 
leader in opposing continued U.S. involvement – whose votes should not be regarded as a 
party defection, but rather as parliamentary tactics to enable later consideration of motions 
failing in the first round. 
 On the Republican side, Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE.) matched Sen. Lieberman’s 
rate of eleven cross-over votes across all categories of legislation. He was followed closely 
by Senator Gordon H. Smith’s (R-OR.) nine defections; exceeding the seven votes cast by 
                                                            
160 Characterization of the Senator’s cultural and defense policy orientations are found in Koszczuk, Jackie and 
H. Amy Stern (Eds.). 2006. CQ’s Politics in America 2006: The 109th Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly, Inc.; pp. 200‐201. 
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each of Maine’s liberal Senate delegation: Olympia J. Snowe and Junior Senator Susan 
Collins. Hagel and Smith were the only two Republicans to vote in March, 2007 for S. J. Res. 
9, adding a provision to the $123 billion supplemental spending bill that called for a “non-
binding” goal to remove most U.S. troops by March 31, 2008. Senator Snowe actually went 
as far as cosponsoring a Democratic bill that would have mandated a withdrawal to begin by 
early 2008. Senator Collins was regarded as one of the most electorally-vulnerable GOP seats 
in 2008, but was returned to office that year by a narrow margin.  
 Through the uncertain spring of 2007, the Administration lobbied Republican 
senators extensively to wait until the September 15th progress report by Gen. Petraeus before 
proceeding with any measures to limit U.S. involvement. The slim Democratic majority, 
along with supermajority (two-thirds majority) passage requirements, meant that only 41 
Republicans were needed to sustain Administration objectives. However, doubts about the 
strategy had become so deep and widespread, that two of the most influential GOP voices in 
foreign and defense policy, Richard Lugar of Indiana and John Warner of Virginia, 
publically joined the call for troop reductions. Although the White House succeeded in 
getting Sen. Warner to agree to wait until September, he cosponsored an amendment with 
Sen. Lugar requiring additional Administration reports; including preparation of a post-
September follow-on plan that would specify circumstances in which troop withdrawal might 
begin and how the mission could be narrowed.161  
Generally, the mixed influence of party affiliation and ideology, and the declining 
salience of ideology over the First Session, probably reflects the greater independence from 
public and partisan influence that Senate tenure affords. This is not to say that opposition or 
                                                            
161 CQ Weekly, July 16, 2007, p.2095. 
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support for Administration policy was any less impassioned, but that Senators have more 
leeway in adjusting their debates as issues evolve. Over the course of 2007, conflict over 
withdrawal policy led to a seminal confrontation in July, after which it was clear to the 
Democratic leadership that the lack of a filibuster-proof majority would thwart any further 
efforts to substantially alter Administration policy. In the end, the absence of a filibuster-
proof Democratic majority, and improving conditions in Iraq, determined the outcome of the 
policy struggle. From about the time of the Petraeus-Crocker report, voting on war legislation 
would be determined by less ideological measures. As conditions improved in Iraq, more 
pragmatic concerns, such as sustaining progress through continued support of the surge 
strategy, policy towards Iran, and (for Democrats) the need to sustain electoral support, took 
precedence. 
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CHAPTER 6 - Conclusions 
 This thesis project has examined the question of whether political party identity (ID), 
or the ideological score (ADA Liberal Quotient) assigned to members of Congress, was a 
better predictor of roll-call votes on Iraq War legislation during the First Session of the 110th 
Congress in 2007. A comparison of separate correlations of party ID and ADA scores with 
those voting tallies revealed that while both variables were strongly related to voting 
outcomes, ideology exceeded the influence of partisan identity in nearly three-quarters of the 
votes taken across both the House and Senate to a very significant degree. ADA scores were 
the predominant predictor of voting decisions on the Iraq War in every roll call in the House, 
but slightly less than half of the votes taken in the Senate. Varied results across the Senate 
voting record hint at the greater decision-making independence of that membership (despite 
the persistent blocking role that the minority was able to sustain in defense of Administration 
policy), and actually diminished over the year as evidence of the success of the surge strategy 
accumulated. Senators were apparently able to subordinate ideological considerations to 
partisan strategy as the prospect of surmounting the filibuster-proof Republican minority, and 
the crisis in Iraq, began to subside. However, the parallel strength of party ID and ADA 
correlations in all Iraq War votes across Congress contributes more evidence of how closely 
associated ideology has become with party affiliation in recent decades - at least on the 
specific issue of the Iraq War.  
Early in the research, separate correlations of party ID codes with roll-call voting 
results, and ADA scores with the same voting results, produced chi-square and phi-
coefficient statistics that indicated party ID and ADA scores were both strongly - and almost 
equivalently - correlated with Iraq War voting outcomes in both chambers. Although the 
143 
 
strength of the correlations varied slightly across the voting sample (indicating variance in 
the intensity of political conflict over the legislation), and while correlations for ideology 
tended to slightly exceed those for party, the difference between the correlations was not 
statistically significant, and did not definitively answer which variable predominated in 
voting decisions. The initial results, based exclusively on the chi-square tests and phi-
coefficient measures of effect, seemed to suggest that the partisan and ideological 
polarization of the American political system over the past four decades had become so 
extreme, that party and ideology had essentially merged in having almost exactly the same 
influence in voting decisions. 
A test of significance for the difference between two nonindependent correlations was 
applied to evaluate the difference between the Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients for party ID and ADA scores. These tests fully illuminated the respective weight 
of party affiliation and ideology in the votes on the Iraq War. In the House of 
Representatives, the ADA correlations very clearly exceeded those of party ID in every vote 
by a large margin, and well within a range considered statistically significant at the p < 0.05 
level.  
In the Senate, most votes taken through the middle months of 2007, and prior to the 
September 15th report on the progress of the troop surge by General David Petraeus and 
Ambassador Ryan Crocker, indicated that ADA scores were more influential than party ID. 
Voting during the rest of the year in the Senate showed diverse results, with party ID actually 
surpassing the influence of ideology in votes taken on issues that tended not to bear directly 
on the immediate involvement of U.S. troops in Iraq (such as policy towards Iran). In many 
of the votes, no statistically-significant difference between party and ideology could be 
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highlighted by the significance test. However, ideology was the stronger influence in Senate 
voting in nine out of twenty-two of the votes taken across all categories of legislation. 
The results are also suggestive of the institutional difference between the House and 
Senate. The mixed influence of party and ideology across Senate voting implies that the 
greater decision-making autonomy of Senators from near-term electoral accountability left 
greater room for broader political calculations of party fortunes, as Democratic leaders 
switched to more partisan tactics to continue opposition to the war after it became clear that 
the surge was beginning to succeed, and that the absence of a filibuster-proof majority would 
allow Republicans to block anti-war policy indefinitely. Republicans from historically-
centrist or liberal-leaning states (i.e. Maine, Minnesota, Oregon) facing imminent elections 
did bow to the greater extent of public dissatisfaction with war policy among their 
constituents and crossed the aisle accordingly. Regardless of which side of the issue the 
reader takes, it can be argued that the Senate functioned in the anti-majoritarian role that the 
Founders intended to check public passion.  
What role did party identity, or party organization, play in the Iraq War issue? Party 
identity correlated very strongly with all roll-call voting outcomes, despite being eclipsed by 
the influence of ideological coding in most votes. In very few of the votes in both the House 
and Senate did more than 6-8 lawmakers from either party defect. The research results lend 
support to assertions that the party organizations are now closely associated with particular 
sets of foreign policy attitudes (e.g. Deibel, 2007:101-106). The results also support other 
observations that the issue of military intervention remains a deeply polarizing cleavage in 
American foreign policy attitudes - despite the nearly continuous and widespread global 
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engagement of U.S. power around the world since 9/11. The division over military 
intervention between the parties could not be clearer in Iraq War voting. 
However, it is difficult to infer from the present results that all issues of military 
intervention would promote such a struggle. The particular salience of the Iraq War itself was 
likely an important factor in the voting results. It could be argued that the Iraq War became 
vested as a symbol of a particular set of attitudes (neoconservative unilateralism) that directly 
challenged premises central to those opposed to intervention in Wittkopf’s continuum. 
Indeed, the war was the ultimate form of intervention – to overthrow a sovereign government 
(regardless of the nature of the regime). The initial level of opposition may have been muted 
by the military success of the drive to Baghdad and the rapid capitulation of Saddam’s 
regime. But controversy intensified as an already divisive policy approach began to face 
severe challenges when the Iraqi insurgency and sectarian violence overlapped during 2006. 
As the November elections approached, the severity of the war seemed beyond the capacities 
of U.S. military or political power to ameliorate (“beyond strategy”). The specter of complete 
mission failure raised anxieties, and created an atmosphere of urgency that likely pushed the 
ideological (and partisan) correlations to greater strength. 
What does the research tell us about Congressional foreign policy-making in general? 
The literature on legislative foreign policy decision-making has long documented the 
electoral disincentives for lawmakers to involve themselves in foreign policy issues, due 
mainly to a lack of public interest and attentiveness. The 2006 elections were one of those 
very rare events in American election history that turned on an international issue – albeit a 
crisis of war (as opposed to a more routine issue of world politics) - which galvanized public 
interest. Given the unusually high level of electoral interest, the precedence of ideology in the 
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closely-fought votes over Iraq War legislation should not be surprising. Ideas, beliefs and 
opinions are probably prior to party loyalty in most foreign policy issues anyway, given the 
public’s interest level. Party loyalty is built on common or converging policy viewpoints, and 
those of similar mind find common cause in party membership. Political parties are, almost 
by definition, a form of collective action on the basis of shared interests - interests based 
largely on shared ideas or values. In light of the precedence of ideology in Iraq War voting, 
American foreign policy-making appears to remain in the domain of ideas (or 
beliefs/values/opinion), rather than party competition. 
Secondly, while the role of ideology in Iraq War voting would seem to bode-ill for 
bipartisanship in future Congressional foreign policy-making, portending the same level of 
difficulty in reaching compromises that attend the most divisive issues of domestic policy, 
other traditional influences on American foreign policy behavior, such as those described by 
James Lindsay (2004, 2007), should not be forgotten. Perceptions of international threat, or 
the degree to which Congress and the public look to Executive leadership under certain 
circumstances, or trust in the judgment of a particular President, could still serve as a basis 
for strong bipartisan support in some future question of intervention.  
Lastly, anti-interventionism on the Left does not necessarily mean pacificism 
(Walzer, 2004).162 A lively debate is currently underway on the left concerning the 
conditions justifying intervention in light of the Rwandan genocide, the Balkan wars, Darfur, 
and the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Right is similarly fractured 
between neo-conservatism, traditional realism, and non-internationalist nationalism over the 
                                                            
162 Walzer, Michael. 2004. Arguing About War. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
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lessons of Iraq. The prognosis for bipartisanship in Congress would still seem to depend 
greatly on the terms of the intervention issue.  
A deeper examination of the Iraq War voting record might take the approach of 
coding each member of Congress according to Eugene Wittkopf’s (1991) typology of 
attitudes toward international involvement versus military intervention. The results might 
indicate, for example, what portion of those voting against the war were internationalists not 
so much opposed to military intervention in principle as they were interested in extricating 
U.S. forces from the dire exigencies of Iraq. Intercorrelations among party ID, ADA scoring, 
and coding for internationalism might shed more light on how attitudes toward international 
involvement are presently distributed in Congress. With those results, a finer-grain 
assessment of the role of ideology in foreign policy decision-making might be achievable. 
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Appendix A – Senate Cross-Over Votes 
Democrat Senators Voting Across Party Lines    Republican Senators Voting Across Party Lines      
Cross‐
Over 
Frequen
cy 
Name  State 
ADA LQ 
Score 
 
Cross‐Over 
Frequency 
Name  State 
ADA LQ 
Score 
   
11  Lieberman  CT.  70    11  Hagel  NE  30     
5  Dodd  CT.  70    9 
Smith‐
Gordon  OR  55     
5  Feingold  WI  95    7  Collins  ME  55     
5  Reid  NV  85    7  Snowe  ME  60     
4  Kennedy  MA  85    4  Coleman  MN  50     
4  Whitehouse  RI  95    3  Sununu  NH  15     
3  Akaka  HI  95    2  Coburn  OK  5     
3  Boxer  CA  80    2  Corker  TN  20     
3  Byrd  WV  80    2  Enzi  WY  10     
3  Clinton  NY  75    2  Hatch  UT  30     
3  Harkin  IA  95    2  Spector  PA  60     
3  Kerry  MA  90    2  Voinovich  OH  25     
3  Leahy  VT  95    2  Warner  VA  35     
3  Mendendez  NJ  95    1  Allard  CO  10     
3  Murray  WV  90    1  Bond  MO  25     
3  Rockefeller  WV  85    1  Bunning  KY  10     
3  Wyden  OR  95    1  Burr  NC  0     
2  Biden  DE  75    1  DeMint  SC  0     
2  Brown  OH  95    1  Inhofe  OK  10     
2  Durbin  IL  95    1  Sessions  AL  10     
2  Inouye  HI  90    1  Thomas  WY  n/a     
2  Lautenberg  NJ  90      21 Republicans       
2  Nelson, Ben  NE  75               
2  Obama  IL  75    Average ADA score of those defecting two or more times: 34.62 
2  Reed  RI  95    Average ADA score of those defecting at least once: 25.75 
2  Schumer  NY  90               
2  Stabenow  MI  100               
1  Bayh  IN  95               
1  Cardin  MD  95               
1  Feinstein  CA  90               
1  Johnson  SD  40               
1  Klobuchar  MN  100               
1  Kohl  WI  95               
1  Landrieu  LA  80               
1  Nelson, Bill  FL  90               
1  Pryor  AR  70               
  36 Democrats                 
                     
Average ADA score of those defecting two or more times: 87.222           
Average ADA score of those defecting at least once: 86.388             
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Appendix B – House Republican Cross-Over Votes 
House Republicans Voting Across  Party Lines   
Cross‐
Over 
Frequency 
Name  Dist.  State 
ADA LQ 
Score 
 
18  Jones  3  NORTH C  50   
12  Gilchrest  1  MARYLAN  60   
12  Paul  14  TEXAS  15   
8  Duncan  2  TENNESS  20   
3  Castle  1  DELAWAR  50   
3  English  3  PENNSYL  40   
3  Ramstad  3  MINNESO  45   
3  Shays  4  CONNECT  55   
3  Walsh  25  NEW YOR  40   
2  Bartlett  6  MARYLAN  15   
2  Ehlers  3  MICHIGA  20   
2  Emerson  8  MISSOUR  50   
2  Upton  6  MICHIGA  40   
1  Bachus  6  ALABAMA  10   
1  Baker  6  LOUISIA  0   
1  Barrett  3  SOUTH C  0   
1  Barton  6  TEXAS  10   
1  Biggert  13  ILLINOI  30   
1  Blackburn  7  TENNESS  5   
1  Brady  8  TEXAS  5   
1  Burgess  26  TEXAS  10   
1  Campbell  48  CALIFOR  10   
1  Cannon  3  UTAH  10   
1  Coble  6  NORTH C  10   
1  Davis, T  11  VIRGINI  30   
1  Flake  6  ARIZONA  5   
1  Franks  2  ARIZONA  0   
1  Garrett  5  NEW JER  0   
1  Gingrey  11  GEORGIA  0   
1  Hastert  14  ILLINOI  15   
1  Herger  2  CALIFOR  5   
1  Hulshof  9  MISSOUR  20   
1  Inglis  4  SOUTH C  5   
1  Johnson  15  ILLINOI  35   
1  Jordan  4  OHIO  0   
1  Keller  8  FLORIDA  20   
1  King  5  IOWA  0   
1  Kirk  10  ILLINOI  40   
1  LaTourette  14  OHIO  55   
1  Linder  7  GEORGIA  0   
1  Miller  1  FLORIDA  10   
1  Pearce  2  NEW MEX  5   
1  Petri  6  WISCONS  30   
1  Sali  1  IDAHO  0   
1  Shadegg  3  ARIZONA  0   
1  Thornberry  13  TEXAS  5   
1  Turner  3  OHIO  25   
  47 Republicans       
           
Average ADA score of those defecting two or more times: 38.46 
Average ADA score of those defecting at least once: 19.26   
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Appendix C – House Democratic Cross-Over Votes 
 
House Democrats Voting Across Party Lines   
Cross‐
Over 
Frequency 
Name  Dist  State 
ADA LQ 
Score 
 
18  Marshall  8  GEORGIA  60   
15  Barrow  12  GEORGIA  70   
12  Taylor  4  MISSISSIPPI  65   
11  Carney  10  PENNSYL  85   
11  Pelosi  8  CALIFOR      
9  Matheson  2  UTAH  75   
8  Boren  2  OKLAHOM  50   
7  Baird  3  WASHING  95   
6  Kucinich  10  OHIO  70   
6  Melancon  3  LOUISIA  85   
5  Davis, L.  4  TENNESS  75   
4  Cramer  5  ALABAMA  80   
4  Lampson  22  TEXAS  60   
4  Mahoney  16  FLORIDA  80   
4  McNulty  21  NEW YOR  90   
4  Mitchell  5  ARIZONA  80   
4  Tanner  8  TENNESS  80   
3  Altmire  4  PENNSYL  95   
3  Cooper  5  TENNESS  85   
3  Cuellar  28  TEXAS  90   
3  Donnelly  2  INDIANA  85   
3  Ellsworth  8  INDIANA  75   
3  Holden  17  PENNSYL  80   
3  Michaud  2  MAINE  85   
3  Sestak  7  PENNSYL  95   
3  Shuler  11  NORTH C  80   
3  Snyder  2  ARKANSA  85   
3  Space  18  OHIO  95   
2  Bean  8  ILLINOI  80   
2  Berkley  1  NEVADA  85   
2  Bishop  2  GEORGIA  90   
2  Boucher  9  VIRGINI  95   
2  Boyd  2  FLORIDA  80   
2  Cardoza  18  CALIFOR  90   
2  Chandler  6  KENTUCK  95   
2  Costa  20  CALIFOR  90   
2  Herseth  1  SOUTH D  90   
2  Lee  9  CALIFOR  90   
2  Lewis  5  GEORGIA  85   
2  McIntyre  7  NORTH C  85   
2  Salazar  3  COLORAD  90   
2  Schwartz  13  PENNSYL  90   
2  Scott  13  GEORGIA  90   
2  Stark  13  CALIFOR  80   
2  Waters  35  CALIFOR  85   
2  Woolsey  6  CALIFOR  80   
1  Ackerman  5  NEW YOR  90   
1  Allen  1  MAINE  100   
1  Berman  28  CALIFOR  85   
1  Boswell  3  IOWA  90   
1  Boyda  2  KANSAS  80   
1  Edwards  17  TEXAS  85   
1  Etheridge  2  NORTH C  90   
1  Giffords  8  ARIZONA  80   
1  Gordon  6  TENNESS  85   
1  Green, G.  29  TEXAS  95   
1  Hill  9  INDIANA  85   
1  Hoyer  5  MARYLAN  90   
1  Kind  3  WISCONS  90   
1  Klein  22  FLORIDA  95   
1  Lipinski  3  ILLINOI  85   
1  Moore  3  KANSAS  90   
1  Murtha  12  PENNSYL  95   
1  Ortiz  27  TEXAS  80   
1  Peterson  7  MINNESO  85   
1  Pomeroy  1  NORTH D  85   
1  Rodriquez  23  TEXAS  95   
1  Ross  4  ARKANSA  85   
1  Rothman  9  NEW JER  95   
1  Ruppersberger  2  MARYLAN  90   
1  Sherman  27  CALIFOR  100   
1  Skelton  4  MISSOUR  85   
1  Spratt  5  SOUTH C  95   
1  Udall  2  COLORAD  90   
1  Watson  33  CALIFOR  95   
1  Wilson  6  OHIO  85   
  76 Democrats       
           
Average ADA score of the 45 members defecting two or more times: 82.66 
Average ADA score of the total 75 members defecting at least once: 77.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
